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Notes from the Editor 
 
Academic homeland security programs have proliferated in the past eight years, 
with more than 270 colleges and universities in the United States offering 
certificates and degrees in homeland security and related areas. How have (and 
are) these programs developing? What goes into creating a viable homeland 
security degree, whether at the associate, undergraduate, or graduate level? What 
might the future hold in store? Should academic homeland security develop an 
accreditation process? Should we, as homeland security professionals, adhere to 
a professional oath? These are the questions addressed by the authors 
contributing to this issue’s special section on homeland security education. 
 
At the instigation of Jim Ramsay, from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 
Homeland Security Affairs asked educators from across the country to tell us 
how their institutions have tackled the difficult task of creating a thoughtful and 
responsive homeland security degree program. Gregory Moore, Kelley Cronin, 
Mary Breckenridge, and John Hatzadony discuss the challenges and advantages 
of  “Homeland Security-Related Education and the Private Liberal Arts College,” 
relating the curriculum-development process at Notre Dame College. With 
certificate and undergraduate degree programs established and a graduate degree 
program awaiting approval, these authors argue that smaller institutions are able 
to adapt more quickly to changes in the marketplace, creating effective 
partnerships between faculty, administration, and practitioners. 
 
Acknowledging the need to meet workplace demands with educated homeland 
security professionals, Jim Ramsay, Robert Raffel, and Daniel Cutrer ask if the 
lack of an accreditation system and established educational outcomes complicate 
or even weaken the program development process. Their article, “Development of 
an Outcomes-Based Undergraduate Curriculum in Homeland Security,” reviews 
existing homeland security programs and presents the results of a Delphi study 
using practicing professionals in a variety of homeland security areas as subject 
matter experts. Based on that study, the authors are able to elucidate a set of core 
academic areas and student learning outcomes that could characterize the 
intellectual underpinnings of the discipline and a set of outcomes upon which an 
undergraduate degree program could be based. 
 
At the graduate level, Kansas State University and the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College are collaborating to create a Homeland Security Graduate 
Degree Program. This collaborative process is described by Cheryl Polson, John 
Persyn, and O. Shawn Cupp in “Partnership in Progress: A Model for 
Development of a Homeland Security Graduate Degree Program.” The authors 
first provide the historical context, briefly tracing the evolution of homeland 
security graduate education since 2001. They then review the existing literature 
on the fundamental components of such programs as identified by experts and 
scholars. Finally, the collaborative process being used by their institutions is 
outlined, offering a useful model for other homeland security graduate degree 
programs. 
Looking beyond the specifics of curriculum, degrees, and specialization, Philip 
Palin suggests that homeland security needs to develop the characteristics of a 
true profession. In “Homeland Security: An Aristotelian Approach to Professional 
Development,” Palin argues that these characteristics can be cultivated through 
the Aristotelian process of understanding change, principled reasoning on the 
influence of our actions, and disciplined reflection on the outcomes of that action. 
Other professions – specifically medicine and law – have established oaths to 
which their practitioners adhere. Should homeland security have the same? 
 
It seems fitting that, in an issue devoted to homeland security education, we offer 
two articles from graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security. Each of these articles draws on research 
conducted for the master’s thesis. 
 
“No Dark Corners: A Different Answer to Insider Threats” presents the findings 
of Nick Catrantzos’ research using a Delphi method to uncover flaws in 
traditional defenses against hostile insiders. These findings suggest that 
infiltrators pose a greater threat to critical infrastructure than disgruntled 
insiders. Catrantzos proposes a system by which the narrow laser beam of 
workplace monitoring only by corporate sentinels be replaced with a broad 
flashlight beam wielded by employees engaged on the front lines, at the team 
level. The No Dark Corners method addresses gaps in traditional insider 
defenses, leaving hostile infiltrators with fewer places to hide. 
 
In “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea,” former 
Deputy Fire Chief Bryan Heirston looks at the pros and cons of using firefighters 
in intelligence gathering. Through the analysis of four domestic and international 
information-sharing systems, Heirston confirms that U.S. fire personnel should 
participate in terrorism-related information sharing at defined levels. To do this 
effectively, firefighters need to be provided with information on threat levels, 
target hazards, and methods of attack. 
 
Finally, in a Letter to the Editor entitled “Twelve Questions Answered,” Samuel 
H. Clovis, Jr. responds to Christopher Bellavita’s “Changing Homeland Security: 
Twelve Questions from 2009,” published in the January 2010 issue of Homeland 
Security Affairs. 
 
As always, we offer these essays and articles in the hopes of stimulating debate 
about the evolving field of homeland defense and security. Please address your 
questions and comments to editor@hsaj.org.  
 
The Editor 
Homeland Security-Related Education and the Private Liberal 
Arts College 
Gregory Moore, John G. Hatzadony, Kelley Cronin, Mary B. Breckenridge 
The growth of academic programs in intelligence studies and homeland security 
education since 9/11 reflects the growing concern about the nation’s security and the 
ability both to anticipate threats and respond to them. Today dozens of academic 
programs have emerged around the country offering a variety of curriculum approaches 
and levels of study. Students seeking to pursue careers in homeland security, emergency 
management, or intelligence analysis can choose from offerings in homeland security 
related fields at large research institutions, mid-size colleges and universities, smaller 
private liberal arts colleges, and distance learning institutions where they may earn 
certificates, associates, bachelors, or masters degrees, and even doctorates. At present 
there is no general consensus on how a homeland security or intelligence studies 
curriculum should be offered, although recommendations have been made by the 
Homeland Security Defense Education Consortium regarding the curricula for 
undergraduate and graduate level programs.1 Nor has any accrediting body for such 
programs come into existence as of this writing.2  
These issues have been addressed at a variety of conferences, seminars, and colloquia 
but it is likely that some time will pass before any real agreement is reached on what 
would comprise an ideal academic program in intelligence studies or homeland security. 
Currently, those programs in existence tend to reflect the resources, capabilities, 
support mechanisms, and faculty interests within those institutions that offer them. Not 
all colleges or universities offer majors or minors in these new disciplines, nor do all of 
them have graduate programs. Many schools have opted for certificate programs at 
either the undergraduate or graduate level which are directed at adult learners seeking 
to build on existing knowledge or skill sets or at those individuals considering a career 
change. Certificate programs enable these schools to become involved in homeland 
security education with a minimum allocation of resources and without subjecting 
themselves to the more complex and time consuming process of developing a 
baccalaureate or graduate program. Many homeland security programs are focused on 
educating first responders and few offer an advanced degree to support homeland 
security efforts on a public policy and administrative level. There is a real need for well-
educated and well-prepared individuals with policymaking and administrative abilities 
in both the public and private sectors today. It is our belief that a small liberal arts 
college provides an ideal environment to educate security and intelligence professionals. 
LIBERAL ARTS-BASED HOMELAND SECURITY EDUCATION: 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Teaching homeland security programs in a small liberal arts college has a number of 
advantages. Rather than focusing on and specializing in one area, a liberal arts program 
provides the student with a broad-based education. The student studies a variety of 
different subjects to gain a holistic understanding of the world around him or her. In 
today’s global environment, this knowledge and understanding is crucial. Such a 
rounded skill set is required for security analysts, administrators, and policy decision 
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makers. Critical thinking, research, and communication become imperative. Those with 
a general knowledge base in many different areas are better problem solvers and 
communicators. A liberal arts education teaches the student how to think, learn, and 
problem solve. Ultimately, the liberal arts-educated student knows how to train his or 
her mind to think critically and in an ordered fashion.  He or she is better equipped to 
take general knowledge and develop an intellectual capacity with it. He or she is also 
better prepared to deal with a diverse group of people, scenarios and problems.  
A critical advantage for a small college is the ability to respond to market demands in 
a timely manner by developing new programs. Any new initiative must be mission 
sensitive.  Part of the strategic plan at Notre Dame College is to attract new students by 
developing new programs.  From the enrollment perspective, this is a necessary survival 
tactic – the more academic options a college has to offer, the more students it can expect 
to attract. While the goal is enrollment driven, the responsibility for achieving the goal 
falls to the Office of Academic Affairs since it is the faculty who has the authority to 
develop curriculum. Because the bureaucratic structure at an institution such as Notre 
Dame College is not considerable, it can be easier to facilitate an effective partnership 
between faculty and administration to develop new programs that are both mission 
sensitive and responsive to a changing marketplace. 
Despite the advantages, for a small private liberal arts college developing a program 
in intelligence studies or homeland security education can be quite a challenge. 
Normally institutions such as these have limited resources to direct to such a project, 
and must utilize what assets are available as expeditiously as possible. Not only must 
faculty and administration buy into the program, but the institution must consider the 
types of students it wishes to recruit, whether or not there are competing programs in 
the region, the opportunities for employment for graduates locally or regionally, as well 
as at the federal level, and if there are agencies and expert practitioners available who 
can serve as advisers, partners, or faculty. Consideration has to be given to what can be 
taught most effectively and who will teach the subjects within the new curriculum. The 
program’s curriculum design will have to reflect all of these considerations as well. 
Finally, the proposed new program or curriculum must pass successfully through both 
the institutional and state processes for approval.  
There are certain advantages, however, to building an intelligence studies or 
homeland security education program at a small, private liberal college such as Notre 
Dame College. These include a strong faculty commitment to teaching, low student-to-
faculty ratios, greater ease for student interactions with faculty, and the enhanced level 
of personal attention students often enjoy. Smaller colleges may have more flexibility in 
designing new majors or curricula, because there may be fewer layers of faculty and 
administrative approval processes to work through. It may also be easier to develop 
partnerships within the college’s academic divisions or departments in regard to the 
coursework offered within the intelligence or homeland security curriculum or in tying 
existing courses into the curriculum as supporting electives or general education 
requirements. Including courses from other academic departments in the intelligence or 
homeland security curriculum can make it easier to win faculty support as a whole, since 
those faculty may come to feel that they have a stake in the program. This is the 
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approach that was taken as a program in intelligence studies was developed at Notre 
Dame College. 
INTELLIGENCE STUDIES AT NOTRE DAME 
Initial research into the existence of intelligence studies programs in 2003-2004, when 
the process of developing an intelligence studies program began, led to the discovery 
that there were very few colleges or universities offering any type of program of this kind 
and that existing curriculum designs varied widely. Some institutions simply placed two 
or three courses relating to intelligence within a larger program, such as international 
studies, while others offered a more comprehensive curriculum emphasizing both 
theoretical and applied knowledge. Given Notre Dame College’s focus on career-
oriented liberal arts programs, the latter approach seemed like the best way to design 
the proposed program. The College’s location in Cleveland, Ohio afforded the 
opportunity to consult with practitioners working with the federal government, in law 
enforcement, and from the private sector. These individuals unanimously supported a 
curriculum design that included both applied and theoretical coursework.  
Curriculum Design 
The process of building the intelligence studies program went through three phases. In 
the fall of 2004 the College launched a six-course certificate in intelligence analysis. The 
courses offered were: Introduction to Intelligence Analysis, Methods of Research and 
Analysis, Writing for Intelligence, Terrorism, Competitive Intelligence in a Global 
Economy, and an independent study. The certificate program was directed toward adult 
learners who were already working in intelligence or a related profession and who were 
seeking to enhance their knowledge and skills, or who were considering a career change 
into an intelligence-related field. The program was administered through the College’s 
Center for Professional Development with courses offered on weekends. The program 
instructors were adjunct faculty who were current or retired practitioners with teaching 
experience, an academic background, or both.  
Meanwhile, the Department of History and Political Science, which was where the 
new undergraduate program in intelligence studies would be housed, had undertaken 
the task of designing that curriculum. As noted above, the decision was to design a 
curriculum in intelligence studies that would include courses that would teach students 
basic skill sets needed to compete successfully for an entry-level position as an 
intelligence analyst as well as expose them to intelligence theory, practice, and history. A 
set of core courses would be offered, supplemented by the College’s general education 
core and required electives. Finally, students would be required to complete twelve 
credits of foreign language study in either Arabic or Spanish, the only languages 
currently being taught at Notre Dame College. The final curriculum includes: 
• Introduction to U.S. Intelligence 
• Writing for Intelligence 
• Methods of Research & Analysis 
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• History of Terrorism 
• Advanced Research & Analysis 
• Competitive (Business) Intelligence 
• Methods of Financial Investigation & Research 
• Intelligence and National Security 
• Strategic Intelligence 
Each course listed above counts for three credits. In addition, students complete the 
College’s general education core, including courses in critical thinking, computer skills, 
mathematics, laboratory science, social science, literature, and writing. Elective 
coursework in American Foreign Policy, International Relations, International Law, 
Comparative Politics, non-western history,3 Anthropology, Economics, Literature, 
Business, and a foreign language supplement the required coursework. The student also 
completes an internship and a senior research project. The curriculum takes note of the 
private sector’s interest in intelligence analysis by offering two courses related to 
competitive (business) intelligence in the core. 
As with the certificate design, various practitioners were consulted, both locally and 
nationally. When asked what skills a prospective intelligence analyst should possess, the 
universal response emphasized good critical thinking/reasoning/analytical abilities, 
strong communications skills (both oral and written), and good computer skills. 
Repeatedly, practitioners argued for a solid liberal arts education as the foundation for 
preparing future analysts. This input greatly affected the ultimate design of the 
intelligence studies curriculum. In addition, those consulted either expressed a 
willingness to teach in the program, helped recruit instructors, or agreed to serve as 
members of an advisory board. 
Program Implementation 
The curriculum design was completed by the end of the 2003-2004 academic year and 
preparations for seeking faculty approval for the new program began. The process 
required departmental approval (a given since the department chair was directing the 
development of the program), followed by approval of the faculty Educational Policy and 
Practices Committee, the Steering Committee of the Faculty Senate, and, finally, the 
Faculty Senate.  
Prior to beginning the process of moving the proposed program forward, a number of 
senior faculty members were consulted for advice and suggestions regarding the best 
method of doing so. A valuable suggestion was to prepare a binder containing a 
description of the proposed program, the rationale for adding it to the curriculum, 
course descriptions, and sample course syllabi. This proved invaluable in gaining faculty 
approval. Presentations about the program were made to the Educational Policy and 
Practices Committee, which unanimously recommended approval, and to the Faculty 
Senate, where approval by a two-thirds majority was necessary to add the curriculum to 
the College’s list of program offerings.  
The faculty responded enthusiastically (particularly to the argument that the 
intelligence studies program represented a nearly ideal liberal arts program) and the 
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curriculum easily won approval. Faculty objections were few, although some expressed 
concern about the creation of a “spy school.” This objection was overcome by 
emphasizing that the program was designed to prepare students for entry level positions 
as intelligence analysts, rather than as espionage agents. A reiteration of the skills sets 
needed by analysts and the value of a liberal arts foundation in their preparation for 
careers as analysts served to overcome those concerns, as did noting that analysts are 
also needed in law enforcement and the private sector. Administration endorsement was 
likewise easily obtained, as the president of the college was a strong supporter of the 
proposed program. The approval process was completed by the end of the fall 2004 
semester.  
Finally, in order to give the College’s admissions office the maximum amount of time 
to recruit students for the program, the decision was made to make the intelligence 
studies program a concentration within the history major. This enabled the College to 
circumvent seeking accreditation of the program as a new major by the Ohio Board of 
Regents, a process that would have delayed launching the program until the 2006-2007 
academic year.  
In 2006, as a result of interest expressed by members of the private sector in 
Northeast Ohio, a second certificate program in competitive intelligence was created. 
Like the original certificate, the curriculum consisted of six courses and was 
administered through the Center for Professional Development. Courses offered for this 
certificate included: Introduction to Intelligence Analysis, Competitive Intelligence in a 
Global Economy, Research and Decision Making for Competitive Intelligence, Analysis 
Techniques for Competitive Intelligence, and an independent study. These courses were 
also offered on weekends.4  
A HOMELAND SECURITY GRADUATE DEGREE: THE NEXT STEP 
By 2008, the Department of History and Political Science had begun to consider adding 
a graduate program related to homeland security to the College’s curriculum. The 
College had only one graduate program in place, in education, and adding a master’s 
degree on top of the undergraduate program in intelligence studies seemed like a logical 
step. Because the College had begun offering distance learning courses, using that 
platform as the basis for creating and marketing a graduate degree in homeland security 
would allow for a broader reach in seeking prospective students. The decision to develop 
a graduate curriculum in homeland security also took into account the fact that this field 
represented a better opportunity for the College. While there was only one homeland 
security-related graduate program in the state, two established graduate programs in 
intelligence studies existed relatively close by.5 Competing with them made less sense 
than moving in a different, and hopefully more innovative, direction. Therefore, it 
seemed reasonable to direct our efforts toward a program of graduate study in 
homeland security. After some discussion within the History and Political Science 
Department, it was decided to develop a program in Security and Policy Studies. The 
idea was presented to the College’s vice president of academic affairs, who was very 
receptive to the proposal.  








As with intelligence studies, homeland security education presented the challenge of 
being an emerging academic discipline. Unlike intelligence, which is a single area of 
inquiry and study, homeland security is a much wider field that is inclusive of a number 
of subsets that can be developed as individual areas of knowledge. The challenge 
confronting a smaller institution such as Notre Dame College was to determine how to 
effectively create a graduate degree program in homeland security that would take 
advantage of the institution’s strengths while utilizing its limited resources for 
maximum effect.  
Since the inception of the Department of Homeland Security, government and 
academia have been striving for a precise definition of “homeland security.”  However, 
for educators at least, the real problem lay in the broad framework and architecture of 
homeland security almost a decade later, which includes emergency preparedness, 
intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, border security, transportation security, 
biodefense, radiological detection, and security research and development. These 
concentration areas, in connection with a core introduction and research methods 
course, fill out the basics of a traditional thirty-six-credit MA/MS degree. 
Curricula in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were sector or thematic specific and 
generally dominated by the field in which the sponsoring educational institution had a 
previous specialty (which is still often the case today); i.e., law enforcement, security, or 
emergency management. Such programs concentrate and reinforce tactical mindsets 
when, in reality, the graduate education should be strategic in nature – by far a much 
more difficult and under-appreciated endeavor.   
As noted above, due to the particularly broad nature of homeland security policy and 
management, the desire to offer concentrations in one or more of these areas initially 
resulted in a ponderous and administratively complex graduate degree program that 
would have taxed many universities let alone a small, liberal arts institution like Notre 
Dame College. While these areas were included in the original curriculum design, 
further reflection led to the realization that a more integrated approach might result in a 
better outcome. The result is an integrated, policy-focused curriculum that is 
strategically oriented and plays to the strengths of a small liberal arts institution. This 
fusion of the multiple elements that fall under the aegis of homeland security into one 
program focusing on security and policy administration (rather than a single track or 
multiple tracks dealing with the variety of elements with which homeland security is 
concerned) offers a new and innovative approach to homeland security education at the 
graduate level. 
Accordingly, the synthesis of a multi-disciplinary graduate curriculum for Homeland 
Security Studies falls neatly into the realm of the modern liberal arts college. The 
availability to state, local, and federal professionals of emergency management and 
security training eliminates the need to repeat this training at the graduate level. Rather, 
what is needed is an integrative educational structure that brings specialists, line 
officers, and tacticians into an intensive space that exposes them to non-specialty fields, 
theory, and the educational transition to staff officer positions and an integrated 
strategic perspective. Intellectual and professional advancement in the field does not 
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allow the luxury of tunnel-vision mindsets forcing a student to specialize in either 
security or emergency management. A review of programs of study offered at other 
institutions found that most programs were expansions of departmental core 
competencies: law enforcement, emergency management, fire science, and so forth.  
These programs were designated as Homeland Security Studies with the addition of a 
core course, a research methods course and a thesis, and then marketed as something 
new.  This is not to say that the programs were being disreputable – far from it; but by 
reinforcing their own core competencies as opposed to expanding into new fields 
demanded by the new paradigm of homeland security, students were not being exposed 
to what they didn’t know.  The Notre Dame College program aimed to resolve the issue 
with a multi-disciplinary graduate program.                  
Ultimately, this has been the approach pursued at Notre Dame College. The 
curriculum that has been initiated blends on-site and on-line best pedagogical practices 
from other fields (particularly MBA/EMBA and Intelligence Analysis programs).   
The limitations of a master’s degree curriculum corresponding to a thirty-six-credit-
hour program similarly simplified the program. Rather than have a traditional core 
requirement and concentration system, the curriculum was revamped into a general, 
integrative and strategic education program in which all courses are required.6 This 
organizational structure also allows students to enter at multiple points since all courses 
are required (although there are prerequisite courses generally required).   
To accomplish the desired learning outcomes,7 three on-site weekend intensive 
courses are included at the beginning, intermediate, and end-stages of the program to 
allow for cohort integration and team-building. The remaining course work is organized 
into on-line courses, eight weeks in length, resulting in a two-year program of study. The 
final curriculum design is given below: 
• Leadership, Ethics and Decision-making (two credits) 
• Security Policy and Program Analysis (three credits) 
• Issues in Homeland Security (three credits) 
• Terrorism & Counterterrorism (three credits) 
• Critical Infrastructure: Threat Analysis & Resiliency (three credits) 
• Strategic Intelligence & Warning (three credits) 
• Analytical Crisis Exercise Program (two credits) 
• Geopolitics (three credits) 
• Transnational Threats (three credits)  
• Biodefense and Disease Surveillance (three credits) 
• Science, Technology and Security (three credits) 
• Capstone I (three credits) 
• Capstone II (two credits) 
The final thirty-six-credit curriculum represents in a unique, cutting-edge program 
integrating all eight major field areas of Homeland Security as well as six hours of 
geopolitical and transnational threat analysis, two areas generally disregarded in 
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Homeland Security programs. The latter are included due to faculty members’ field 
experience in law enforcement and homeland security and intelligence that 
demonstrated the effect of international events on U.S. Homeland Security policy and 
programs and highlighted the general lack of international experience and knowledge 
on the part of state and local safety and security professionals.   
A mid-program Analytical Crisis Exercise is included as an on-site integrative 
experience to assess students’ strategic analysis, decision-making and forecasting skills.   
Finally, a two-part capstone experience of five credits is included. Rather than a 
traditional six-credit MA/MS thesis project, a team-oriented real-world experience has 
been included.  State, regional, and local administrations, along with private enterprises, 
are invited to participate and offer research projects for completion by one of the 
program teams. Participating enterprises are required to provide access to the necessary 
internal data and a single point-of-contact for each team. In return, the enterprise 
receives an expertly researched and analyzed strategic product at no cost.  Students in 
turn receive the necessary research and analysis training on a real-world project that 
includes a final, live briefing, on campus, to the client enterprise and graduate faculty.  It 
was ultimately concluded that a traditional MA/MS thesis project provided little real-
world relevance to students, researchers, and practitioners and that a multi-disciplinary 
team approach (again borrowed from other bench-mark programs) provided the best 
assessment tool. 
Finally, the decision to introduce a complete systematic course of study allowed the 
integration of educational elements across a number of course programs as opposed to a 
single three credit course. Thus the final program not only integrates subject matter but 
a course of study within the courses themselves. For example, case studies of disaster 
recovery and resiliency can be included in the thematic course as well as biodefense or 
terrorism. Overall, the Security Policy Studies graduate program at Notre Dame College 
aims to progress the developing field of Homeland Security Studies and Policy with a 
unique program of study. 
The Implementation Process 
As noted earlier, the implementation of an undergraduate intelligence studies 
curriculum at Notre Dame College did require administration approval, but because the 
program was established as a concentration within an existing major (history) there was 
no need to seek state approval for the program. That, however, was not the case in 
regard to our proposed graduate program. Like the undergraduate program, the 
graduate program went through a series of steps within the College to get the necessary 
support and approval before being submitted to the State of Ohio for review. Similarly to 
the undergraduate program, the graduate curriculum had to get the endorsement of the 
Department of History and Political Science, the Division of Humanities, the faculty 
Graduate Policy and Planning Committee, the Office of Academic Affairs, the Office of 
the President, and final approval by the College’s Board of Trustees.  
The primary difference between shepherding the undergraduate program through the 
internal consent process and obtaining consent for the graduate program was that the 
graduate program did not require a vote of the entire faculty, but only those faculty 
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members involved in graduate instruction. This process went very smoothly and was 
completed before the end of the fall 2009 semester. Thus, a graduate curriculum 
development process that had begun in the spring of 2009 was ready for presentation to 
the Ohio Board of Regents by the end of the year, in the form of a formal proposal for 
approval to offer the new degree program to prospective students.  
It should be noted that the relative ease in receiving internal approval for the project 
may reflect the College’s efforts to grow enrollment by increasing program offerings and 
to enhance its distance learning programs. Also, the proposed new program, if approved 
by the Board of Regents, will be only the second graduate program offered by Notre 
Dame College. Therefore, both faculty and administration were receptive to the proposal 
as it fits in to the College’s strategic planning and mission. Additionally, the graduate 
program will serve as a complement to the College’s undergraduate program in 
intelligence studies, thereby making it a natural addition to the current curriculum. 
Even before the internal approval process had been completed, preparations for 
seeking state approval had gotten underway. A preliminary proposal was forwarded to 
the state board of regents in July 2009; the state responded by returning a new template 
for submitting new academic program proposals and work immediately began on 
gathering the required information and writing it up in the format required by the state. 
This required an intensive faculty effort and the involvement of the College’s Office of 
Academic Affairs. The role of the administration at this point in the development of a 
new academic proposal was critical. 
It is the responsibility of the college administration – or, more specifically, the vice 
president for academic affairs – to assist the faculty in program development efforts.   
Although assisting in the development process can take many forms (such as course 
releases for development and financial incentives), a college must have committed 
faculty members who have the passion and energy to see this bureaucratic process 
through. The faculty typically have great ideas for new curricula and new majors. But 
when it comes to actually developing an entire program and seeking the various 
approvals, excitement can quickly wane.  All programs must follow internal governance 
approval guidelines, seek state approval, and more often than not in today’s highly 
regulatory environment, also seek their regional accreditors’ approval.      
Comprehension of and adherence to the processes and protocols required by various 
state and regional bodies is painstaking, but necessary. In most colleges, the vice 
president for academic affairs has the background and experience in addressing 
regulatory issues. Using a collaborative approach, an administrator should assist with 
the sections of the program proposal that are primarily administrative. Faculty know 
their own discipline; they don’t know the administrative “ins and outs” that are 
important in proposal/program development. It is also the administrator’s role to help 
keep the faculty members involved motivated. This can be achieved when the 
administrator becomes as involved as the faculty, when the administrator offers 
encouragement, and when the administrator recognizes “good work.”     
Another important role for a college administrator is keeping those involved on task 
and on a timeline. The various faculty duties – from course preparations to committee 
obligations to advising - can intrude upon and consume all of one’s time. At Notre Dame 
College, weekly or biweekly meetings of the team served to keep the energy level where 
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it needed to be in the process as the vice president of academic affairs brought the 
resources of the Office of Academic Affairs and the faculty together to provide the 
necessary data required by the Board of Regents. 
Meeting weekly or biweekly as necessary, the process of completing the ten-part 
template required by the state was accomplished over a period of several months. Data 
about the College’s mission, accreditation, resources, assessment procedures, student 
resources, and, of course, the curriculum was collected and prepared for presentation to 
the Board of Regents. The final product was a document more than forty pages in length 
which was forwarded to the board in February 2010. On March 1, 2010 the board 
responded with a number of comments and questions, and indicated that it was 
prepared to move forward with the final step in the approval process: a visit by an 
accrediting team to the campus in May. Should the College complete this process 
successfully, it will be able to begin marketing the program and recruiting students.  
CONCLUSION 
We believe there is a need for career-oriented or focused academic programs in the 
twenty-first century, and we also would argue that a strong grounding in the liberal arts 
will enhance the preparation of today’s students for success in their respective 
endeavors. Programs in homeland security education and intelligence studies are 
excellent examples of these types of career-oriented academic programs of study that 
are currently in demand and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. They also 
offer the smaller liberal arts-focused institutions an excellent way to add innovative 
offerings to their curricula, prepare their students for new career opportunities, and 
contribute to enhancing the nation’s security.  
We are also aware that programs in intelligence and homeland security education or 
studies are new to academia and a great deal of discussion is underway in regard to their 
acceptance as scholarly disciplines within higher education. Numerous issues need to be 
resolved in order for these programs to achieve the status they seek as recognized 
academic disciplines, including general agreement on curricula, the development of a 
body of literature, the education and training of new generations of teachers and 
scholars, the question of accreditation, and how scholars and practitioners can best 
work together to bring this all about. From the inception of our intelligence studies 
program, Notre Dame College has been actively involved in the process and will 
continue take part in these considerations. Homeland security and intelligence 
education is an arena where small colleges can make a notable contribution and should 
not shy away from doing so.  
As in any organization, higher education follows a life cycle; colleges and universities 
are continuously beginning and ending programs. Unencumbered by a massive 
bureaucracy, Notre Dame College has been able to employ talented resources to develop 
programs that attract student interest because of future job opportunities.  
Commitment, encouragement, and recognition by the administrative team is critical, 
along with the ability to work in partnership with a talented faculty that shares the 
commitment to the growth of the College, to the development of exciting and innovative 
programs that reflect the institution’s mission, and that combine a rigorous liberal arts 
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education with career-focused programs. There is definitely a place for the small private 
liberal arts college in the realm of homeland security or intelligence education. We hope 
that our efforts will encourage other institutions such as ours to take on the challenge of 
contributing to the evolution of these programs into true academic disciplines while 
taking on the challenge of preparing the next generation of security and intelligence 
professionals. 
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College Center for Intelligence Studies in Cleveland, Ohio and director of the forthcoming 
graduate program in Security Policy Studies. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Case 












Notre Dame College 
Security Policy Studies Program Goals and Objectives 
 
GOAL 1: Provide future public and private leaders with the necessary framework and 
practical skills to succeed in contemporary and future security environments. 
• Objective 1: Understand and apply the process of designing and implementing 
policy to protect the safety and freedom of the public. 
o SPS 510: Security Policy and Program Analysis 
o SPS 530: Critical Infrastructure: Threat Analysis and Resiliency 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
• Objective 2: Demonstrate an understanding and appreciation of the legal and 
ethical dimensions of personal and professional judgments to be applied in the 
private or public sector and in positions of leadership. 
o SPS 500: Leadership, Ethics and Decision-Making 
o SPS 511: Issues in Homeland Security 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
• Objective 3: Compare, contrast and analyze different risk management 
methodologies for resource allocation based on threat, probability and magnitude. 
o SPS 510: Security Policy and Program Analysis 
o SPS 531: Strategic Intelligence & Warning 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
GOAL 2: Prepare students to develop strategies, plans and programs for man-made 
and natural incidents across the spectrum including: terrorism, mass-casualty events 
and pandemic outbreaks:  
• Objective 1: Evaluate current homeland security policies, strategies, operational 
theories and issues from both domestic and international perspectives. 
o SPS 511: Issues in Homeland Security 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
o SPS 610: Transnational Threats 
• Objective 2: Describe and critically analyze policy issues related to cooperation 
among the international community, state governments, local jurisdictions and 
private industry in facilitating intelligence operations, infrastructure protections and 
resiliency, emergency preparedness, responses to terrorism and terrorist incidents 
and the development of homeland security. 
o SPS 520: Terrorism & Counterterrorism 
o SPS 530: Critical Infrastructure: Threat Analysis and Resiliency 
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o SPS 531: Strategic Intelligence & Warning 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
o SPS 610: Transnational Threats 
o SPS 620: Biodefense and Disease Surveillance 
• Objective 3: Understand, explain and respond to the vast array of transnational 
man-made and naturally occurring threat vectors from areas other than  the 
student’s specialty field (including, but not limited to: detection sensors, target 
hardening, crowd control, public health and event planning). 
o SPS 520: Terrorism & Counterterrorism 
o SPS 540: Geopolitics 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
o SPS 620: Biodefense and Disease Surveillance 
o SPS 630: Science, Technology and Security 
GOAL 3: Prepare students to contribute to the development of the emerging discipline 
of homeland security through the application of domestic and international security 
policy analysis, related theories and research into effective practice. 
• Objective 1: Demonstrate the critical thinking and reasoning skills necessary to 
provide leadership and support to the public/private security community. 
o SPS 500: Leadership, Ethics and Decision-Making 
o SPS 510: Security Policy and Program Analysis 
o SPS 531: Strategic Intelligence & Warning 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
o SPS 640: Capstone I 
• Objective 2: Critically analyze current security policies and practices and be able to 
apply decision-making tools and methodologies in order to foster and implement 
ideas to resolve or overcome difficult homeland security issues. 
o SPS 510: Security Policy and Program Analysis 
o SPS 550: Analytical Crisis Exercise Program 
o SPS 640: Capstone I 
o SPS 641: Capstone II 
• Objective 3: Contribute original research and scholarship in order to advance the 
development and growth of the academic discipline. 
o SPS 640: Capstone I 












1 See the Homeland Security Defense Education Consortium recommendations at 
http://www.chds.us/resources/uapi/HSDEC_Graduate_Course_Recommendations.ppt and 
http://www.chds.us/resources/uapi/mcc_final_brief_ver_2.ppt . To date the International Association 
for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) has not made any recommendations regarding curricula for 
intelligence education studies programs at the college/university level. Dr. Moore participated in the 
HSDEC 2009 Model Undergraduate Curriculum conference, and serves as vice chair of IAFIE.  
2 The Homeland Security Defense Education Consortium Association (HSDECA) is seeking recognition 
from the Department of Education as an accrediting body for Homeland Security Education; IAFIE is in 
the process of considering whether or not to attempt to become an accrediting body for intelligence 
education or intelligence studies programs. 
3 Students select from courses in Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Middle Eastern, African, or Latin American 
History. 
4 Today, as a result of Notre Dame College’s entrance into distance learning, the certificate programs have 
ceased to offer face-to-face courses. The certificate programs have been revamped and will now offer four 
eight-week online courses. Conversion of the certificate courses to an online format is presently underway 
and is scheduled for completion by June 2010.   
5 These programs are offered at Mercyhurst College and the University of Detroit Mercy. 
6 Interim iterations of the curriculum were as high as forty-eight credit hours (one faculty member 
advocated a sixty-credit curriculum), but this was eventually reduced to a traditional thirty-six-credit 
course of study.   
7 Program goals and objectives may be found in the appendix included at the end of this article. 
Homeland Security: An Aristotelian Approach to 
Professional Development 
Philip J. Palin 
Homeland security may be emerging as a new profession. It need not – I will argue 
should not – become another specialization. Claiming the core characteristics of a 
profession is how homeland security can best serve the public interest.    
For much of Western history there have been three learned professions: the 
priesthood, lawyers, and physicians. The learned professions have been distinguished 
from other occupations by three characteristics: 
1. An extended period of education and apprenticeship focused on mastery of a 
shared body of literature and way of thinking. 
2. Those successfully completing education and apprenticeship have professed a 
self-sacrificing commitment to serving society, abiding by shared principles of 
ethical behavior, and advancing transcendent goals – e.g. spiritual salvation, 
justice, and human healing. 
3.  Substantial freedom to self-organize and self-regulate as a community of 
professionals. 
The three core characteristics are tightly linked. The self-sacrificing pursuit of 
transcendent goals has justified the freedom to self-organize and self-regulate. 
Professional education traditionally focused on the ethos of the profession as much as 
the specific skills of the profession. When (I might write, as) self-regulation has failed, 
the process of professional preparation has been blamed, and the profession has 
suffered reduced social esteem, independence, and effectiveness. 
Over the centuries other occupations have been conspicuous and honored. But 
without all three of these characteristics the other occupations have not – until quite 
recently – been considered professions. In the modern era architecture, engineering, the 
military, accounting, journalism, and many others have aspired to become professions 
by emulating the three core characteristics of the traditional learned professions. 
Today, across the Western world, there is a diluted sense of professionalism. This has 
profoundly affected the three learned professions. In particular, the ethos of self-
sacrifice can sometimes seem difficult to find among either the traditional or parvenu 
professions. But if there is to be any long-term value to homeland security as its own 
field of academic study, it will emerge from a process of professional preparation that 
reflects the society-serving, transcendent, and self-sacrificing ethos of a true profession. 
If we are to be professionals, what do we profess? How do we behave? Who do we 
serve? What is the goal of our service? What ought we be prepared to sacrifice? 
Taking Vows 
A professional is someone who professes, who declares publically a certain 
commitment; usually someone who makes a vow or swears an oath. Perhaps the best 
known professional oath is that of Hippocrates, administered to physicians for nearly 
2,500 years. The Hippocratic Oath is mostly about what the physician will not do. A 
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professional is sufficiently aware of self and context to exercise mindful restraint: Do no 
harm. 
The homeland we seek to secure has emerged from the Constitution. The homeland’s 
physical aspects have changed dramatically over time. What has largely persisted is the 
set of principles, simple rules, and relationships set out in the Constitution. The 
founders put in place effective processes for a certain sort of coming-to-be.  
The profession of homeland security should not impede the ability of the people to 
“form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for 
the common defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity.” Fundamental to being a homeland security professional in 
the United States should be to do no harm to the Constitution.   
The tensions between security and liberty are real. Those who specialize in security 
will, with the best of intentions, seek to protect and defend the nation with whatever it 
takes. Homeland security professionals should honor the expertise and intentions of 
security specialists. But homeland security professionals have a different role. 
There are also those who specialize in liberty. With a passion and integrity equal to 
the security specialists, zealous advocates of liberty will resist any step that might lead 
us down the slippery slope to tyranny. Homeland security professionals should honor 
the expertise and intentions of those who specialize in liberty. But homeland security 
professionals have a different role. 
Others pursue specific elements that reflect the boundaries and possibilities woven 
into the Constitution. As a profession homeland security is focused on preserving and 
advancing the constitutional system through which the specific elements contribute to 
an ongoing process of the whole fulfilling its potential and becoming completely itself. 
Less widely known than the Hippocratic Oath is the Lawyers Oath, yet something 
very similar to the Michigan example (shown on page 5) is administered to new lawyers 
in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Once again, there is considerable attention to 
restraint.   
The Lawyer’s Oath also includes a positive obligation to advance the cause of justice, 
regardless of personal cost: “I will never reject, from any consideration personal to 
myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any cause for lucre or 
malice…”  
 The long tradition of pro bono publico – lawyering without compensation for the 
public good – reflects this professional commitment. While not fully articulated in the 
Hippocratic Oath, a similar ethos can be found in hundreds of free public medical 
clinics, the work of Doctors Without Borders, and similar cases of free medical care. The 
distinction often made that pay is what differentiates amateurs from professionals is a 
perversion. Fulfilling obligations without concern for compensation is fundamental to 
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The Hippocratic Oath 
I swear by Apollo the Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia 
and all the gods, and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will 
fulfill according to my ability and judgment this oath and this covenant:  
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live 
my life in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a 
share of mine, and to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male 
lineage and to teach them this art–if they desire to learn it–without fee and 
covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction and all the other 
learning to my sons and to the sons of him who has instructed me and to 
pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken the oath according 
to medical law, but to no one else. 
I will apply dietic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my 
ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice. 
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a 
suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive 
remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art. 
I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw 
in favor of such men as are engaged in this work. 
Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, 
remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of 
sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or 
slaves. 
What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the 
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must 
spread abroad, I will keep myself holding such things shameful to be 
spoken about. 
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life 
and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come; if I 
transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot. 
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What is so fundamental to the practice of homeland security that it should, if 
necessary, be performed without concern for budget, compensation, or other aspects of 
“lucre”? 
Recently I taught an advanced Terrorism Liaison Officer class in California. The class 
completed a regional analysis of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The final 
assignment was to deliver an intelligence brief on the highest risk identified. 
Surprisingly two separate teams identified the same place and institution. Moreover, the 
process led the class to perceive the risk they had identified as much more than just an 
academic exercise.  
The intelligence briefing targeted the senior security official at the high-risk 
institution. I role-played the senior security official. A federal law enforcement officer 
and a local firefighter teamed to give one of the briefs. The brief reflected the prior 
expertise they each brought to the broader homeland security goal. They also 
incorporated strategic and analytical skills covered in the class.  
During the brief I resisted a bit. As I resisted, the briefing team gradually moved from 
an objective stance – which my instructions had encouraged – to something close to 
advocacy. After the brief one of the other students questioned the shift in tone: “Is it 
appropriate for a professional to push as hard as they did?”  
I acknowledged the concern as appropriate and asked the briefers if the shift was 
purposeful. They would have preferred to keep a more objective stance, the team 
explained, but the decision-maker (the role I was playing) did not seem to be listening. 
They felt compelled to push. From their perspective, the risk was real, “even imminent” 
as one of them said. They recognized there could be career consequences from pushing 
too hard, but their professional judgment regarding the risk to the public required such 
action. 
The Hippocratic Oath requires that in serving patients the physician will act, 
“according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.” How 
should homeland security education help aspiring professionals recognize those 
moments when their professional obligations require potential self-sacrifice? How can 
we prepare them to engage such moments courageously and effectively? How can we 
strengthen both ability and judgment?   
Embracing Ambiguity 
There is a particular need for homeland security professionals to have the ability and 
judgment to deal with ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity. Where the issues at hand 
are definable, understandable, and predictable, homeland security is not needed.  
When the expertise of others has the issue well-in-hand, homeland security 
professionals should defer to such expertise and exercise restraint. But when the 
challenge exceeds the experience, perspective, or knowledge of such experts, homeland 
security professionals should be able to helpfully frame the situation, explicate the 
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The Lawyer’s Oath 
 
 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm): 
 
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
the State of Michigan; 
 
I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers; 
 
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to 
me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly 
debatable under the law of the land; 
 
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me 
such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never 
seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact 
or law; 
 
I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my 
client, and will accept no compensation in connection with my client’s 
business except with my client’s knowledge and approval; 
 
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial 
to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the 
justice of the cause with which I am charged; 
 
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of 
the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any cause for lucre or malice; 
 
I will in all other respects conduct myself personally and professionally in 
conformity with the high standards of conduct imposed upon members of 
the bar as condition for the privilege to practice law in this State. 
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There is also a role for homeland security professionals when experts try to force 
novel problems into traditional definitions. This is the innate hubris of experts. An 
expert scans his or her environment for repeating patterns and categories of patterns. A 
homeland security professional should scan for aberration, randomness, and change. 
Such preparation goes beyond typical approaches to training or education. 
Aristotle gives us two different – but related – types of knowledge: episteme is 
knowledge of objects that do not change, while techne is knowledge of objects that 
change.1 Both sorts of knowledge are valuable. But within Aristotle’s concept of techne 
we can find theory and practice, art and science, flexibility and discipline. Aristotle 
explains that techne is “a productive capacity involving true reasoning.”2 My summary: 
techne is the reasoned application of theory to practice and the assessment of theory 
through practice. 
The natural, accidental, and intentional threats around which homeland security has 
emerged have prehistoric pedigrees. A wide range of expertise exists to prevent, 
mitigate, and otherwise engage these threats. For Aristotle such threats are the material 
components of reality.   
While earthquake, pandemic, and the evil we do one another are persistent – and 
may even be predictable – the immediate expression or form of the material depends on 
a range of contextual contingencies that seriously complicates accurate prediction of the 
threat’s effect. As context changes, how the threat is expressed will also change. 
Homeland security can contribute most by attending closely to context and 
interdependencies within the context. For example the urban density of South Florida is 
an important issue of changing context. Hurricane seasons are persistent. 
Since the Enlightenment, Western science has profitably focused on uncovering 
unchanging and predictable patterns. Yet today much of our cutting-edge science is 
focused on what cannot be predicted. As an academic field and a profession homeland 
security will contribute most when it focuses on change. 
Aristotle’s classic notion of techne – as a way to engage change – resonates with 
contemporary work on Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). In both techne and CAS we 
recognize the key role of randomness. As Aristotle wrote, “Chance and techne are 
concerned with the same objects…Techne loves chance and chance loves techne.”3 Even 
where there is specific intention, chance persists in both complicating and 
complementing what we earnestly intend. 
Since Isaac Newton we have learned a great deal about mechanistic cause and effect. 
But there is an increasing awareness that Newton’s universe is not our only universe. In 
biology, sub-atomic physics, human society, and more it is often not possible to predict 
an activity’s outcome. It is possible to observe – and come to better understand – 
behavior and outcome by recognizing the relationships involved in the activity. 
Developing a deliberate framework for engaging the reality of change – a reality of 
becoming – is at the core of any meaningful academic treatment of homeland security. 
Testing and refining this framework in practice is essential to any meaningful profession 
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Acting and Reflecting 
Aristotle is keen to distinguish between poesis and praxis.4 Poesis is activity to finish 
something: a poem, a building, a criminal case. The activity’s meaning is established by 
how it is finished. Praxis is an ongoing, never finished yet self-fulfilling activity. With 
praxis the activity’s meaning is established by how the activity’s purpose is advanced. 
When law enforcement is understood as making an arrest, it is poesis. When 
firefighting is defined as suppressing a fire, it is poesis. But when these and other 
specializations are reconceived as, for example, protecting the community, they have the 
potential to become examples of praxis.  Rather than something that can be finished, 
praxis is an ongoing process of becoming. 
Poesis and praxis require different skills and mindsets. While poesis finishes its 
activity, it typically does not create anything fundamentally new. Aristotle suggests 
poesis is often a repetitive and imitative activity without creative purpose. Praxis, in 
contrast, is able to give an account of its purpose(s) and adapt to changing conditions for 
achieving its purpose. Praxis self-organizes on the edge of chaos, spawning variety and 
creating new possibilities.  
Praxis is action. At its best praxis is thoughtful, purposeful, imaginative, and creative 
action.  Techne informs how action is taken. Action or, rather, reflection-on-action also 
informs techne. Because techne is knowledge of objects that have variability and that 
change, action creates the potential for new knowledge. Aristotle explains,  
Now experience seems to be almost the same as knowledge of things that do not 
change (episteme) or knowledge of things that change (techne), but for human 
beings episteme and techne result from experience, for experience makes 
techne… but inexperience makes chance. Techne comes into being when out of 
experience comes many conceptions and one universal judgment arises about 
those that are similar… We think that knowing and understanding are present in 
techne more than is experience and we take the possessors of techne to be wiser 
than people with experience only, as though in every instance wisdom is more 
something resulting from and following along with knowing; and this is because 
the ones know the cause while others do not. For people with experience know 
the what, but do not know the why, but the others are acquainted with the why 
and the cause.5  
Just as techne informs praxis and is informed by praxis, so is praxis informed by 
practical reasoning (phronesis). There can be a disciplined way of reflecting on action 
and the results of acting. Nancy Sherman, a Georgetown University professor of 
philosophy explains, “Aristotle insists that the good life is a life studying one’s actions, 
choices, and emotional responses, and studying them in a way in which one remains 
open to criticism and reform.”6 
Aristotle is especially interested in reasoning about and reflecting on particular 
actions in particular situations. Because change is fundamental, Aristotle insists we 
must carefully consider both unchanging matter and changeable form. Unlike 
Socrates/Plato, in Aristotle there is no immutable model of justice, beauty, truth, or any 
other excellence. Rather, there is the best possible outcome in a particular situation. An 
Aristotelian approach to homeland security is not paralyzed by the vision of some ideal 
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outcome. It will, instead, be concerned with the best possible given the concrete realities 
at hand. 
Reality is composite. It is made up of what changes and what persists. To be wise is to 
be realistic. So our reasoning must give attention to the material elements of reality that 
do not change and how the material assumes new forms in response to changing 
context. 
All perceptible independent things have material. And what underlies something 
is its thinghood, and in one sense this is the material (and by material I mean that 
which, while not being actively a this, is a this potentially), but in another sense 
what underlies something is its articulation and form, which being a this, is 
separate in articulation; and a third sort of underlying thing is what is composed 
of these, of which alone there is coming into being and destruction, and which is 
separate simply.7 
It is precisely Aristotle’s embrace of change and his situational ethic that is so effectively 
calibrated with the needs of homeland security.  
Despite manifest evidence of constant change, our intellectual and operational habits 
are more Platonic than Aristotelian. Despite the demonstrated unpredictability of 
Quantum Mechanics, we still prefer Newtonian certitude. This is especially true of our 
typical approach to organizational management where we continue to worship at the 
altar of Frederick Taylor’s vision of systematic efficiency: seeking predictable answers 
that are always right. 
Aristotle warns of such excess. Plato is not wrong, but Plato’s insights must be 
applied to fit the specific case. Newton is not wrong, but Newton is only right in certain 
contexts. Frederick Taylor continues to have value in some situations, but not in all.  
Because change is real, judgment is required. Judgment, reason, principled reflection, 
phronesis can be learned. This is fundamental to any homeland security curriculum. 
A significant portion of Aristotle’s body of work is committed to explaining phronesis 
and how it is learned. Hans-Georg Gadamer heroically attempts a summation,  
The old Aristotelian distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge is 
operative here – a distinction which cannot be reduced to that between the true 
and the probable. Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of knowledge. 
Primarily, this means it is directed towards the concrete situations.  Thus it must 
grasp the “circumstances” in their infinite variety… this kind of knowledge exists 
outside the rational concept of knowledge, but this is not in fact mere resignation. 
The Aristotelian distinction refers to something other than the distinction 
between knowing on the basis of universal principles and on the basis of the 
concrete. Nor does (this) mean only the capacity to subsume the individual case 
under a universal category – what we call “judgment.” Rather there is a positive 
ethical motif that merges into the Roman Stoic doctrine of sensus communis.  
The grasp and moral control of the concrete situation require subsuming what is 
given under the universal – that is, the goal that one is pursuing so that the right 
thing may result.  Hence it presupposes a direction of the will – i.e., moral being. 
That is why Aristotle considers phronesis an “intellectual virtue.” He sees it not 
only as a capacity, but as a determination of moral being which cannot exist 
without the totality of the “ethical virtues,” which in turn cannot exist without it.  
Although practicing this virtue means that one distinguishes what should be done 
from what should not, it is not simply practical shrewdness and general 
cleverness. The distinction between what should and should not be done includes 
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the distinction between the proper and improper and thus supposes a moral 
attitude, which it continues to develop.8 
In the concrete context of homeland security what are Gadamer’s – and Aristotle’s – key 
take-aways? This is “another kind of knowledge.” Phronesis reasons about change, what 
is unpredictable, shifting and uncertain. As such, it is especially appropriate to the 
natural, accidental, and intentional threats of concern to homeland security. 
Phronesis is, among other things, reasoning that articulates the shared wisdom of a 
community. It requires participation, collaboration and deliberation across whatever 
boundaries divide a community. This is especially valuable to homeland security where 
threat, vulnerability and consequence are characteristics of neighborhoods, 
communities, and regions. 
Phronesis depends on a clear purpose. To effectively practice phronesis homeland 
security must make clear its targets and intended outcomes. Given that our homeland 
security purpose is X, Y, Z and not A, B, or C, what do we know and how can we advance 
our purposes using what we know? 
Phronesis requires a moral capacity and commitment. We are, I suggest, back to 
taking vows. “Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit… no aspect of moral 
excellence arises in us by nature… states of character arise out of like activities. This is 
why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because states of character 
correspond to the difference between these.”9  
Fundamentals of Professional Development for Homeland Security 
Western education has, especially in the last sixty years, suffered from misapplication of 
Newtonian principles to all sorts of learning. The profound success of science since the 
Enlightenment engendered envy among other academic disciplines. Envy encouraged 
emulation. Emulation has resulted in awkward – even perverse – efforts to apply 
knowledge of what does not change to contexts that are constantly changing. 
As a new or, at least, potential discipline, homeland security can avoid this dead end. 
Academic programs in homeland security should focus on the properties of change. 
What do we know about change? 
We know that change is explored through action and principled reflection on action. 
This is Aristotle’s praxis. By combining what we know about what changes and what 
does not change – about both material and formal reality – we can begin to accurately 
observe reality as a whole. The disciplines of praxis are essential to any profession of 
homeland security and should be prominent in any academic preparation for the 
profession. 
Did our action produce a result consistent with our purpose? Did we understand our 
purpose sufficiently to calibrate it with what we know about change and changelessness, 
about material and formal reality? Was our choice of action well-suited to reality?  Did 
we nudge emerging reality in our desired direction or did we unleash an unintended 
consequence that upended our purpose? These are questions of phronesis: practical 
reasoning over purposeful action. Learning to ask such questions may be the most 
important aspect of academic preparation for the activity of homeland security.  
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What these three interactive processes of learning do not tell us – cannot tell us – is why 
we act. What function does homeland security fulfill? What is the purpose(s) of 
homeland security? Without such purpose it is difficult to assess the value of what we 
learn. This is, though, hardly unprecedented. Purpose – or what Aristotle calls telos – is 
simultaneously of great importance and notoriously elusive. But here too Aristotle 
provides some clues. 
Given the prominence of change in Aristotle’s work, he gives careful attention to the 
sequence of emergence.10 Each step creates preconditions – even the cause – for each 
subsequent step. Aristotle gives particular attention to four aspects of an object or 
activity. By understanding the preconditions of homeland security’s purpose, we might 
better discern our purpose. 
• Material Cause: Of what materials does homeland security consist? It consists of 
various specializations – law enforcement, firefighting, emergency management, 
public health, private security, intelligence, military, and many more. It consists of 
risk management, prevention, mitigation, response, recovery, and other concepts 
and practices. 
• Efficient Cause: What knowledge is the “primary source of movement or rest” 
within homeland security? Is this, perhaps, unexpected death, injury, and 
destruction? Certainly 9/11 and Katrina are specific efficient causes of what we 
know as homeland security. Legislation, regulation, and funding cause movement 
within homeland security. The efficient cause brings together the material from 
which the object or activity emerges. 
• Formal Cause: What is the “essential formula and the classes which contain it… 
and the parts of the formula” that make the object or activity recognizable? I would 
argue that this has not yet been achieved in a coherent way. But we seem to be best 
able to differentiate homeland security from its material components when there is 
collaboration and strategic integration of the material components focused on 
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meaningful aspects of the efficient cause. The formal cause is a particular 
organizing of material. 
• Final cause: To what end do the material, efficient, and formal causes point? What 
is the essential function of homeland security? How is that function fulfilled? What 
is the telos of homeland security? 
For Aristotle while purpose may be deliberate, it can also be innate. In organizing 
material to achieve a particular form, we attempt to endow object or activity with 
particular purpose. But the thing may have immanent purpose beyond any explicit 
concept of form or function. To discern the final cause – the true purpose – of any 
object or activity Aristotle encourages us to examine the relationships between material, 
efficient, and formal causes and to study the outcomes of the object or activity. 
Discerning homeland security’s final cause is an appropriate and important academic 
task.  It is not yet apparent. Often it is in dispute. 
Doing Homeland Security 
As with most of Aristotelian reality, homeland security is a coming-to-be or a passing-
away. If homeland security persists as a coming-to-be it will find or craft a function… 
purpose… telos… that unfolds toward fulfillment, as an acorn unfolds into an oak. If not 
it will pass away. 
While purpose is fundamental to Aristotle’s understanding of reality, his sort of 
purpose cannot be proclaimed by the White House, QHSR, or in a speech by the 
secretary of homeland security. Each of these activities may contribute to knowledge of 
the final cause or telos of this homeland security thing, but so will a host of other – and 
often contrary – actions and intentions. 
Aristotle argues that every activity, such as homeland security, has two beginnings: 
that of resolve (ou eneka) and that of movement (ou kenesis). We can certainly perceive 
movement in homeland security. Can we perceive resolve? 
I perceive a multiplicity of resolves. Depending on the specifics of threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and each perceiver’s angle on each object or activity, resolve 
proliferates, complicates, and occasionally complements, spawning reverberations 
worthy of the most complex fractal. 
Any academic treatment of homeland security must engage both random movement 
and this multiplicity of resolves. As Aristotle shows us, there is value in an organized, 
explicit effort to categorize experiences and make sense of the various elements and 
relationships that constitute experience. We can be surprised to find predictability 
where, in the absence of careful examination, we assumed there was only ceaseless 
change. Or where we confirm change, careful examination and explanation may help us 
know the characteristics of change. 
But while an academic engagement with homeland security may helpfully describe its 
reality, the thing-itself will be created from practice. The telos of homeland security, if 
any, will emerge from its praxis.  
This brings us back to being a profession, which is largely about what we will profess 
as our purpose. Professing does not – as we can see in the behavior of many lawyers, 
physicians, and priests – ensure the purpose is achieved or even consistently embraced.  
But professing may have some influence on how the coming-to-be will unfold. 
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Acknowledging we seldom achieve all that we undertake, regardless of strength or 
sincerity, what might be the long-term outcomes of a profession seriously engaged in 
actualizing the following? 
 
I resolve to fulfill according to my ability and judgment this public 
commitment: 
 
I will preserve and protect the Constitution of the United States of 
America. 
 
I will apply all that I know to preserve and protect the people of the United 
States; I will keep them from harm and injustice. 
 
I will increase my knowledge of threat, vulnerability, and consequence; 
seeking to deal responsibly and realistically with risk. 
 
I will increase my knowledge of collaboration, deliberation, decision, and 
action; seeking to prevent harm and strengthen resilience. 
 
I will honor the relationships that emerge from shared learning and doing. 
 
I will embrace change and variability as susceptible to understanding, 
imagination, and creativity. 
 
I will avoid mistaking personal preference for considered judgment and will 
daily endeavor to strengthen the humility, knowledge, awareness, and 
discipline whereby I may contribute, along with others, to a true and 
reasoned capacity to act with regard to what is good or bad for 
humankind.11 
 
Intention is not sufficient to do good, but it is something. If a hundred or a thousand or 
ten thousand share similar intentions – and act with intention – how might this shape 
emerging reality? 
 Homeland security is emerging. It is changing. Homeland security is of the class of 
knowledge in which change is continuous. As professionals – and as those trying to 
prepare professionals – we can share what we know about change, we can share what we 
know about choosing and acting in the midst of change, and we can reflect together 
about how we might more effectively choose and act in the future. Our reason is limited, 
but it is the best we have to offer.  
 
Philip J. Palin is a research fellow with the Pace University graduate program in 
Management for Public Safety and Homeland Security Professionals. He is the principal 
author of the Catastrophe Preparation and Prevention series from McGraw-Hill. Other 
publications include Consequence Management (2008) and Threat, Vulnerability, 
Consequence, Risk (2009). Mr. Palin chaired the General Preparedness Working Group of the 
Obama presidential campaign’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is a former college 
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president, foundation executive, and corporate chief executive officer. Mr. Palin can be 
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Partnership in Progress: A Model for Development of a 
Homeland Security Graduate Degree Program
Cheryl J. Polson, John M. Persyn, and O. Shawn Cupp
INTRODUCTION (HOW IT BEGAN)
Following the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11, all of American  society  began to 
reexamine our homeland security  procedures and paradigms. Ultimately, this scrutiny 
led to dramatic policy  changes and reorganization at the highest levels of the federal 
government and to significant enhancements in emergency  services training and 
security  at the local government and community  levels.  Higher education did not  escape 
this review, either,  as leaders sought ways to enhance knowledge and skills of homeland 
security  professionals as a means to mitigate future threats to the homeland.  In 2002, 
David McIntyre offered a scathing critique of the homeland security  education 
landscape that existed in those early days of this national self-examination:
There is no nationally  recognized program  of higher  education  at  all.  In  fact, 
there is no generally  accepted curriculum  for  homeland security, because there is 
no generally  accepted body  of knowledge upon which  to base an  academic 
discipline…. 
Worse, there is no tradition  of education  for  the senior  practitioners of 
homeland security. Mayors, business leaders, staffs,  and senior  officials generally 
learn  by  doing:  they  don’t  even  know  what  concepts and organizing principles 
are missing. 1 
In the seven years since McIntyre offered his critical perspective on homeland security 
higher education,  some things have changed – and some have not.  Yes, the national 
emphasis on homeland security  has soared, illuminating the critical need and demand 
for quality  educational programs that provide professionals the fundamental knowledge 
and skills to meet the current and future diverse national homeland security 
requirements. In turn, this has led to the creation  of some government-sponsored 
educational programs, including the Center  for  Homeland Defense and Security  (CHDS) 
master’s degree program and the Department of Homeland Security  University  System.2 
Additionally, the Homeland Security  and Defense Education Consortium  (HSDEC) was 
founded to address educational issues relevant   to the homeland security  and homeland 
defense enterprise as the emerging academic discipline continues to mature and take on 
increasing significance.3   Augmenting these efforts are the hundreds of academic 
institutions that have initiated or  expanded existing degree programs in response to the 
pivotal events of 9/11. In 2007, the Homeland Security  Education Survey  Project 
reported there were 215 homeland security-related degree and certificate programs.4 
Just two years later,  that number has grown significantly, as evidenced by  the 271 
programs listed on the CHDS partner institutions web page.5   
Yet, despite this expansion of available programs, some of the challenges of 2002 still 
linger as colleges attempt to meet the increasing demand for quality  degree and 
certificate programs in  homeland security  and emergency  management. As the numbers 
2continue to grow, the question more and more prospective providers will be, or should 
be,  asking is: How can we build an effective, viable homeland security graduate 
program? As Christopher Bellavita and Ellen Gordon observed, there is certainly  no 
shortage of alternative approaches with “at least four  dozen ways colleges, universities, 
agencies, and textbook publishers have conceptualized homeland security  education.” 6 
Still, some suggest that the availability  of quality  graduate programs continues to trail 
behind demand by  homeland security  professionals.7  Anecdotal and limited empirical 
evidence from  several sources supports this view. Examples include the continuing 
growth in the number of institutions offering graduate programs, as well as anecdotal 
comments by  program  managers of new programs describing the dramatic growth in 
enrollments. The vast size of the homeland security  professional community  and its 
forecasted continued growth provides ancillary  evidence of the associated need for 
additional quality educational programs – at least some of them at the graduate level. 8     
This article describes a  collaborative endeavor by  two complementary  graduate 
education providers to build an interdisciplinary  graduate degree program that helps 
meet this growing demand for quality,  effective,  and viable homeland security 
educational programs. In the Midwest, this program begins the “tradition of education” 
for homeland security  professionals that McEntyre found lacking  by  augmenting their 
experience-based knowledge with academic study  of the key  concepts and organizing 
principles relevant to the field.
In order  to provide the context for  how the program  was developed, and how  it will be 
situated in  the homeland security  profession, this article addresses three inter-related 
components of the Kansas State University  (K-State) and U.S.  Army  Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) Homeland Security  Graduate Degree Program 
development. First, to provide the historical context, a brief overview traces the 
evolution of homeland security  graduate education since 2001. Next, the article reviews 
the literature relating to identification of fundamental elements that  experts and 
scholars have suggested should constitute a graduate homeland security  curriculum. 
Finally,  the article details the process used to develop the K-State/CGSC Homeland 
Security  Graduate Program. This discussion is offered as an aid to others involved in or 
considering the development of their own regionally-responsive homeland security 
graduate degree program.
THE EVOLUTION OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRADUATE EDUCATION
Who We Are and Where We Are Going
Kansas State University  (K-State) and the U.S. Army  Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) both have expertise of value in developing a  homeland security  graduate 
degree program. This program  takes advantage of that expertise while building upon an 
already well-established history of collaboration that began in 1990. 
K-State has existing courses and expertise in six  different colleges addressing 
homeland security-related issues.  Key  areas include food safety, agriculture security  and 
emergency  planning, cyber-infrastructure and cyber-security, all-hazards emergency 
operations and planning, and infectious disease (human, animal and plant) parameters 
impacting public health. A particular strength is found in the food-animal disease arena, 
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and Arts and Sciences. K-State’s expertise in this focus area led the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHS) to select the university  as a Center of Excellence for 
Emerging and Zoonotic Animal Diseases.9   In that  capacity,  K-State will develop and 
validate vaccines, create innovative devices to detect and diagnose threatening diseases, 
and help implement systems to curtail human and animal disease threats.  Additionally, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Unit is 
relocating to K-State.10   These activities have validated the DHS decision to site the 
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility  on land contiguous with K-State at Manhattan, 
KS. 
The U.S. Army  Command and General Staff College is the largest graduate-level 
military  service college in the United States and is accredited by  the Higher  Learning 
Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCA) to grant a 
Master of Military  Art and Science degree.11   The ten-month curriculum emphasizes 
development of mid-career and senior officer  skills in planning  and conducting military 
operations – essential military  skills that  frequently  parallel those required by  homeland 
security  professionals in the field.12  Moreover, many  CGSC faculty  and students bring 
with  them  real-world training and experience commensurate with many  of their 
homeland security  professional peers: most have confronted the challenges associated 
with combating terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, or  consequence 
management through  their  participation in foreign security  assistance missions around 
the globe; many  have also assisted with domestic and international disaster assistance 
activities supporting relief efforts such as Hurricane Katrina, the tsunami in Indonesia, 
or the recent Haiti earthquake.13  
As professionals in  homeland security  have learned, if relationships are established 
with  counterparts in other key  agencies before a crisis, then coordination after a crisis is 
more responsive and more effective. Despite their separate chains of command and 
their unique roles and responsibilities, military  and civilian groups are often  called upon 
to work side by  side in crisis response and disaster assistance operations. While some 
critics might be concerned by  increased military  influence in domestic security-related 
matters, dealing with  the complexities and uncertainties of the homeland security 
environment requires the high-level critical and creative thinking that results from 
considering the multiple perspectives that are reflective of a  diverse group of homeland 
security  practitioners and professionals. Combining these groups in educational 
programs can help to limit the impact of training and communications differences that 
otherwise might not  be evident until they  find themselves in the midst  of a large-scale 
incident. Furthermore, this interagency  and civil-military  integration during homeland 
security  planning processes may  also have significant crisis deterrent or  prevention 
possibilities. This opportunity  for direct classroom integration of these two diverse 
groups of military  and civilian  homeland security  professionals represents a key 
strength of the collaboration between K-State and CGSC. Complementary  opportunities 
for integration of diverse regional assets enhance this strength.
A number  of regional facilities and capabilities also provide potential for interagency 
educational integration.  Ft. Leavenworth houses some of the most sophisticated 
simulations capabilities in the military,  including the National Simulation Center,14 and 
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CGSC Digital Leader Development Center.15  While security  classifications might 
preclude participation by  non-military  personnel,  the use of selected simulation 
capabilities potentially  could be expanded to include appropriately-cleared homeland 
security  professionals. A multi-use Homeland Security  training facility, funded and 
supported by  the State of Kansas,  offers an additional integrated educational 
opportunity  for homeland security  professionals. Located at the Great Plains Regional 
Training Center  in Salina, KS, Crisis City  provides a realistic simulation or exercise 
setting in which to practice interagency  planning or  crisis response.16  Additionally, 
within a one-hour drive of the Ft. Leavenworth  campus are three key  governmental 
organizations that represent federal, state,  and city  homeland security  entities.  The 
headquarters for Federal Emergency  Management Agency  Region VII is located in 
Kansas City, MO, just  thirty  miles to the southeast; the Kansas State Adjutant General, 
dual-hatted as the Director of Emergency  Management and Homeland Security, is 
located in Topeka, KS, fifty-five miles to the southwest.  Finally, the Mid-America 
Regional Council’s Regional Homeland Security  Coordinating Committee integrates the 
Kansas City  area emergency  response efforts and maximizes the sharing and 
coordination of resources among the various municipalities throughout eight counties in 
Kansas and Missouri.17  Collectively, these regional resources and capabilities can help 
provide a robust graduate educational experience for a diverse group of military  and 
civilian homeland security professionals.
Together,  as other  educational institutions have done before them, K-State and CGSC 
have sought to fill a niche need for homeland security  graduate education in order to 
better  serve homeland security  professionals regionally. Toward that  goal, program 
developers have conscientiously  and systematically  addressed the complexity  of issues 
which surround building such a curriculum  – particularly  given the uncertainties 
inherent in this new field of study. Equally  important, rather than hastily  constructing a 
program by  merely  piecing together  existing courses,  this collaboration has focused on 
building a core curriculum  from  scratch, informed by  a review of current  literature, and, 
most importantly,  a deliberate needs analysis of homeland professionals and other 
stakeholders in the region. Program developers have placed priority  on meeting  the 
regional homeland security  educational needs, rather than on profiting from quick 
implementation and rapid growth of enrollments. 
Previous Approaches to Curriculum Development
Foremost  in developing a new graduate degree program should be a commitment to 
meeting identified needs of homeland security  professionals at all levels. A review of the 
literature highlights some of the prevalent curriculum development questions that must 
be examined or  considered. Even before the 9/11  attacks, the Office for  Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) had sought to determine whether existing training programs were 
meeting the needs of the various jurisdictions within the U.S. Department of Justice.  In 
August 2001, a collaborative team  of training, education, and strategic planners, and 
subject  matter  experts completed the ODP Training Strategy that focused on five key 
questions:  
1. Who should be trained?
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3. Which training instruction/delivery  methods and training sites should be paired 
with which tasks to maximize success in training?
4. Which methods are most  capable of evaluating competencies and performance upon 
completion of training?
5. What gaps need to be remedied in existing training  to assure consistency  with  the 
findings of the training strategy?18
From  that  study, ODP determined that key  gaps existed in training programs associated 
with  the more complex upper-level leadership challenges requiring  critical thinking  and 
problem-solving approaches; filling these gaps would require an educational, vice 
training, approach. With  the 9/11  attacks just one month later,  the ODP 
recommendations gained momentum, and in April 2002, the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DoJ) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), with the support of Congress, 
signed an interagency  agreement to establish the Center for  Homeland Defense and 
Security  (CHDS) at the Naval Postgraduate School in  Monterey, CA.19  The Center 
immediately  embarked on building the first post-9/11  homeland security  graduate 
program incorporating an evidence-based curriculum  – that  is,  a curriculum  designed 
around policy, practice, and program needs identified through empirical research.20 
In January  2003, CHDS welcomed its first cohort of students into a new, inquiry-
based homeland security  master’s degree program. This program was an innovative 
approach to serve the homeland security  educational needs of senior  leaders of local, 
state, and federal government agencies across the country. From  that initial start, the 
program has grown steadily. The Center has established the Executive Leaders Program, 
a certificate program  designed to meet the needs of senior  leaders who prefer  a shorter, 
more focused program. It has also created the Mobile Education Team program to 
provide strategic-level seminars to governors and their cabinets and major urban area 
leaders.21 The expanded CHDS role now also includes development and stewardship of 
the Homeland Security  Digital Library, publication of the Homeland Security Affairs 
Journal, and the encouragement  of professional networking among higher  education 
institutions through the University and Agency Partnership Initiative (UAPI).22   
The CHDS program is a  sound model for  development of a quality  graduate program 
and addresses a need defined by  national leaders to fill a  critical gap in graduate-level 
education. In the CHDS approach, a needs analysis of the national shortfalls led logically 
to the development of a  nationally-focused,  broad-based master’s degree program. 
Students participating in that program  have represented all areas of homeland security, 
every  level of government,  and most of the fifty  states. The impact of CHDS is 
unmistakable.
Despite the success of the CHDS programs, they  still only  serve a small segment of 
the homeland security  profession. Because of congressional prohibitions, the CHDS 
program is not available to private-sector attendees – an educational gap that  must be 
served by  other institutions. For eligible public-sector  applicants, acceptance into the 
CHDS master’s degree program  is a highly  competitive process; only  28 percent of those 
who complete the entire application process are selected into the program. As of 
December 31, 2008, 262 students had earned master’s degrees through CHDS.23  Yet, 
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were not admitted, and an estimated 9,000 who began, but  did not complete the 
application process.24  Clearly, there are thousands of homeland security  officials and 
professionals throughout the country  who would benefit from  a  homeland security 
graduate degree, but who are not eligible for the CHDS master’s degree program. 
In light of the capacity  limitations of CHDS, homeland security  professionals created 
a parallel demand for alternative opportunities offered through other accessible 
homeland security  educational providers. As a result, hundreds of academic, credit-
bearing, undergraduate and master’s degree programs have been developed to meet  the 
growing needs of homeland security  professionals. Representative programs can be 
found at  Pennsylvania  State University, Long Island University’s Homeland Security 
Management Institute (HSMI), San Diego State University,  Tulane University, and 
California Polytechnic State University. 
One of the more established homeland security  graduate degree programs is the 
thirty-three-credit-hour  Master of Homeland Security  in Public Health Preparedness 
first  offered by  Pennsylvania State University  in  2005. This multi-disciplinary  face-to-
face program  exploits the institution’s strengths in its niche area of public health by 
drawing upon the expertise of seven colleges that  contribute in such key  areas as 
agricultural sciences, medicine, engineering, and information sciences and technology. 
Another  seasoned program can be found at  Long Island University’s Homeland 
Security  Management Institute. In 2006, the HSMI expanded its 15-credit graduate 
credential program  to offer  a thirty-six-credit master’s degree in Homeland Security 
Management. This fully  online degree program serves homeland security  personnel 
from across the country; its students, mostly  working professionals, also represent a 
broad spectrum  of homeland security  and emergency  management  occupations. 
Additionally, through federally-funded research as a member of the National Security 
Center  of Excellence for the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security 
Management Institute contributes directly  to the body  of knowledge on issues relating 
to transportation security.25
More recently,  the San Diego State University  Graduate Program  in Homeland 
Security  has created a face-to-face master’s degree program  that reflects a distinct, 
regional focus associated with the school’s proximity  to Mexico. Established in 2007, the 
program offers specializations in such regional-relevant  areas as border security, 
terrorism, and irregular warfare, and includes a unique study abroad requirement.26  
The Master  of Professional Studies Homeland Security  Program at Tulane University 
also serves a working professional student  population.  Accepting its first students in 
spring  2010, this face-to-face program, offered through the University’s School of 
Continuing Studies, emphasizes an all-hazards perspective,  concentrating on 
managerial roles of leadership and decision-making in terrorism  and disaster 
responses.27   
The California Polytechnic State University,  in partnership with the California 
Emergency  Management Agency, is expanding its offerings for homeland security  and 
disaster  management professionals. This includes the addition of a  new online program 
developed from a pre-existing graduate certificate program. The new Master’s of 
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expected to open in fall 2010.28
Each of these examples represents the institution’s effort to develop a  homeland 
security  program that addresses questions similar to those asked by  the early  CHDS 
educators. Each institution has separately  sought answers to the fundamental questions: 
who should the program serve and what should it teach? Each has endeavored to meet 
the needs of its own constituency  by  effectively  incorporating program concentrations 
and specializations that are most  relevant  to that institution’s particular setting. As 
these examples illustrate, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to homeland security 
graduate program development. Thus, despite the great work done by  those building 
effective programs such as these, for  those just embarking on building a program, the 
answers to questions regarding program  design may  still  seem  as elusive today  as they 
did in 2002. 
ELEMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRADUATE EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS
Creating New Academic Programs:  The Challenge
In a  recent critique, Robert McCreight identified four issues, strikingly  similar to those 
expressed seven years earlier, that continue to challenge the higher education 
community: reconciliation of the distinctions between homeland security  and 
emergency  management, the degree of standardization necessary  or appropriate for 
instruction in these complex subjects, the extent to which educational programs prepare 
students to perform successfully  as emergency  managers or homeland security 
professionals, and determination of topics and concepts to be taught.29  Some things 
have not changed.  As McCreight acknowledges, given the diverse nature of the 
homeland security  field, resolving these issues will not be an easy  task; but  overlooking 
these issues would be irresponsible in any  new program development. He further  asserts 
that, “there ought to be consensus among practitioners, scholars,  and related 
professionals alike that certain fundamentals become part of a  thirty-three-credit  hour 
graduate program or a twenty-four-credit hour undergraduate requirement”30 
The Questions of Standardization and Quality 
Through the years, numerous attempts have been made to reach the consensus that 
McCreight  calls for.  As new homeland security  issues and challenges emerged, content 
emphasis changed accordingly.  For example, the term  all hazards  was not  generally  part 
of the homeland security  lexicon until  after the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe in late 
August 2005; since then, it has become a popular descriptor  for comprehensive 
homeland security  programs and approaches. McIntyre described the top homeland 
security  priorities defined when the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) was first 
established, as reflected in the national strategy  and in the initial organization of the 
department: borders,  bioterrorism (and threats from  weapons of mass destruction), 
training first responders,  intelligence sharing, and alerts (system and response).31 While 
these may  have been a good starting point for defining the priorities for homeland 
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security educational programs. 
The Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium  (HSDEC) attempted to find 
the common ground and to propose standardized educational outcomes that  would 
encourage more rigor and accountability  across homeland security  related programs. In 
August 2005, HSDEC hosted a workshop comprising twenty-five representatives from 
twenty  universities to identify  common topic areas that  should be included in graduate-
level homeland security  educational programs. The result was a  set  of core content areas 
recommended for emphasis in homeland security  graduate programs: current and 
emerging threats; context and organizations; policies, strategies, and legal issues; 
processes and management; and practical applications.32  
The Homeland Security  Education Survey  Project, sponsored by  HSDEC, collected 
data and conducted an analysis of the commonalities, differences, and trends among the 
various academic programs in emergency  management,  homeland security, and fire 
protection/science.33  The project final report,  published in May  2007, identified the 
prevalent homeland security  educational challenges illuminated by  a review of more 
than 200 degree and certificate programs. Specifically, the final report identified issues 
that detract from the otherwise growing legitimacy  of homeland security  as an area of 
academic study. It was found that,  although academic collaboration  is increasing in the 
homeland security  academic field,  so are concerns regarding program  standards and 
eventual program accreditation, and methods by  which to assess program  graduate 
competencies.34
Notwithstanding McCreight’s call for consensus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish a  uniform set of standards for  all academic programs that span the homeland 
security-related professions from local emergency  responders to national policy-makers. 
Certainly,  these areas may  overlap in their  knowledge and skills requirements; however, 
painting them all with the same brush  ignores some significant  differences in purpose 
and application. It  is possible that  the proliferation of new degree and certificate 
programs has compounded this problem of standardization with  imprecise program or 
course names that imply  stronger connections to homeland security  content than 
actually exist. 
In the Homeland Security  Education Survey  Project,  John Rollins and Joseph  Rowan 
found that little standardization existed from one program  to the next in course design, 
content, or  delivery  system.35  Many  pre-9/11  emergency  management, disaster 
management, or public policy  programs had been merely  re-badged with the title 
“homeland security;” in  some cases the link to homeland security  was suspect, perhaps 
driven by  funding and recruitment factors,  rather than a truthful description of a 
program.36  Just as some degree programs were merely  renamed, others were cobbled 
together from  a few existing political science, public administration,  and other courses 
to create a new program  with an in-vogue homeland security  title. In both cases, they 
noted that degree titles did not necessarily  reflect the focus of the courses comprising 
the programs; and programs with similar  course titles might differ dramatically  in 
course content.37  Presumably, most  were legitimate efforts to help meet the emergent 
homeland security  education needs; however, others may  have been driven more by  a 
desire to capitalize on the national emphasis on homeland security  and the once 
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inconsistencies relating to program naming and content highlight McCreight’s concern 
regarding standardization.38 
Further exacerbating the problem of standardization, no uniform  program 
requirements or overarching program outcomes have been established to serve as 
guidelines for curriculum  development. Currently, higher education programs are 
required by  accreditation agencies to show how the program meets the standards of the 
accrediting body. Approval of newly  created degree programs is dependent upon having 
a comprehensive assessment plan and the ability  to document program  outcomes.39 
But, without established, agreed-upon outcomes, accreditation of homeland security 
degree programs becomes problematic.  To address this deficiency,  as other extant 
professional disciplines have, HSDECA has championed the development of homeland 
security  program outcomes and has initiated efforts to pursue recognition as an 
accrediting organization to ensure consistent quality  and focus.40  While these 
accreditation efforts may  provide the impetus for program  enhancements and 
drastically  improve the homeland security  educational system, caution must be 
exercised before blindly  adopting accreditation standards for  homeland security 
educational programs. As the 2006  Spellings Commission report noted, “Accreditation 
and federal and state regulations, while designed to assure quality  in higher  education, 
can sometimes impede innovation and limit the outside capital investment that is vital 
for expansion and capacity  building.”41 In the young and still evolving field of homeland 
security  graduate education, limitations on program  innovation, expansion, and 
capacity  building could be counterproductive. Nevertheless, institutions building new 
homeland security  programs could benefit if the field was able to assist them in 
identifying core program outcomes.
In part, the difficulty  in defining a standardized set  of educational outcomes stems 
from the lack of a  common definition of homeland security  and from parochial views 
about what is most important within the field. 42  Viewpoints are as wide as the field 
itself. As Bellavita observed, definitions of homeland security  often align  with 
jurisdictional perspectives: 
In  my  experience,  the emergency  management “community  of interest”  and the 
fire services tend to constellate around the All Hazards  definition, law 
enforcement  tends to cohere around Homeland Security  as Preventing 
Terrorism,  people  who work for a  federal  agency  tend toward Terrorism and 
Major Catastrophes,  and the Department of Defense sees homeland security  as 
what civilians do.43 [Emphasis in original]  
Bellavita proceeded to offer seven definitions of homeland security  that he suggested 
describe fundamental discipline-specific beliefs about  homeland security.  As with the 
DHS homeland security  priorities, while these definitions may  help define the scope of 
the diverse field of homeland security, they  are insufficient to outline a core set of 
graduate homeland security  courses; however, they  do hint at possible specialization 
areas to be included in an interdisciplinary program. 
Competencies and Outcomes
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Several other authors have also explored what content areas should comprise a graduate 
homeland security  core curriculum. Lists typically  include such  fundamental common 
areas as threats and vulnerabilities, science and technology  issues, roles and 
responsibilities of the varied levels of government, roles of other  public and private 
entities, planning procedures and processes, interagency  coordination and cooperation, 
legal aspects,  and intelligence and information sharing. These key  areas were reflected 
in  McIntyre’s 2002 list and continue to be considered as basic academic underpinnings 
of contemporary  homeland security  curricula.44 Yet, in the authors’ descriptions of these 
common areas, there is also a notable shift in emphasis coinciding with the occurrence 
of the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe: pre-Katrina lists emphasize combating terrorism 
while post-Katrina lists focus more on an all-hazards perspective.45   
Bellavita and Gordon also emphasize those common areas listed above. While 
described and combined somewhat differently, their list details the twelve competency 
areas that define the core instruction for  the CHDS master’s degree program.46 Evident 
in  their list, however, is a distinct emphasis on combating terrorism. In five instances, 
the term terrorists  or  terrorism is expressly  used to describe a given competency; in 
several others, this focus is alluded to indirectly.  For example, the emphasis on the role 
of terrorism in homeland security  is made explicitly  in highlighting  the requirement to 
understand the “logics,  strategies, methods, and consequences of terrorism;” this 
emphasis is made implicitly,  but equally  clearly, in their call to emphasize “science and 
technology of weapons of mass destruction.”   
At the Workshop on National Needs (WON2), cosponsored by  the Homeland 
Security  and Defense Education Consortium  and Texas A&M University  in 2007, 
representatives from  ten prominent universities sought to identify  “What  Employers 
Want from Graduate Education in Homeland Security.”47  To provide a  basis for  their 
assessment, they  invited key  homeland security  stakeholders to share their personal, 
vice institutional, perspectives. These stakeholders represented a  cross-section of 
federal, state,  and local government,  and private industry,  and included homeland 
security-related disciplines ranging from  law  enforcement and emergency  management 
to veterinary  medicine and food safety. The results indicated that these employers of 
homeland security  professionals affirmed the competencies previously  identified and 
displayed a distinctive post-Katrina emphasis on all-hazards planning and response. 
Specifically, the following knowledge, skills, and abilities were prominently  cited as 
core competencies: applying basic technology; a basic understanding of science, 
especially  the biological sciences; effective communications (written, oral and 
interpersonal); critical thinking and analysis; resource management (planning, 
budgeting and project management); and “real world experience.” While it  could be 
argued that effective communications and critical thinking and analysis are hallmarks of 
educated people in general, these skills have been repeatedly  cited as important for 
homeland security  professionals,  suggesting these skills may  take on even greater 
significance in  the complex, ambiguous, and hazardous world of homeland security. 
Additionally, the following discipline-specific content areas were emphasized: 
fundamentals of homeland security; fundamentals of government; business principles; 
criminal justice and law  enforcement; emergency  management; national defense and 
intelligence apparatus; risk management; and international considerations.48  
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McCreight’s own list included twelve key  topic areas that correlated closely  with other 
lists. Contrasted with Bellavita and Gordon,  McCreight did not expressly  include 
terrorism  in any  of his competencies; instead, he emphasized more of an all-hazards 
perspective, using the term emergency management in five of the twelve areas in his 
list. Also appearing in McCreight’s list was a focus on exercise design and coordination 
principles,49 as reflected in the HSDEC recommended content areas and related to the 
WON2 emphasis on real world experience. 
More recently, in  his address at the Fourth Annual Homeland Defense and Security 
Education Summit, Michael Chertoff, secretary  of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security  from  2005 to 2009, suggested seven core curriculum  elements integral to 
homeland security  education: (1) intelligence, to include collection,  analysis (with due 
consideration of the language, psychology,  and risk factors of terrorists),  and 
dissemination; (2) technology  capabilities focusing on software, detectors, and new 
systems; (3) emergency  management, including community  preparation, planning 
(which he described as a well-defined military  skill set  less frequently  visible in the civil 
sector), and response with a special focus on helping communities to become resilient 
by  building backup systems; (4) understanding of legal constraints that underpin all 
military  and governmental doctrines and actions; (5) international relations and 
processes, to include border security  and immigration, as well as relations and 
constraints specific to the European Union vice its constituent nations; (6) cyber-
security, and (7) social psychology, with  a increasing  focus on the need to incentivize 
behaviors.50  Chertoff’s list  overlapped with many  of the other  recommendations 
previously  summarized.  Again, a  post-Katrina  all-hazards perspective was emphasized; 
however, Chertoff also added a new focal point by  emphasizing the psychological aspect 
of homeland security  and the importance of positively  influencing behaviors in 
preparedness and mitigation aspects of crisis response. 
Without a well-defined set of standardized educational outcomes to guide program 
development, early  pioneers in homeland security  graduate education  were forced to 
build their programs “from  scratch,”  relying on inputs from  homeland security 
stakeholders to help refine the program design. In fact, CHDS attributes some of its 
success to the early  emphasis on tailoring the program  to the needs of the homeland 
security  leadership and practitioners the program  would serve.51  Based on their lessons 
learned through the development of the Pennsylvania State University  master’s program 
from infancy  to maturity,  Peter Forster and Jeremy  Plant offer  these invaluable insights 
for others seeking to build and institutionalize a quality  interdisciplinary  homeland 
security  graduate program: the program  should be based on market research, faculty 
must be committed to teaching in a  homeland security  program, solid program 
development is time intensive and cannot  be rushed, and the established program must 
be responsive to students and connect with the field’s practitioners.52 
The Workshop on National Needs  discussed earlier is an excellent example of the use 
of effective market research to identify  what competencies employers want  from 
homeland security  professionals. Forster  and Plant also suggest that effective market 
research will aid in selecting the most appropriate program delivery  mode – whether  it 
should be offered in residence,  online, or in  combination.53 To ensure the most qualified 
continue to be hired or  promoted, quality  programs that fit  individual professional 
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needs must be readily  accessible to homeland security  professionals. For some, access to 
online programs may  satisfy  their needs. Others may  prefer programs that offer a  more 
traditional face-to-face educational experience. In either case, programs should be 
provided through respected, accredited institutions,  and taught by  qualified faculty  with 
subject  matter  expertise in their  teaching area. K-State and CGSC are two such 
institutions. 
Since those early  days in the development of homeland security  educational 
programs, experts and practitioners have attempted to more narrowly  define specific 
program outcomes that would address specific competencies associated with the field of 
homeland security. At every  institution in which graduate homeland security  programs 
have been or are being developed, program planners must address this issue. Although 
these planners may  give due consideration to what other institutions have included, in 
the end, their  interpretations of what should be included and what should be 
emphasized invariably  results in a program distinct from any  of those that may  have 
served as models. In his remarks at the WON2, Stanley  Supinski,  a perennial pioneer 
and contributor  to the homeland security  education  effort, highlighted the significance 
of the institution-specific approach  to the development  of homeland security  graduate 
educational programs: “The programs and curricula we develop will take many  shapes, 
and certainly  the quality  and applicability  to certain  sectors of the workforce will vary.”54 
Quoting from Drabek, he continued,
But  the independence and autonomy  of the universities,  and those working 
within  all settings of higher  learning, must be maintained.  Decisions regarding 
curricular  content and assessments of academic excellence must  come from 
within  these institutions and accreditation procedures and bodies they  construct. 
As the professions of emergency  management  and homeland security  continue to 
evolve,  they  must become more active participants in  the standard setting 
process. 55 
In this context, K-State and CGSC began their  homeland security  graduate degree 
program development. 
HSDEC and DoD Recommendations and Guidelines  
Faced with the wide range of perspectives reflected in the literature,  curriculum 
developers sought to identify  the most  appropriate framework for  the development of 
the K-State/CGSC Homeland Security  Graduate Degree Program. Their search brought 
them  back to the recommendations of the initial HSDEC-sponsored workshop.56 
Although they  were developed in  2005, and prior to the more recent emphasis on all-
hazards planning and response, the HSDEC recommendations were a consensus 
perspective of twenty-five identified homeland security  educational experts and they 
continue to be widely  recognized and accepted. Not only  do they  encompass the critical 
curriculum components addressed in earlier literature, but they  also stress the 
importance of including practical applications and exercises,  an important aspect that 
had previously  been overlooked or downplayed by  some authors. Furthermore, the 
HSDEC-suggested content areas are concisely  organized, easily  transferrable to newly-
created degree programs, and useful in identifying critical curriculum content 
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requirements. In short,  they  were well-suited for  use in the development  of the K-State/
CGSC graduate program. 
Finally,  because the joint  K-State/CGSC graduate program  will include a significant 
number of military  students, curriculum  planners also examined those competencies 
considered by  the Department of Defense to be necessary  for  homeland security 
professionals. The twelve DoD competencies include the following areas: ethics, 
collaboration, communication, creative and critical thinking,  cultural awareness, 
strategic leadership,  management and planning skills,  adaptability, crisis management, 
critical expertise, science and technology  expertise, and risk management.57 Together, 
the HSDEC content area  recommendations and the DoD competencies have been used 
to aid in the comprehensive and on-going curriculum  development of the K-State/CGSC 
Homeland Security Graduate Degree Program. 
Recognizing its value, the “build-from-scratch” approach employed out of necessity 
by  those early  programs was adopted by  choice in the development of the K-State/CGSC 
curriculum. The development began with a comprehensive analysis of the needs of the 
regional homeland security  professionals and a correlation  of those expressed needs 
with  the established HSDEC and DoD recommendations. Ultimately,  this deliberate and 
systematic planning process is creating an  entirely  new program – not merely  including 
or modifying existing courses. When finalized, the new program  will comprise an 
entirely  new set of core courses specifically  tailored to match the needs of those whom 
the program will serve. 
DEVELOPING A REGIONALLY-RESPONSIVE PROGRAM:  
THE K-STATE/CGSC APPROACH
Methodology
At the 4th Annual Homeland Defense and Security  Education Summit, Barbara 
Yagerman, education, training and outreach director  for the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection, Department  of Homeland Security, described the approach that she sees as 
essential to the development of sound homeland security educational programs. 
We need to foster  development  of a  multi-disciplinary  academic  framework for 
homeland security  education. There is a  need for  a  "holistic  approach" to 
homeland security  education  that  provides the opportunity  to focus,  or  specialize 
in  discrete disciplines – such  as infrastructure protection  – within  the 
overarching umbrella.58
This “holistic approach” calls for a flexible and comprehensive program planning 
process. This process involves negotiations between and among the various stakeholders 
with their own organizational complexities, traditions, needs, and interests.59 
Considering the wide range of individual and institutional interests involved, Rosemary 
Caffarella’s interactive model of program planning was used as the basis for the 
development of this proposed interdisciplinary  homeland security  graduate program in 
an attempt to reflect the varied interests of the regional homeland security stakeholders.  
In her  interactive planning model, Caffarella  describes twelve components that 
should be considered when planning programs for adults.60  While all program planning 
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components apply  to the development  of the K-State/CGSC Homeland Security 
Graduate Program, planners initially  paid particular attention to five key  components: 
building a solid base of support,  discerning the context, identifying  program  ideas, 
sorting and prioritizing program ideas, and developing program objectives. 
Listening to Homeland Security Professionals
Building a Solid Base of Support
Rather than institutionalizing a curriculum  that merely  reflected the perspectives of 
those in  the academe, K-State and CGSC began to build a solid base of support by 
seeking input from  diverse groups of homeland security  providers. Planners from both 
institutions jointly  conducted a Regional Homeland Security  Educational Needs 
Analysis Workshop to collect regional-specific data that  could help shape the 
development of a viable homeland security  graduate program  designed to serve the 
diverse needs of homeland security  professionals throughout the Midwest. The 100 
attending stakeholders represented academic, first responder, government (federal, 
state, tribal,  and local), health, private industry, and military  perspectives. Data was 
collected using both  written  surveys and facilitated focus groups. These data were then 
aligned with previously  identified HSDEC content areas and DoD competencies to form 
core common areas that should be included in the proposed master’s degree program. 
Six randomly  assigned focus groups, with an average of sixteen participants each, 
were asked to respond to three discussion questions, adhering  to workshop ground rules 
established to ensure a free exchange of ideas in an environment of open and respectful 
debate. The following discussion questions guided the focus groups in  identifying 
program ideas: 
1. Identify and describe homeland security as a profession and as a field of study. As 
concisely as possible, tell us what homeland security signifies to you.
2. What are the regional specialized emphasis areas needed? 
3. What are the key skill sets and required knowledge critical to this specialization? 
For  each focus group, K-State and CGSC shared responsibility  to provide a facilitator 
and an information technology  manager to moderate and collect group discussion key 
points. 
Discerning the Context
Question 1  asked participants to “identify  and describe homeland security  as a 
profession and as a field of study.” This question served as an ice breaker to encourage 
attendees to share their perspectives and as a means to ensure that  the group members 
had a common understanding of the professional and academic contexts in which 
development of the graduate program  would take place. While the groups gained 
consensus on this without significant disagreement,  their responses nevertheless 
represented a range of emphasis areas that seemed to align with  individuals’ 
concentration areas – just  as Bellavita had concluded from his own experiences.61  At the 
end of the first hour, each group’s comments were saved on a common access network 
drive and made available to other groups for review. 
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Identifying Program Ideas
The second hour of the focus group sessions began with a review of other groups’ 
responses to the first question to informally  compare and contrast with their  own 
group’s response and to determine if the group wanted to make any  adjustments or 
refinements to its definition as a result of this review. Still in their  original groups, 
participants then addressed the second discussion question: “What are the regional 
specialized emphasis areas needed?” At the end of the second hour, workshop 
coordinators and facilitators reviewed the focus group responses to identify  common 
specialization areas. Six  representative areas emerged from this initial review: 
agriculture and food, health and medical, information management and cyber security, 
strategic communication, homeland defense and civil support, and all-hazards planning 
and policy.
Sorting and Prioritizing Ideas
All workshop participants were then reconvened as a large group to review the focus 
group discussion summaries and the six  specializations areas defined by  previous 
sessions.  For  the final question, attendees were asked to participate in the specialization 
focus group that  best  reflected their  own expertise. This self-selection  was designed to 
ensure that  those most expert  in a given area were the ones proposing curriculum 
content information. The groups were to consider: “What are the key  skill sets and 
required knowledge critical to this specialization? List  content areas required for  this 
specialization.”  Although groups were asked to focus specifically  on skills unique to their 
areas of expertise,  the group responses overlapped, highlighting the following key  skill 
sets: 
• Understanding communications and language
• Leadership, public speaking, and critical thinking
• Infrastructure protection and assessment 
• Emergency and/or disaster management 
An additional theme appeared important to a majority  of participants, but had no 
specific curriculum  implications: each content area specialization group highlighted the 
importance of understanding the differences between public health and medical 
services. Other responses during this focus group session affirmed the discussions in the 
earlier  sessions regarding what skills and knowledge homeland security  professionals 
need; however, little information was gleaned to guide specific course content 
development. 
Unsure of what data the focus groups would produce, and to augment the data 
collected through the focus group sessions, attendees were also asked to complete a 
written survey  through which they  could provide individual perspectives that might not 
have been fully  reflected in the entire group’s work. Fifty-six completed surveys were 
received from  100 attendees for a 56  percent response rate.  Table 1  shows the sample 
distribution by employment area. 
Table 1. Survey Sample Distribution by Employment Area
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State government 7 12.5% 7.0%
Federal Government 14 25.0% 14.0%
First responders 6 10.7% 6.0%
Health/Medical 3 5.4% 3.0%
Business 2 3.6% 2.0%
Academia 7 12.5% 7.0%
Military 6 10.7% 6.0%
Other* 11 19.6% 11.0%
Total 56 100.0% 56.0%
*Includes representatives of local government, chamber of commerce, public health, retired, emergency 
management, and a private consultant.
These surveys also highlighted some important common themes. For example, one 
question asked respondents to recommend a program  name: “In your opinion, what is 
the most appropriate name for a degree program that provides both  a broad overview  of 
homeland security  and, on  an elective basis, specific in-depth focus in areas of 
specialization?” Responses to this question reflected a wide range of options consistent 
with  the range of program names described by  Rollins and Rowan in the Homeland 
Security  Education Survey  Project.62  Not surprisingly, and reinforcing Bellavita’s 
conclusions, the recommendations often emphasized the respondents’ areas of interest 
within homeland security.63 Most recommendations included homeland security  as the 
root, with additional descriptors appended to focus on such areas as policy  and 
management, emergency  management, or preparedness.  Others included homeland 
security  as the emphasis area for a  degree in public health, public administration, or 
business administration. 
Responses to the survey  questions also closely  paralleled the focus group results.  On 
the survey, respondents were asked to “Identify  and describe what you believe are the 
core professional competencies required by  those involved in delivering Homeland 
Security. What do all graduates of this program need to know?”  A review  of the 
responses to this question yielded five areas that attendees considered core 
competencies for homeland security  professionals: homeland security  structures, 
authorities,  roles, and responsibilities (30.4  percent); management and leadership, 
including decision-making, interpersonal skills, and critical thinking (21.4  percent); 
planning and capabilities (19.6  percent); common language and understanding (16.1 
percent); and knowledge of incident command systems, including the National Incident 
Management System  (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) (12.5 
percent). 
In a third question,  attendees were asked: “If you were to develop 3 to 4  required, 
core courses in Homeland Security  curriculum, what  courses would you include? If 
possible, provide a 2  to 3  sentence description of these proposed courses.”  Responses to 
this question also aligned closely  with the results of the focus groups, as well as with the 
recommendations made by  Bellavita and Gordon, McCreight, and others.64  The most 
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commonly  cited recommendations from the surveys included these areas: risk, threat, 
and vulnerability  assessment (28.6 percent); incident  command, NIMS, and NRF (25.0 
percent); communication and understanding language (19.6  percent); history  (14.3 
percent); legal considerations (14.3 percent); and strategic policy (14.3 percent). 
Correlating Regional Data with HSDEC Recommended Content Areas and 
DoD Competencies
Through the comprehensive analysis of focus group and survey  data, the needs analysis 
workshop helped to identify  fifteen discrete region-defined core competencies and 
highlighted the need for an interdisciplinary  program  to address each of those diverse 
competencies. These results were then correlated with the HSDEC Graduate Program 
Recommended Content Areas and DoD Competencies to help define program  core 
course content.  The correlation of the workshop regional data to HSDEC educational 
content areas and DoD homeland security competencies is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Alignment of Workshop Core Common Areas with HSDEC Recommended Content 
Areas and DoD Competencies
HSDEC 
Content Areas Workshop Core Common Areas
DoD Core 
Competencies
Content Area 1 
Current and Emerging 
Threats
Historical aspects of domestic incidents Critical expertise
Human factors and psychology of domestic incidents, sociology, 
needs of people (resiliency)
Cultural Awareness 
Understand and identify characteristics of domestic threats 
(manmade and natural; accidental and purposeful) and hazards 
(chemical, biological, natural, terrorism, domestic threats, etc.)
Risk Management 
Content Area 2 
Context and 
Organization
Policy, roles, and responsibilities at National, Tribal, State and 
Local organizational levels (including preparation, preparedness/
protection, response, and recovery)
Critical expertise
Policy, roles, and responsibilities of non-profits, volunteers, and 
private sectors (within crisis continuum preparation, preparedness/
protection, response, and recovery)
Critical expertise
Common language, understand and learn acronyms, TEN code 
common terms, Homeland Security terminology
Communication 
Role of military in domestic incidents Critical expertise
Crisis Management 
Content Area 3 
Policies, Strategies, 
Legal Issues
Core focus on state and local level structures Critical expertise
Legal aspects of domestic incidents Ethics 
Content Area 4 
Processes and 
Management
Common national plan and emergency systems (National 
Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management 
System (NIMS))
Collaboration 
Border and transportation security Critical expertise
Infrastructure protection, critical infrastructure and impact on 
homeland functions
Science and Technology 
Expertise
Understand and identify assets for use in domestic incidents Management and 
Planning Skills 
Content Area 5 
Practical Application     
Leadership in crisis situations from the local, state, tribal, and 
federal levels (communication with the public)
Strategic Leadership 
Exercises, training, practicum as part of course (Table Top 
Exercise, training scenario, vignette-based practical exercise)
Adaptability 
Creative and Critical 
Thinking 
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Developing Program Objectives and Core Courses
Based on this comprehensive analysis, the program  areas were defined and aligned with 
each  institution’s content area and discipline strengths. From  this conceptual 
framework, specific program objectives were developed to support each  of the 
workshop-defined competency  areas. These program  objectives were then prioritized to 
define common core requirements and specialization areas of emphasis. The resultant 
proposed curriculum included fifteen credit hours devoted to core required courses and 
fifteen credit hours within an emphasis area. 
Core courses were defined to address the foundational and interdisciplinary  program 
objectives and will focus on five broad areas. Proposed course titles include Foundations 
of Homeland Security, Homeland Threats, Organizations Amid Crisis, Homeland 
Security  Processes and Management, and Homeland Security  in Practice. As previously 
referenced, Yagerman suggested homeland security  professionals need educational 
programs that provide a broad-based understanding of the field while also allowing 
them  to focus in  their  areas of specialization.65  While a  general homeland security 
curriculum will initially  be launched incorporating the core courses identified above, 
curriculum planners also envision the development of six additional emphasis areas, 
building upon the strengths of K-State and CGSC. These emphasis areas will include 
agriculture and food, health and medicine,  information management and cyber security, 
strategic communications, all-hazards planning and policy, and homeland defense and 
civil support. Within each of the emphasis areas, new  courses will  be developed to 
support the program objectives. In addition to developing program  objectives and core 
courses, other important issues must be considered before a  program  is fully 
implemented.  
Institutional Challenges 
Unique institutional issues are created when developing new interdisciplinary  degree 
programs, including decisions as to where the program  should be housed, what 
admissions standards should be applied,  and other critical concerns. Building 
institution-wide support can also be problematic. Institutional support waxes and wanes 
in  the face of shifting leadership priorities,  and may  completely  collapse as institutional 
leadership changes. The homeland security  field has already  witnessed the demise of 
potentially  premier academic degree programs in  the face of withering institutional 
support or  critical personnel changes. These concerns, coupled with budgetary 
constraints that accompany  the building of new academic programs in times of 
economic stress, challenge even the best curriculum development plan. Undeniably, 
institutions opting to build homeland security  programs from  existing degrees are more 
efficient in  terms of time and money  but the question remains to what degree are they 
meeting the identified needs of homeland security professionals. 
As previously  discussed,  a fundamental planning consideration for  this graduate 
program was to ensure that  the final design would represent a  built-from-scratch 
approach to meeting the actual educational needs of the homeland security 
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professionals it  will serve, rather  than merely  repackaging and remarketing courses that 
currently  existed in the two collaborating institutions. As a result, extensive curriculum 
development to create new, relevant courses is currently  underway. Significant progress 
has been made, but significant work also remains to be done. 
CONCLUSION
Throughout higher education, significant emphasis has been placed on improving the 
accessibility  and quality  of homeland security  graduate educational offerings. Thus far, 
the catalyst  for  these efforts has been the federal government through a  number of 
organizations, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security  hosted at the Naval Postgraduate School,  and the 
Homeland Security  and Defense Education Consortium (originally  established by  the 
U.S. Northern Command, and now replaced by  the Homeland Security  and Defense 
Education Consortium  Association). While these efforts have been productive, future 
success will depend not only  on the collective and collaborative efforts of these federally-
sponsored homeland security  entities, but also on the research, innovation, and 
knowledge expansion provided by  key  educational institutions which have expertise in 
these areas. This article has described the efforts of two such institutions, K-State and 
CGSC, which  have collaborated to develop a homeland security  graduate degree 
program using a novel approach to ensure the expressed educational needs of homeland 
security  professionals are addressed. More broadly, this article has traced the growing 
maturity of homeland security as the profession moves toward a theory of curriculum. 
As Forster and Plant observed, building and institutionalizing a quality 
interdisciplinary  homeland security  graduate program takes time if it  is to be done well. 
Program  development must, therefore, be accomplished in a  deliberate and methodical 
manner.  The program must be based on appropriate market research  to ensure the 
content and delivery  methods are aligned with  the needs of the prospective students and 
the priorities of the homeland security  entities the program  will serve; it must be 
responsive to students and connected to practitioners; and it  must be delivered by 
knowledgeable faculty who are genuinely interested in homeland security. 66   
An issue that many  institutions may  face is the matter of qualified and committed 
faculty, defined by  Forster and Plant to be an essential element of a  viable graduate 
program. As Supinski pointed out in a 2009 homeland security  education update,67 
identifying individuals who have the academic credentials and the research and 
scholarship background required to become faculty  members is one of the most pressing 
issues facing institutions developing graduate level homeland security  degree programs. 
This issue is further  magnified by  the dearth of homeland security-specific doctoral 
programs or the identification of a  complementary  doctoral degree program that would 
support the intellectual development required of individuals who could serve as the 
primary program instructors.  
Over  the past two years, K-State and CGSC have conducted a thorough and deliberate 
program planning process that  models the Forster and Plant recommendations. 68  First, 
they  conducted targeted market research through focus groups and surveys of various 
stakeholders, including homeland security  practitioners and employers. That data  was 
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then analyzed and aligned with the HSDEC Recommended Content Areas and the DoD 
Competencies to help define program outcomes and course objectives. This analysis 
yielded a set of fifteen core common areas that  were then organized into five core areas 
and six specialization areas of emphasis. 
Although creating a interdisciplinary  program enables homeland security 
professionals to concentrate in their discipline-specific emphasis areas, this approach 
also complicates the process of identifying program  outcomes and demands that 
individual disciplines share in  the learning outcome and assessment processes to 
contribute to program  improvement.  To address this challenge, next steps include 
developing program  assessments (in partnership with discipline-specific subject  matter 
experts) that will enable program  critique and improvement through the assessment of 
learning outcomes.  These assessments will  include various instruments such as 
embedded course assignments and portfolios to ensure students achieve the level of 
professional preparation dictated by  the program  outcomes. While in the initial stages of 
defining the assessment process,  it is expected that  one key  assessment instrument will 
capitalize on  a  specific CGSC strength by  incorporating a capstone simulation exercise to 
evaluate students’ abilities to apply  program knowledge in a  realistic homeland security 
scenario. 
The proposed Homeland Security  Graduate Degree Program consolidates the 
strengths of two institutions to fulfill the regional needs identified by  the key  homeland 
security  stakeholders at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.  Development of this 
program capitalized on the long-standing educational partnership between these 
institutions, drawing on the expertise of six  different K-State colleges and five teaching 
departments within CGSC.  The result was the creation of new  program  focused on 
meeting the specific regional needs of the homeland security  profession, rather  than 
merely  revising existing programs to generate rapid enrollment growth and financial 
gain.
Finally,  this collaboration between K-State and CGSC represents an important step 
toward building a community  of practice in support of Homeland Security  research  and 
education and, ultimately, better  protection of American  citizens from future 
catastrophic terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Clearly  there is still a  need for 
additional quality  homeland security  graduate programs. Other institutions considering 
adding new  (or  revising existing) homeland security  graduate programs should consider 
the use of the HSDEC and DoD competencies as a framework for program  analysis and 
design, as emphasis on these areas may  help to reduce the accreditation, 
standardization, instructional quality, and competency  measurement concerns. The 
process described here may  serve as a useful model to ensure that the resulting program 
effectively  meets the standards for  quality  and rigor expected by  the homeland security 
educational community; that it  adequate accommodates the access and relevance 
demands of the region’s homeland security  professionals; and that it fulfills the 
expectations of value and applicability  for  the federal,  state, tribal and local homeland 
security agencies and other stakeholders. 
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Development of an Outcomes-Based Undergraduate Curriculum 
in Homeland Security 
Jim Ramsay, Daniel Cutrer, and Robert Raffel 
INTRODUCTION  
The homeland security construct has become a large, complex, and dynamic enterprise, 
consisting of multiple professions, skill sets, and expertise. Homeland security is large in 
that it consists of several public sector agencies, organizations, and many hundreds of 
thousands of employees. Homeland security is complex in that it includes dozens, if not 
hundreds of job descriptions which count a plethora of duties, skills, and behaviors 
among their employees. Finally, homeland security is dynamic in the sense that it is a 
process, not an end point; a process which requires constant innovation and undergoes 
unrelenting evolution. These forces operate from strategic to tactical levels in order to 
meet often asymmetric and irregular threats (natural, man-made, or technological).  
As the current homeland security workforce ages, there exists an anticipated need 
throughout the U.S. for competent, educated homeland security professionals, in both 
public and private sectors. Hence, there has been both opportunity and pressure in 
higher education to quickly develop degree programs that will produce the next 
generation of homeland security practitioners.1 In addition, the commitment by the U.S. 
to continue development in the areas of homeland defense and homeland security is 
expected to continue.2 It is estimated that over 300 programs now exist which claim to 
offer some sort of homeland security education; that is, either an associate’s degree, an 
undergraduate degree, a graduate degree, or a certificate.3 This is in stark contrast to the 
known thirty-five dedicated undergraduate homeland security programs that existed in 
2007.4 As rate of rapid growth continues, academic program development has to date 
produced irregular and inconsistent core curricula.  
Given the scope of the homeland security enterprise, it is perhaps understandable 
that standardized core curricula are either absent or inconsistent. However, the issue of 
inconsistent core curricula exists, at least in part, due to the fact that no professional 
association has been established that can offer a vetted or even published set of 
program-level student learning outcomes (i.e., those outcomes that describe the 
curriculum in terms of knowledge, skills and abilities that students acquire at the 
program level), that can guide or provide model curricula to emergent homeland 
security programs.5 Nor is there an organization that has itself been recognized or 
certified by either the United States Department of Education (USDoE) or the Council 
for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) to perform accreditation for academic 
homeland security programs. Although this study is not a defense of whether 
accreditation should or should not occur in academic homeland security, the authors 
point out that when accreditation does exist in professional curricula such as medicine, 
law, engineering, nursing or dietetics, etc., program-level accreditation provides a de 
facto template for emergent programs to model their own core curriculum development.  
As a professional practice, homeland security is a complex and dynamic enterprise. It 
follows that academic homeland security must stay abreast of the nuances, complexities, 
and changes that describe and constitute the homeland security construct. The first 
organization to attempt to identify, collect, and examine academic programs for shared 
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research and discussion was the Homeland Security and Defense Education 
Consortium, or HSDEC. Since HSDEC’s inception, growth in the academic field of 
homeland security programs has been phenomenal. As interesting as such growth may 
be, it leads to particular challenges. These challenges are largely the same as those faced 
by all other occupations that have matured into proper professions. Namely, what does 
it mean to be a homeland security professional? Who can or cannot be a homeland 
security professional? Can one become certified to practice homeland security? What is 
the knowledge base of the practice? Who regulates this knowledge base?  
Over time, answering such questions will be critical if homeland security is to become 
more than a job description or more than simply an occupation. This study aimed to 
address a subset of these questions; namely, what are the student learning outcomes 
that should describe an undergraduate degree in homeland security? Although there are 
undoubtedly other ways of addressing the validity of homeland security curricula, 
student learning outcomes are solid indicators of the knowledge, skills and abilities that 
students bring to the discipline, and add value to the discussion. 
Purpose of the Study 
Recognizing the simultaneous lack of guidance from professional associations and 
accrediting bodies in homeland security, the challenges facing all new homeland 
security programs are what core academic areas should be included in an undergraduate 
curriculum, and what student learning outcomes should students be able to 
demonstrate upon completion of the program? The twofold purpose of this study was to 
develop and test a consensus set of core academic areas that could be used to represent 
the breadth of the homeland security enterprise in an undergraduate curriculum.6 
Second, the study aimed to develop and examine both a consensus set of educational 
objectives and program-level student learning outcomes for an undergraduate 
curriculum in homeland security. What follows is a brief description of HSDEC as the 
nation’s first attempt to systematically consider and address the challenges facing 
homeland security program development. The next section describes program-level 
accreditation and outcomes-based education as it exists in higher education, followed by 
the methodology and results including the core academic areas of homeland security 
and a complete set of the resultant student learning outcomes.   
The Homeland Security and Defense Consortium (HSDEC)7 
In the summer of 2003, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was faced with the 
prospect of hiring a workforce capable of successfully carrying out its recently 
designated homeland defense and security mission set. The Command quickly realized 
that personnel with the required knowledge and skill sets were not readily available in 
either the military or civilian communities. The challenge of meeting the demand led to 
the establishment of the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium, or 
HSDEC. Though initially intended to enhance academic program development and 
consequently provide more options to command personnel, the organization summarily 
took on the broader role of promoting education, research, and cooperation to support 
the national homeland security/homeland defense (HS/HD) mission.  
Taking the lead in advancing education in the civilian community was unique to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), but justified. DoD has historically met such challenges by 
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educating its own personnel and allies to improve performance against a common 
enemy. USNORTHCOM partners potentially include first responders, Title 32 National 
Guard forces, federal agencies, and a host of other partners from government and 
private communities. This diverse partnership is especially pertinent given the 
somewhat bifurcated mission of NORTHCOM to provide for defense of the homeland 
and support to civil authorities. The consortium developed a long-term view that 
interoperability between these potential partners would be enhanced through common 
understanding of each other’s roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. Overall, the 
USNORTHCOM effort encouraged multiple paths, goals, and topics ranging from 
substance to technique. Although not necessarily DoD-centric, the recognition of valid 
research areas within the ambit of homeland security and homeland defense helped 
produce the beginnings of a robust research initiative and professional association.   
Academic membership in the HSDEC grew very rapidly. In just four years, the 
number of affiliated organizations exceeded 250 universities, colleges, and other 
interested agencies. Expansion was supported by engaging in a variety of functions to 
include holding conferences with themes focusing on national and regional issues, 
developing a newsletter with pertinent HS/HD education information, and establishing 
a very successful internship program. 
In 2007 the HSDEC leadership decided that the organization had grown beyond the 
originally intended scope of the Department of Defense and that it would be more 
appropriate as a member-run organization similar to other discipline-specific 
associations such as the American Society of Safety Engineers, the International 
Association of Intelligence Education, etc. HSDEC ceased to exist in November 2008, 
converting to HSDECA, the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium 
Association. HSDECA in turn set its initial sights on becoming a professional 
membership association for homeland security professionals and began work on 
developing an accreditation function for academic homeland security. The role of the 
HSDEC in establishing a homeland security and defense academic community was an 
important step. HSDEC recognized that guidance and a coordinating body might be 
useful to the subsequent development of academic homeland security, and it stepped in 
to fill this void until the community could organize effectively. Program-level 
accreditation and the role it played in this study are discussed below: 
What is Program-Level Accreditation? 
Program accreditation (also known as specialized accreditation) is both a structure and 
a process that demonstrates a measure of public accountability that graduates have 
mastered a baseline set of knowledge and skills in order to function as required in 
specific professional venues. It is a measure of quality assurance that a program is 
teaching what it should be, and that graduates have the discipline-specific outcomes 
(knowledge, skills, behaviors) required by practitioners. According to CHEA, 
“Accreditation is a process of external quality review used by higher education to 
scrutinize colleges, universities, and educational programs for quality assurance and 
quality improvement.”8 Ultimately, not only do organizations that accredit these 
academic programs provide outcomes that all academic programs seeking accreditation 
must demonstrate and therefore all students in those programs acquire, they also 
provide guidance to academic institutions that develop and maintain degree programs 
in these disciplines.9  
RAMSAY, ET AL, OUTCOMES-BASED UNDERGRADUATE CURRICULUM 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
4 
While there are social, regulatory and economic pressures that may contribute to the 
demand for program accreditation within a discipline, there can also be pressure within 
the discipline to move toward program accreditation as a mechanism to further define 
itself or to protect its scope of professional operations. For example, just as there are 
legal requirements for physicians or lawyers to be licensed or dieticians to be registered 
in order to practice, these same professions actively set, maintain, and disseminate their 
own student outcomes. Programs that cannot demonstrate that their programs offer the 
prescribed outcomes do not become accredited and, consequently, such graduates can 
not become licensed to practice.  
Accreditation has evolved over time. Early on, accreditation was process oriented and 
typically required academic programs to offer a given set of topics in a prescribed 
sequence. The presumption was that students passing such classes had indeed mastered 
the knowledge or skill set required in their profession. While a process orientation had a 
certain appeal and convenience, problems associated with such an assumption included 
the need for academic programs to continuously offer classes that were (at least 
superficially) tied or matched to professional requirements, and the simple observation 
that passing grades did not always equate to a mastered skill. Outcomes-based 
education offered solutions to this problem and will be discussed in more detail below. 
Over the last ten years, academic accreditation has evolved and has moved away from 
a rigid dependence on process orientation (i.e., a required list of courses) and instead 
has moved toward a set of outcomes that represent behaviors, skills, and knowledge 
practitioners need to possess in order to function in their profession. Such outcomes-
based requirements require institutions or academic programs to demonstrate that their 
graduates have an appropriate set of knowledge, skills, and behaviors required by the 
profession when completing their course of study. As such, programs are incentivized to 
work in closer partnership with their professional counterparts and to concentrate on 
teaching/evaluating their students in areas that matter to practitioners and employers. 
This is not to suggest that higher education has abandoned more holistic or 
comprehensive education ideals or that outcomes-based education reduces to “training” 
and avoids true “education.” In many areas of homeland security, for example, the 
ability to engage in critical thinking, to analyze and to express oneself concisely, both 
verbally and in writing, are important, if not critical aspects of the homeland security 
educational experience. The presumption with such outcomes-based accreditation in 
higher education is that it constitutes a powerful means of ensuring degree integrity and 
quality.  
In higher education, accreditation occurs at both the institutional (college or 
university) level, as well as at the level of individual programs (aka specialized 
accreditation). Institutions can be accredited by organizations recognized by the U.S. 
Department of Education (USDoE), or the Council on Higher Education Accreditation 
(CHEA) which incorporates the regional accrediting bodies such as North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools. Academic programs can also be accredited by an 
organization, such as the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology or ABET. 
Enhancing the reliability and credibility of the accreditation process, accrediting bodies 
such as ABET are themselves often recognized by either the USDoE or by CHEA. For 
example, ABET is recognized as an accrediting body by CHEA.  
However, not all programs in higher education pursue or maintain accreditation. For 
example, even though ABET has accreditation criteria for bachelors degrees in 
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occupational safety and health, only a relatively small number (eleven) of the 188 
programs possess ABET accreditation.10 Further, although most accrediting bodies 
manage and adjudicate accreditation procedures and decisions, they neither develop nor 
maintain the program-level outcomes that define or characterize a field or profession. 
This is usually done by consensus inside professional associations that represent a given 
field. As an example, the Education Standards Committee in the American Society of 
Safety Engineers (ASSE) develops and maintains the ABET criteria for academic safety 
programs.  
In several disciplines, modern accreditation requires a program to demonstrate that 
they have achieved a defensible level of integrity, outcomes-based performance, and 
continuous quality improvement.11 The rationale behind continuous quality 
improvement as it occurs in program accreditation is to revisit the educational 
standards and outcomes used in program accreditation often enough so as to be 
reflective and responsive to changes in the field. Additionally, the nature of outcomes-
based accreditation is to suggest that outcomes are not inviolable. They are in fact 
subject to change as the field changes, or as best practices evolve, or the body of 
knowledge changes.12  
Among other components, and although it varies across disciplines, outcomes-based 
program-level accreditation typically requires each academic program to demonstrate at 
least six goals. Each program needs to demonstrate:  
1. How their program meets the mission of their college and university.  
2. How their students achieve the educational objectives set by the program.  
3. How the needs of the program’s constituents are reflected in the program and how 
the program meets those needs.13  
4. That all students are exposed to the required program level outcomes, and that a 
reasonable percentage accomplishes them.  
5. The program possesses adequately trained and qualified faculty, resources, and 
institutional support.14  
6. The program has a mechanism to gather data from students, advisory boards, and 
other constituents in order to engage in self reflection and continuous quality 
improvement.  
In this fashion accreditation serves to guide the curricular development of a program 
over time (as well as provide a template for newly developing programs), which requires 
programs to have a mechanism in place whereby they consistently monitor the needs of 
their constituents, assures degree integrity, and helps to delegitimize “diploma mills.” 
Although not the only method to achieve these goals, specialized accreditation 
constitutes a time-tested and generally accepted methodology to help ensure the validity 
of a degree. Indeed, outcomes-based program accreditation preserves, protects, and 
disseminates the intellectual core of any profession that undergoes the process. By any 
profession, the authors seek to underscore the efficacy of an accreditation process to 
disciplines across the spectrum of intellectual endeavor. One need not to become an 
engineer, for example, to benefit from the focus, methodology and intellectual quality 
that accreditation brings to the process of developing a curriculum.  
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Outcomes-based Education in Curriculum Development 
The field of education has long recognized the principles and theories of outcomes-
based education (OBE), which emphasize result-oriented thinking. Outcomes-based 
education, or as it is sometimes called, standards-based or performance-based 
education, is not new. OBE has been referred to as standards-based education, since it 
essentially creates specific, concrete, measurable standards in an integrated curriculum 
framework. These standards then apply across the curriculum of a degree program. 
Traditional curricula may have been more subject-based in the past; however, the 
transition to more competencies-based approaches is beginning to take place within the 
university sector as a whole.15 In the last ten years, academic accreditation has evolved 
and has moved away from a rigid process orientation (i.e., a required list of courses) and 
instead has moved toward a set of outcomes that represent behaviors, skills, and 
knowledge practitioners need to possess in order to function in their profession.16 As 
such, outcome-based programs are incentivized to work in closer partnership with their 
professional constituents and to concentrate on teaching/evaluating their students on 
things that matter to practitioners. The presumption with such outcomes-based 
accreditation in higher education is that it is a powerful means of ensuring degree 
integrity and quality.17   
One study that examined the future directions of higher education showed that core 
competencies are being used to redefine and shape outcomes-based curricula across 
many academic degree programs in recent decades18. While developing a core 
competency model for a graduate degree program, Judith Calhoun and others found 
that educators across diverse disciplines agree that competency- or outcomes-based 
education can improve individual performance, enhance communication and 
coordination across courses, and provide an impetus for curriculum development.19 
According to Jack Lohmann, universities and colleges throughout the United States are 
increasingly being required by accreditation organizations to demonstrate that they 
have appropriate self-regulating processes in place to assure that they are achieving 
their stated missions and goals.20   
Based on the review of current literature discussed above, we felt that the educational 
concept of OBE can be a valuable tool in the training of undergraduates in the field of 
homeland security, because it focuses on the outcome of the education (what 
knowledge, skills, and abilities the graduates have earned) rather than on the input to 
the education. In order to develop measurable program-level outcomes in a homeland 
security undergraduate degree, our study examined the model used by the Accrediting 
Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), the largest, most established accrediting 
body in the U.S, as an exemplar.   
Recognizing the need to teach graduates the knowledge, skills, and abilities that are 
tied to program-level outcomes, ABET adopted the new set of standards in 1996, called 
Engineering Criteria 2000,21 which shifted the basis for accreditation from inputs (such 
as what is taught) to outputs (what is learned). In 2002, ABET commissioned a study to 
assess whether the implementation of its new evaluation criteria , known as EC2000, 
had the intended effect of implementing an outcomes-based education methodology 
that led to improved student learning outcomes. As the first national study of an OBE 
accreditation model, the ABET EC2000 report indicated clearly that the implementation 
of the outcomes-based accreditation criteria had a positive, substantial, impact on 
engineering programs, student experiences, and student learning.22  
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This ABET report provides empirical data that validates the success of implementing 
outcomes-based curricula for an engineering degree program. Likewise, we believe the 
development of a homeland security degree program can benefit equally from 
incorporation of OBE into its curricula and subsequent accreditation standards. Hence, 
our study posits that there should be baseline standards for an academic homeland 
security curriculum, and that these standards should be based on measurable, 
outcomes-based, program-level requirements.  
Several studies have addressed the issue of graduate preparedness for entering the 
workplace.23 These studies show that employers are increasingly looking for transferable 
knowledge and skills. Transferable in this context means that knowledge, skills and 
abilities (KSAs) acquired while in the university are, to the largest extent practicable, 
directly applicable to the needs of the homeland security field. Today’s employers in the 
field of homeland security/homeland defense recognize the value of employees who 
bring a validated set of KSA to the field of homeland security, and are willing to reward 
those skills with higher starting pay.24  
Quality education demands a process of continuous improvement by systematically 
and collectively evaluating and refining the system, practices, and culture of educational 
institutions in order to meet the needs of the customers and constituents. This is 
certainly true in the dynamic field of academic homeland security, where missions, 
policies, and doctrines are subject to change as new threats emerge and successive 
administrations grapple with asymmetric terrorism and natural disasters. As a 
pedagogical tool, outcomes-based education can be used to reshape accreditation and 
certification across the discipline of academic homeland security, making certain that 
graduates of a homeland security program are equipped with the KSA to deal with 
emergent threats.   
METHODOLOGY 
In the absence of a vetted and published set of accreditation outcomes concentrated on 
the practice of homeland security and maintained by an association that represents the 
homeland security profession, the authors determined that an expert panel could be 
used to develop a robust set of student learning outcomes. A panel of subject matter 
experts (SME) was formed by contacting eight homeland security professionals with 
extensive educational and professional credentials across a wide range of topic areas 
including emergency management, homeland security law and policy, terrorism studies, 
critical infrastructure and risk analysis, state and federal law enforcement, strategic 
planning, military planning and operations, and homeland defense. The eight panelists 
represented a cross-section of expertise and experience in a variety of areas involving 
homeland security. Some offered multiple areas of expertise, such as the Circuit Court 
judge who spent thirty-seven years as a JAG Officer in the Navy before retiring as a 
Captain, O-6, and was able to provide valuable comments in areas involving both 
civilian-centered criminal justice and issues pertaining primarily to the military. 
Together, the eight panelists combined to have 120 years of experience in homeland 
security. (See Appendix 1 for a short biographical sketch of each panelist.)  
The Delphi Technique25 was employed as the means to develop consensus among the 
SME. A web-based survey instrument was used to deliver information and collect 
responses from the panel. The Delphi Technique presumes each member proceeds from 
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a common platform and common vocabulary.26 Hence, the authors provided working 
definitions for the terms “academic homeland security,” “educational objective,” “core 
academic area.”27 Prior to the start of the survey process, an orientation packet 
consisting of sixteen pages of information was sent to each panelist. The packet was 
intended to facilitate a common understanding among all panelists. Items included 
characteristics of the Delphi Technique, how panelists were to use the online survey to 
submit their opinions, a list of basic accreditation terms and concepts, principles of 
adult learning and outcomes-based education, and a primer on Bloom’s taxonomy to aid 
in restating their ideas into the format of a student learning outcome.  
For the purpose of this study, the following questions were put to the panelists:  
1. Given the breadth that exists in the practice of homeland security, what would 
constitute a set of core academic areas that would capture the essence (for an 
undergraduate student) the intellectual core of the field and the broad practice 
areas of the field? (Here, consensus was sought on both the area and the definition 
of the area). 
2. What would constitute a set of educational objectives and overall program 
outcomes; that is, outcomes common to all undergraduate degree programs in 
homeland security? (Here consensus was sought on developing the set of 
objectives and overall outcomes). 
3. What would constitute a set of student learning outcomes for each core academic 
area identified in step 1 above? (Here consensus was sought on developing a set of 
outcomes under each core area). 
The Delphi Technique 
To cost-effectively address the above questions using a panel of experts from around the 
country, the Delphi Technique was adapted to an online (web-based) format from 2007-
2008 using a secure web portal that contained the survey items. Panel responses were 
entered online and the completed survey electronically submitted to the authors for 
review and evaluation.  
Specifically, the web-based Delphi process proceeded in rounds that included several 
iterations per round. The Delphi process was split into two rounds with round one 
concentrating on developing consensus on educational objectives and a set of core 
academic areas, including definitions for each core area. Round two was focused on 
developing consensus on student learning outcomes. Prior to initiating round one, the 
panel of SME was emailed a package which provided instructions including how to log 
on to the secure server, how to submit results, a reminder of how the Delphi process 
worked, and the focus of each round, the idea that consensus would be determined 
when six of eight panelists agreed, the precise obligations the panel had for each 
iteration, and a timeline for completion. Following the first iteration of round one, the 
instruction note for all subsequent iterations and rounds also included an update and 
summary of progress to date.  
With the objective of providing the SME a place to start, and utilizing the fact that the 
Delphi Technique accomplishes consensus through a series of iterations, round one 
presented a starter set of educational objectives and core academic areas of homeland 
security developed by the researchers. Similarly, and after consensus was reached in 
round one regarding a working set of core academic areas, round two presented a starter 
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set of overall student learning outcomes (that is, outcomes not tied to a specific core 
area such as writing, or research, or oral presentation outcomes, etc.) and a starter set of 
learning outcomes for each core area. In each round, once submissions from each 
panelist were received, all suggested comments and changes were integrated into the 
survey instrument. The survey was then re-sent to each panelist for comment. Thus, and 
through a series of iterations, consensus was sought and gained. Hence, the Delphi 
process used in this study consisted of the following three steps: 
1. Iteratively develop a consensus on what should constitute a set of educational 
objectives for an undergraduate program in homeland security. 
2. Iteratively develop a consensus on what should constitute a set of core academic 
areas, and definitions for those areas, that represent broad practices in homeland 
security. 
3. Iteratively develop a consensus on what should constitute a broad set of program-
level outcomes for an undergraduate degree in homeland security (both overall 
outcomes and outcomes for each core academic area).  
RESULTS 
Recall that this study aimed to produce both educational objectives and student learning 
outcomes. Educational objectives are considered statements that describe the career and 
professional accomplishments that the program is preparing its students to achieve and 
are based on the needs of the constituents. These are typically exemplified by graduates 
five to ten years after graduation. Core academic areas of homeland security are 
considered major functional areas of homeland security which correspond to an extant 
academic discipline.   
At the conclusion of the Delphi process, consensus was reached by the panel on three 
sets of results. First, the panel identified educational objectives (EO) for the program. 
Second, the panel identified six overall (or general) program-level outcomes (OA); that 
is, student learning outcomes that are not part of a core academic area. Finally, the 
panel agreed on eight “core” academic areas, including definitions of each area, within 
the academic discipline of homeland security, along with student learning outcomes in 
each area. In addition, two areas of concentration (twelve credits beyond the core) were 
developed from panel comments about the need to offer some depth to the curriculum. 
The two concentrations included emergency management and terrorism studies.  
Table 1 displays the educational objectives derived from the Delphi Technique, Table 
2 the general outcomes, and Table 3 the core academic areas, their definitions and the 
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Table 1: Educational Objectives for an Undergraduate Degree in Homeland Security 
 
EO 1 Instill in our graduates skills, knowledge and abilities appropriate to the profession 
of homeland security. 
EO 2 Infuse each graduate with a desire to be a lifelong learner and to pursue 
subsequent degrees or other professional certifications appropriate to the 
profession of homeland security. 
EO 3 Instill an appreciation of one’s civic duties and responsibilities to society.  
 
General Program Outcomes 
General, or overall, program outcomes are those knowledge, skills, and behaviors that 
all graduates of the homeland security program should achieve and which are not tied to 
a specific or core academic area. Table 2 lists the eight general outcomes derived from 
this study. 
Table 2: General Program Outcomes (GO) for an Undergraduate Degree in Homeland Security 
GO 1 Apply homeland security concepts in a non-academic setting through an 
internship, cooperative, or supervised experience to include real-world 
experiences, strategies, and objectives. 
GO 2 Gain an understanding of professional ethics and how they apply in the field of 
homeland security.  
GO 3 Demonstrate the capability to utilize and evaluate analytical data applicable to 
homeland security. 
GO 4 Demonstrate the ability to conduct research, compose a research paper, and 
deliver professional presentations and briefings in order to develop and refine 
analytical abilities.  
GO 5 Identify, describe, and critically evaluate applicable homeland security 
technologies.  
GO 6 Ability to demonstrate effective communication; especially in ways applicable to 
homeland security (e.g., policy analysis, briefings, strategic or risk 
communications, etc). 
GO 7 Demonstrate the ability to work in teams. 
GO 8 Demonstrate knowledge of contemporary or emergent threats, challenges or 
issues.  
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Core Academic Areas (CAs) & Student Learning Outcomes  
Table 3 summarizes the eight core academic areas comprising undergraduate study in 
homeland security.   
 
Core Academic Areas and their Associated Student Learning Outcomes 
 Core Area & Definition Associated outcomes – Each student will 
possess a demonstrated ability to or 
knowledge of: 
CA 1 Intelligence - A systematic process 
of collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information in 
support of national, state, and/or 
local policy or strategy. 
1) The intelligence and counter-intelligence concepts, 
to include the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of intelligence data both within the 
US and internationally.  
2) The organization and mission of the federal 
Intelligence Community, state and local intelligence 
agencies within the US, private/corporate sector 
intelligence efforts, and selected components 
globally.  
3) Synthesize fundamental intelligence concepts while 
understanding their variables, limitations, and 
shortcomings.  
CA 2 Law & Policy - Legal and policy 
formulations that provide the basic 
direction of homeland security 
means and objectives and establish 
a context for homeland security 
within the broader purview of 
national security. 
4) Legal and constitutional principles and their 
application in the area of Homeland or National 
Security law and policy.  
5) Case law, precedential, and court decisions 
relating to and having an effect upon homeland 
security policy and law. 
CA 3 Emergency Management - The 
process of coordinating available 
resources to deal with emergencies 
effectively, thereby saving lives, 
avoiding injury or illness, and 
minimizing economic losses. This 
protection process involves four 
phases that are reinforcing and 
mutually dependent: preparedness, 
response, mitigation, and recovery. 
6) Emergency management and response concepts, 
phases, and procedures across the range of 
homeland security challenges.  
7) Entry-level emergency operations, training and 
exercises, to include all levels of emergency 
management exercises.   
 
CA 4 Risk Analysis - A systematic 
method of identifying the assets 
(e.g., critical infrastructure and key 
assets) of a system, the threats (i.e., 
strategic, political, economic, 
technological, or cultural) to those 
assets, and the vulnerability of the 
system to those threats in such a 
way as to be able to quantify threats 
and their consequences to a system 
for the purpose of developing 
appropriate countermeasures. 
8) Risk analysis principles, processes, and 
techniques, in both the public and private sectors. 
This includes knowledge of an all hazards 
approach to risk analysis and infrastructure 
protection.  
9) Threat, vulnerability, consequence, and critical 
infrastructure analysis.  
10) Basic industrial security principles. 
RAMSAY, ET AL, OUTCOMES-BASED UNDERGRADUATE CURRICULUM 
 




CA 5 Critical Infrastructure - Systems 
and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or 
any combination of these assets. 
11) The evolution and basic principles of critical 
infrastructure, in both the private and public sectors 
vital to their community, state or the nation.  
12) Identify critical infrastructure and key assets, and 
apply appropriate counter measures using a risk-
based methodology.  
13) Compare and contrast private sector and 
governmental responsibilities in the area of critical 
infrastructure/key asset identification and 
protection.  
CA 6 Strategic Planning - the process of 
defining an organization’s strategy 
(a long term plan of action designed 
to achieve a particular goal or 
objective) or direction and making 
decisions on allocating its resources 
to pursue this strategy, including its 
capital, its technology and its human 
resources.  
14) Applicable national strategies and plans, including 
their history, inter-relationships, similarities and 
differences.  
15) The strategic planning interface between national, 
state, and local governments.  
16) Basic principles underlying strategic planning, and 
identify these principles as they apply to the 
national strategy for homeland security.  
CA 7 Terrorism - The threat of violence, 
individual acts of violence, or a 
campaign of violence designed 
primarily to instill fear. Terrorism is 
violence for effect: not only and 
sometimes not at all for the effect on 
the actual victims of the terrorists’ 
cause. Fear is the intended effect, 
not the by-product of terrorism. 
17) The history and basic concepts of global terrorism 
to include groups, ideologies, and underlying 
causes.  
18) Specific types of terrorism (e.g., state-supported, 
transnational, domestic, international) including 
their similarities and differences. 
19) The conceptual aspects of counter-terrorism, 
counter-terrorist activities, and outcomes and be 
able to identify and describe examples of these 
concepts.  
CA 8 Environmental Security - a 
process for effectively responding to 
changing environmental conditions 
that have the potential to destabilize 
the political economy or 
governmental infrastructure of a 
nation or region which reduces 
peace and stability and thereby 
affects US national security. 
20) Basic environmental health principles to include: 
geochemical cycling, population dynamics, aspects 
of air, water and land use, food production, 
environmental economics, and the human impact 
on the environment. 
21) Destabilizing influences and potential security 
implications from anthropogenic causes, climate 
change, natural disasters, and hazards.  
Table 3: Core Academic Areas and their Associated Student Learning Outcomes 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using an external advisory panel of eight subject matter experts, this study developed 
the intellectual infrastructure for an undergraduate degree in homeland security. 
Specifically, the study achieved a consensus set of educational objectives, overall 
program outcomes, core academic areas, and twenty-one student learning outcomes 
distributed across the core areas. Consensus was accomplished using an online Delphi 
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Technique and a secure web portal to receive respondent submissions. The results 
demonstrate the utility of an online Delphi process in identifying a set of core academic 
areas that an institution might consider in developing a homeland security curriculum.  
The results further provide a baseline from which the same technique – albeit 
comprising larger sets of SMEs aligned on a national scale and representative of a larger 
professional cross section of the homeland security enterprise – might identify core 
academic areas applicable to the field on a national level. In turn, the results provide a 
basis for a set of master course outlines from which a core curriculum in homeland 
security can be designed. In addition, the results provide a basis for areas of 
concentration within the homeland security program as well as a mechanism for the 
continuous quality improvement of a homeland security curriculum.  
Interestingly, these results have some degree of convergent validity as seen from the 
Winegar study in 2008,28 which was conducted nearly a year later. In a national survey 
of homeland security programs, Scott Winegar identified thirty main topics taught in 
homeland security programs. He went on to identify the relative frequency with which 
homeland security programs offered each topic. Not surprisingly, terrorism was the 
most frequently cited topic taught, followed by emergency management, strategic 
planning, risk analysis, and intelligence. Our current study also identified as core 
academic areas environmental security and homeland security law and policy which 
were not explicitly identified by Winegar.29 Although the Winegar study employed a 
larger sample size, it seems reasonable to include homeland security law and policy as a 
core academic area. The SMEs used in the current study were specifically tasked to 
identify core academic areas, whereas the Winegar study surveyed what already existed 
in academia, and did not query SMEs about what they thought should or should not be 
core areas in homeland security curricula. 
For this project, the panelists concentrated on the knowledge, skills and abilities they 
believe are essential to entering generalists in the practice of homeland security. 
However, they did not offer suggestions on the learning level undergraduate students 
should acquire, as this was not included in the tasking. For example, outcomes can be 
integrated into curricula at very basic levels (e.g., using Bloom’s taxonomy this would be 
“to understand, recognize, or demonstrate”) or at more complex levels (e.g., a more 
advanced learning level would be “to evaluate, analyze, or synthesize”); and should 
students acquire a given outcome at the relatively low level of “understanding” or 
“demonstrate” versus at a relatively higher level, such as “evaluate” or “analyze”? Hence 
at the conclusion of the Delphi Process, the authors met to decide the learning level for 
each outcome identified. For example, Student Learning Outcome 21 under Core Area 8 
above states:  
21. Destabilizing influences and potential security implications from 
anthropogenic causes, climate change, natural disasters, and hazards.  
To be used as a student learning outcome in an undergraduate academic setting, it 
might be better stated as:  
21. Students demonstrate the ability to describe and identify destabilizing 
influences and potential security implications from anthropogenic causes, 
climate change, natural disasters, and hazards.  
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Security threats to the U.S. are complex and ever-changing. Consequently, academic 
homeland security will struggle for some time about which outcomes should be taught 
to best prepare graduates. Similarly, whether or not there’s a common identity or 
definition of the enterprise will also take time to sort out. Though research presented 
here and the Winegar study suggest that there is no minimum set of outcomes common 
to all academic homeland security curricula (at least to the extent observed in medicine, 
law, engineering, etc. curricula), there does appear to be some degree of consistency 
across programs regarding the major topics taught even without the influence of 
accreditation. As such, we suggest that researchers/educators, policy makers, 
employers, and practitioners of homeland security work together to improve the body of 
knowledge with basic and applied research, and to identify best practices that have 
built-in flexibility enabling them to adapt to the characteristics of the environments in 
which homeland security occurs.  
The degree to which the core areas identified in this study (and hopefully other 
subsequent studies) are applicable to U.S. national security strategies and the elements 
of national power might further define both the academic as well as the homeland 
security disciplines. Given the relatively small number of panelists, and the fact that 
their collective expertise, though impressive, did not reflect all operational areas of 
homeland security, what remains to be demonstrated is the degree to which these 
outcomes/core areas possess construct validity; that is the degree to which the outcomes 
identified really are representative of the skills, knowledge and behaviors practitioners 
need to have to function appropriately.  
Ultimately, for academic homeland security to mature we would observe that there 
needs to be some mechanism that would identify and vet the outcomes and best 
practices needed by employers of homeland security graduates, and which should be 
taught in academic programs.30 A less structured approach to homeland security 
education seems at best to be inefficient, and at worst dangerous. In addition, this set of 
outcomes would not represent the entire curriculum, but rather a minimum set of 
outcomes which would allow each program the flexibility to specialize its curriculum 
according to the desires/talents of its faculty and needs of its constituents. We would 
further argue that it is critical to obligate homeland security programs to engage in some 
sort of continuous quality improvement process that would cause programs to partner 
with employers, practitioners, and other constituents so that best practices and changes 
in the body of knowledge over time are reflected and integrated into the curriculum.  
We acknowledge that there remain several empirical questions that might guide 
future work on homeland security program development. For example, at what point in 
the evolution of the homeland security enterprise could one derive a core set of student 
learning outcomes that can guide academic program development? What should that 
core set of outcomes be and are these similar to those identified in this study? Who 
should manage them and how should they be vetted? How often should they be 
reviewed, updated, modified? Should accreditation exist and if so, should it be 
mandatory for all homeland security programs? If so, how best would this be 
accomplished? Should the Federal government mandate it through legislation (e.g., the 
OSHA model for performance-based safety standards) or should states regulate the 
practice of homeland security via licensing at the state level (e.g., the engineer model)?  
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Addressing these questions is difficult for any profession, let alone an emergent one 
as complex and dynamic as homeland security. In part, this study is an attempt, not to 
necessarily provide definitive answers to the above issues, but rather to frame an 
ongoing dialogue through developing and asking the proper questions. 
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Composition and Short Biosketch of the Delphi Panel of Subject 
Matter Experts (SME) 
Panelist # 1 is an active-duty colonel in the U.S. Army National Guard. She served as 
commander, U.S. Army Mobilization Augmentation Command, and has held positions 
as the National Guard/Reserve advisor to the president of the National Defense 
University (NDU). She also served as the director of the Joint Reserve Affairs Center of 
the National Defense University. Prior assignments included senior guard advisor to the 
Pentagon’s Joint Staff J4, and commanding officer of the 40th Forward Support 
Battalion, 40th Infantry Division.  She is currently serving her second tour in Iraq.  
Panelist # 2 is the director of support for headquarters, Ohio Air National Guard, 
coordinating policy, guidance, and strategic planning for the 5,000-plus member Ohio 
Air National Guard. In addition to twenty years of service as a traditional guardsman, he 
has served in full-time staff positions with the National Guard Bureau, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, U.S. European Command, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
Panelist # 3 is a Planner II with the Volusia County, Florida Division of Emergency 
Management. Prior experience in the U.S. Army, and as an emergency management 
consultant includes emergency preparedness and response; physical, operational and 
travel security; and crisis communications. He has developed and written state-
mandated Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans and Domestic Terrorist 
Incident Response Plans, which included detailed table-top and full-scale exercises.  
Panelist # 4 serves as the associate judge, Prince George's County, Maryland Circuit 
Court, 7th Judicial Circuit. With thirty-seven years in the Naval Reserve, he is a retired 
U.S. Navy captain and served as a senior reserve military judge and judge of Military 
Court of Criminal Appeals. He is also a fleet professor (National Security Decision 
Making) at the U.S. Naval War College. 
Panelist # 5 was the deputy director of the Central Florida High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (CFHIDTA). He worked for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
from 2002 to 2006, serving as the assistant federal security director of law enforcement 
for the Orlando, Sanford, Daytona, and Melbourne International Airports, and acted as 
the chairman of the Transportation Committee including rail, aviation, seaport, and 
trucking modes. He also served over twenty years in the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and retired from that organization as special agent in charge 
(SAC) of the Orlando Field Office. 
Panelist # 6 is a director in the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division of the Institute 
for Defense Analyses (IDA). He is the principal author of the DOD’s Homeland Defense 
and Civil Support (HD&CS) Planning Scenario, a comprehensive approach to identifying 
and providing technology and system solutions for homeland defense. His prior 
experience was in the U.S. Navy and included serving as military assistant to the 
secretary of defense and special assistant to the director of central intelligence.  
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Panelist # 7 is an internationally recognized specialist in the study of terrorism. He has 
authored and co-authored a number of texts on the subject and is a leading expert on 
the subject of Red Teams. He has also worked as a consultant for the firm of Booz Allen 
Hamilton. He is a professor emeritus at the University of Oklahoma, and is currently the 
Lawrence J. Chastang Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies and a university 
professor and fellow in the Office of Global Perspectives at the University of Central 
Florida.  
Panelist # 8 is a senior executive service-level member of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). She has been instrumental in establishing baseline security 
standards and implementing risk reduction methodologies associated with modal 
transportation. Much of her work has involved the establishment of cooperative 
measures with industry. Prior positions included work in the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) as a security policy analyst and as an independent contractor for 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
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No Dark Corners:  A Different Answer to Insider Threats 
 Nick Catrantzos 
 
Everything we think we know about defeating the insider threat may not be wrong. It 
just fails to solve the problem. Background investigations are easily sidestepped.  
Institutional inquisitors – whether security staffs, auditors, cyber network custodians, 
or other corporate sentinels – repeatedly miss unmasking the infiltrator or saboteur 
until it is too late. Yet most organizations rely precisely on these sentinels as the first, 
last, and only line of defense. After all, it is their assigned job. At the same time, the 
sentinels’ invasive audits and technical monitoring alienate essential employees while 
posing minimal hurdles to those whose aim is our ruin. Nevertheless, our institutions 
and received wisdom tell us to invest ever more resources in such defenses with dismal 
track records and unproven deterrent value. Might there be a better way? 
THE PROBLEM 
A 2008 report to the President explained the insider threat problem this way: 
Essentially, the threat lies in the potential that a trusted employee may betray 
their obligations and allegiances to their employer and conduct sabotage or 
espionage against them. Insider betrayals cover a broad range of actions, from 
secretive acts of theft or subtle forms of sabotage to more aggressive and overt 
forms of vengeance, sabotage, and even workplace violence. The threat posed by 
insiders is one most owner-operators neither understand nor appreciate.1 
While reports such as these underscore the potential of insider threats, trust betrayal 
remains a statistically rare phenomenon.2 If, as the literature suggests, a “miniscule 
fraction” of the people in a position to betray trust actually do so,3 then quantitative 
methods offer limited value in uncovering practical countermeasures and strategic 
innovations. After all, if most people do not violate trust to the point of becoming a 
threat to their organization, statistical surveys of willing and benign respondents are 
unlikely to reveal telltale signs of trust betrayers. Under the circumstances, a qualitative 
approach may offer more insight into dealing with insider threats bent on visiting 
irreversible harm to American infrastructure and institutional targets. Accordingly, an 
application of the Delphi method offered a means of tapping the career experiences of a 
diverse group of experts in dealing with insider threats. The Delphi study results 
highlighted fissures in the fortress wall of existing countermeasures. Delphi study 
results also led to some innovations in defending against hostile insiders.4 
DELPHI METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO INSIDER THREAT STUDY 
For this research project on insider threats, the study asked seasoned defenders, 
investigators, and line managers to answer questions and distill judgments through the 
iterative Delphi research process.5 This project consisted of recruiting a dozen experts 
from different organizations and disciplines and then asking them three series of 
questions over time. Respondents operated independently, with guarantees of 
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confidentiality, and without direct interaction with other experts. After the first round of 
questions, these respondents saw a compilation of all the answers to the first round and 
then addressed a second round of questions that were suggested by the first. Similarly, 
for the third and final Delphi round, respondents saw compilations of their aggregate 
responses to the second round of questions in addition to a final series of questions 
informed by preceding rounds.  This approach also followed the counsel of analysts who 
have claimed, “we need multidisciplinary research teams (not just geeks) investigating 
what we should look for as indicators of possibly malevolent behavior.”6    
The group of experts in this study consisted of a dozen professionals representing 
different disciplines, such as counter espionage, prevention of workplace violence, 
defense against systemic institutional fraud, corporate response to handling 
reputational risk, as well as law enforcement, military, and business profit-and-loss 
experience. Each respondent possessed at least twenty years of professional experience 
and first-hand exposure to managing or investigating insider threats. Each Delphi round 
involved transmitting questions by e-mail, with responses returned via e-mail, with at 
least two weeks between rounds. All respondents agreed to participate in the study 
under standard confidentiality protections and with repeated reminders that no 
classified or proprietary information was being solicited for the study. Of the dozen 
experts who agreed to participate in three rounds of Delphi surveys, 100 percent saw the 
process through from start to finish, from January to April, 2009.7 Initially, Delphi 
experts suggested that traditional countermeasures, such as random audits, would stand 
fast between a hostile insider and a devastating attack. However, by the time the same 
experts were induced to trade places and evaluate their own countermeasures in terms 
of how they would impede the experts themselves from carrying out a successful insider 
attack, the story had changed dramatically.   
Initially, the hostile insider seemed likely to emerge as a disgruntled employee with 
the capacity to plan a devastating attack and the arcane knowledge to make the most of 
the opportunity.8 Indicators of this trust betrayer included unexplained anger and other 
suspicious behaviors, like undue secrecy and self-aggrandizement, potentially serving as 
red flags. Finally, countermeasures such as random audits, monitoring of employees, 
and investigations appeared likely to offer value as ways to thwart this kind of insider. 
By the end of the Delphi process, however, the same experts arrived at different 
conclusions. Their judgments flew in the face of this accepted wisdom. Despite being 
unable to see each other’s observations or remarks, the Delphi experts ultimately 
converged on findings that ran counter to their own initial assumptions and to the 
accepted wisdom on insider threat defense. 
COUNTERINTUITIVE FINDINGS 
Infiltrators More Likely Threat than Disgruntled Insiders 
Research results suggested that the terrorist attacker targeting institutions such as 
stewards of critical infrastructure would more likely use an infiltrator than a disgruntled 
insider already in place.9 A career employee with long-term access and in-depth 
knowledge of inner workings will necessarily know more about how to dismantle the 
organization or its critical assets than an infiltrator new to the entity. The same 
careerist, given time and inclination to plan, is in the best position to develop and carry 
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out a devastating attack that circumvents defenses. However, the disgruntled insider is 
potentially unstable and difficult to control. According to the Delphi experts, this 
employee is not a joiner and is likely to be too egocentric to accept direction readily  
Volatility makes this person an operational risk who may compromise details of an 
attack out of disagreement with the particulars or out of spite at not being consulted on 
every move. 10  
Additionally, in the age of the Internet and with critical infrastructure targets that 
have traditionally operated openly without the security precautions of the national 
security sector, targets and their employees remain highly accessible. Their critical 
assets are often immobile. Thus, in contrast to weapons classified for reasons of national 
security, critical infrastructure cannot be relocated or concealed once its location and 
operating details have been compromised. In this context, the targeting information 
necessary for mounting an infrastructure attack need not be so esoteric as to be 
available exclusively to a career insider with very detailed knowledge.   
Instead, as the Delphi experts reasoned, an infiltrator who gets through the door, 
even at a relatively low level for a limited time, should be able to accumulate enough 
details to enable an attack without having to spend years masquerading as an innocuous 
employee. We also need to remember that many infrastructures and institutions are 
desperate for talent and have aging work forces with few systemic arrangements for 
recruiting, training, and deploying successors. Thus, as one expert noted, infrastructure 
employers are prone to welcome any skilled workers without criminal convictions who 
show an interest in accepting entry-level positions. The same employers make frequent 
use of contractors who soon gain unfettered access to their systems.  This situation gives 
an infiltrator two paths of entry: as a direct employee or as a contractor. Infiltrators may 
even try the two approaches concurrently without fear of one rejection influencing the 
possibility of another. In this milieu, if the remaining defenses (described below) are 
also flawed, the chances for a successful attack begin to tilt more in favor of an infiltrator 
than a disgruntled insider. The infiltrator may not have quite so much access, but he can 
definitely be better controlled, focused, and more disciplined about concealing telltale 
indicators of an impending attack to avoid compromising the attack.  
Weakness of Traditional Defenses 
The weaknesses of traditional defenses against this insider threat appear more evident if 
depicted in the context of the mutual challenges of infiltrator and defender, as Figure 1 
illustrates.11 
 








Figure 1.   Traditional Situation:  Infiltrator Meets Infrastructure 
Figure 1 depicts the situation in which infiltrator and infrastructure find themselves 
when these countermeasures and their limitations impinge upon each other in the 
traditional scheme of penetration and defense. In this conceptualization, the adversary’s 
job is to select a target, prepare an infiltrator, and gain entry into the target to the point 
of being able to probe and maneuver with unimpeded access. It falls to the infiltrator to 
pass the background check and then enter and pass a probationary period during which, 
or at least after which, the infiltrator anticipates having sufficient freedom of maneuver 
to gather information unimpeded by any close scrutiny or interference. The infiltrator 
eluding detection or interference is free to operate in the dark corners of insufficient 
oversight and management, as long as his behavior and work performance do not 
deviate so much from the norm as to invite attention.   
Infiltrator Step 1:  Get Through Screening  
The standard screening, or pre-employment, background investigation presents a low 
hurdle to the prepared. As long as the infiltrator does not have a record of criminal 
convictions or obvious disqualifications (like inability to lift twenty-five pounds in a job 
whose essential functions require some manual labor) he or she has little to fear from 
the third party consumer reporting agency performing the background check.    
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The more invasive background and update investigations permitted for national 
security employment are not available for the public and private sector employers who 
operate the nation’s critical infrastructure. Nor is it feasible to demand the same level of 
scrutiny for a maintenance mechanic as for an intelligence analyst. Besides, the telltale 
component of such investigations – the probe for financial irresponsibility – is only 
useful in cases where trust betrayal is primarily driven by money, exemplified in the so-
called “marketplace espionage” most frequently observed in counterintelligence cases of 
the 1980s.12 However, as Herbig discovered in her study of trust betrayal in such cases 
over time, the trend in the last ten years has changed: the most common driver for 
today’s traitors is divided loyalties, i.e., ideological rather than monetary motivation.13 
Consequently, yesterday’s focus on finances as an indicator of possible trust betrayal 
offers limited value in detecting today’s traitors who will be living well within their 
means. They will also be showing no signs of the kind of debt indicative of financial 
hardship that would make them targets for bribery or ostensible candidates for selling 
out their employers to relieve financial distress.   
Similarly, an infiltrator sent into an infrastructure employer to attack it will be 
unlikely to draw attention by amassing bad debts that set off financial responsibility 
alarms, assuming a credit report is even requested as part of the background 
investigation. Nor will this individual invite negative scrutiny through drunk driving or 
criminal convictions that the average background investigation detects through a 
standard check of superior court records in counties of residence and of employment.14 
Insulating the infiltrator even more from what such background investigations uncover 
is that the infiltrator is already under the control and sponsorship of a primary, albeit 
undisclosed, employer: the attacker. Thus, the infiltrator is seeking infrastructure 
employment not so much for monetary or professional reward as for access to an 
assigned target. Meanwhile, the attacker coaches the infiltrator to avoid actions that 
would raise eyebrows. Moreover, the larger and more sophisticated the attacker’s 
organization, the more candidates available to choose from in qualifying an infiltrator, 
and the more likely that the ultimate selectee will arrive on the job with an unblemished 
record. 
To complicate matters more for defenders, the legal constraints affecting employers 
in America severely limit a critical infrastructure steward’s ability to expand the scope of 
a background investigation or to use its product in any way that is not demonstrably 
related to a given job vacancy.15 The same applies to any program for performing update 
investigations on existing employees. As one industry guideline cautions, “The 
consideration of extraneous information that is not a valid predictor of job performance 
can create a source of liability.”16 In the context of employment laws prohibiting job 
discrimination yet defending privacy, it is the rare hiring manager who dares flaunt such 
guidance by rejecting any otherwise qualified applicant, even if subtle or stated 
antipathies against the United States surface during the hiring process. Fidelity to 
America is seldom called out as a hiring criterion for work at a utility that operates 
critical infrastructure. In the broader context of employment law, anti-discrimination 
protections, and limitations on the extent to which employers may practically scrutinize 
applicants for work at critical infrastructure sites, background investigations are 
unlikely to unmask any but the most unsophisticated of infiltrators.   
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Update investigations, if performed at all, typically come after seven years because 
this is the standard limit that many states and the Fair Credit Reporting Act recognize as 
the maximum period for making criminal history available for retrieval for employment 
purposes.17 Like pre-employment investigations, updates performed through a credit 
bureau or other agency falling under the rules of this Act must also be fully disclosed to 
the subject of the investigation. An infiltrator requiring more than seven years to gather 
insider information to support an infrastructure attack would have aged enough to cast 
doubt on his or her motivational zeal and to be suspected of beginning to identify too 
closely with the target. 
2. Infiltrator Step 2:  Gather Information 
As Figure 1 shows, once safely through the door the infiltrator now interacts primarily 
with fellow employees and a supervisor, who supplies the institution’s direct oversight 
during the probationary period. Corporate sentinels, whether security staff, auditors, 
information systems guardians of the computer network, human resources recruiters, 
attorneys, or others with assigned responsibility for various monitoring functions, rarely 
interact with the new employee. They may participate in a new-hire orientation, but 
otherwise they deal with the newcomer only if the latter’s actions or questions affect 
their various disciplines. The new employee benefits from a grace period during which 
minor transgressions committed in the course of gathering information are easily 
dismissed as a rookie’s excusable faux pas. Unless the neophyte does something 
egregious to excite remark, he or she is unlikely to face a random audit or active 
monitoring of computer key strokes, or time and duration of access into a given work 
space. On the rare occasion when an infiltrator’s actions invite challenge, all that are 
necessary to deflect focused attention of corporate sentinels are a ready apology and a 
profession of ignorance. 
To further limit opportunities for detecting an infiltrator’s suspicious gathering of 
insider information via random audit, Delphi experts in business and operational audit 
note that so-called random audits are seldom truly random. As one of the experts 
pointed out, the astute observer sees them coming. Moreover, many audits are 
perfunctory, particularly if auditors consider themselves overextended and loathe taking 
on the extra work of sustaining a negative finding. As one analyst found in a longitudinal 
study of organizations susceptible to accountability failures, cases are “resource 
intensive and, as a result, enforcement is necessarily selective.”18 This explains why a 
resource-intensive audit will not be “wasted” on a neophyte who has still not even 
passed probation. 
In many, if not most critical infrastructure environments, audits are by definition 
adversarial. They are, therefore, regarded as a necessary evil perpetrated by individuals 
who are more tolerated than esteemed. To the extent that auditors are aloof, disdainful, 
or menacing, they struggle to obtain active cooperation. One Delphi expert has seen that 
co-workers are even more likely to defend than to report a trust betrayer who has 
managed to come across as “just one of the guys.” The greater scrutiny is likely to focus 
on activities affecting financial performance or high-value losses. However, until the 
moment of attack, the infiltrator targeting critical infrastructure is unassociated with 
any loss-producing events that would invite such scrutiny. In such circumstances, it is 
the rare audit that will identify and focus sufficient attention on an infiltrator to elicit 
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anything more than an oral warning or mild rebuke. Consequently, the traditional audit 
poses no threat to the infiltrator operating with a modicum of training and 
sophistication. 
Technology exists to remotely monitor every keystroke an employee makes whether 
operating a desktop computer or a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system – the principal means of controlling valves and distribution of signals, power, or 
water when handling a critical infrastructure component. It is possible to configure 
control room access so that no one individual may enter a critical area alone. It is also 
possible to monitor such areas remotely through video surveillance. These capabilities 
can theoretically prevent all but the most astute from carrying out undetected acts of 
mischief. However, when applied to the challenge of detecting and thwarting an 
infiltrator bent on attacking critical infrastructure, technology alone falls short for 
several reasons.  
First, for every device capable of tracking activity, there must exist somewhere in the 
institution a means of discriminating untoward activity from acceptable routine. A 
surveillance camera or automated log cannot by itself tell whether an operator laying 
hands on a SCADA panel is doing his job or interfering with another’s. Such a 
determination requires human judgment. True, some automated tools can approximate 
a level of human judgment, if given precise details and parameters of what kind or 
number of transactions become suspect once they exceed a certain frequency in a given 
time period or take up significantly more time than necessary. However, the effort 
needed to establish these boundaries and the resources necessary to automate 
associated triggers exceed the capacity of the average financially-strapped employer. 
Nor is this investment in proportion to the expected benefit.   
The same caution applies to the labor-intensive alternative to this technology-based 
solution: invasive snooping by a designated monitoring force. Delphi experts with career 
experience as line managers in critical infrastructures opined that such snooping 
negatively affects productivity and morale, while often leading to an unintended 
consequence. It sparks the creativity of aggrieved operators to find new ways to elude or 
defeat monitoring systems because they dislike being watched like wayward children.  
Thwarting such corporate sentinels, whether human overseers or automated devices, 
soon becomes part game, part badge of honor. Operators then transfer this knowledge of 
how to bypass what they regard as invasive monitoring to peers and newcomers alike – 
including the potential infiltrator – because they know that if all the workers are 
defeating Big Brother, then management will be unable to single out any one employee 
for punishment.   
Step 3:  Exploit Vulnerabilities 
At this point in the penetration effort, if the infiltrator has managed to survive the 
screening process and stay under the radar of corporate sentinels, inertia and initiative 
are on his side. The more he blends, the less he stands out, and the more likely he is to 
gain the unwitting support of co-workers and management alike, particularly if seen to 
be a competent team player who gets along well with others.    
One contradiction in defensive strategy highlights how traditional measures can be 
self-undermining. The common thread that unravels the foregoing defenses when 
exploited by an infiltrator or any hostile insider is a lack of active involvement on the 
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part of the workforce on the one hand, tied with what infrastructure workers perceive as 
the offensiveness of too much oversight on the other hand. One career analyst of trust 
betrayers explained the latter phenomenon by stating that vigilance against disloyalty 
“threatens the ecology of trust and raises the likelihood of disloyalty because of a 
motivation to resist excessive oversight.”19   
In this context, the institution comes to rely excessively on its corporate sentinels, viz. 
its designated watchers, such as security staff, leaving the rest of the workforce 
indifferent to a defensive role that the employees and managers leave to such specialists. 
Meanwhile, the capacity of these sentinels, to focus limited resources on discovering a 
needle-in-the-haystack level of visibility of an insider threat is constrained by 
infrastructure operator resistance to draconian security measures that are too costly and 
impede operations. Into the space between general employee indifference and 
constraints on corporate sentinels, the infiltrator and any insider threat can create a 
dark corner to carry out hostile activity with impunity. 
ALTERNATIVE: NO DARK CORNERS APPROACH 
One way to overcome the vulnerabilities in the foregoing defensive measures is to re-
examine Figure 1’s penetration sequence in light of how a different strategy might apply 
the same institutional resources to better effect.  Figure 2 shows such an alternative end-
state. 
 
Figure 2.   Desired End-State for Infrastructure vs. Hostile Insider 
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What has changed? First, the screening process no longer relies excessively on a 
search for indicators that uncover neither an infiltrator nor other hostile insider. As one 
executive who studied trust betrayal for an entire career pointed out, many experts find 
that personnel investigations do not prevent espionage or detect those who may commit 
such a crime.20 Instead, the process now pays special attention to verifying identity.  It 
takes advantage of government resources through a program that U.S. Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) makes available to companies and infrastructure 
institutions alike: ICE Mutual Agreement for Government and Employers 
(ICE/IMAGE). For a fraction of the resources necessary to conduct update 
investigations of utility employees every seven years,21 infrastructure employers can 
instead devote more attention to verifying basic identity and right-to-work 
authorizations of new hires in order to defend against potential infiltrators. They 
improve their internal capacity via a federally-funded program that trains human 
resources recruiters to check credentials and gives access to Social Security and 
immigration databases to facilitate verification of employment eligibility.22  
The new screening program will not necessarily catch all infiltrators any more than it 
will defeat individuals who enter the institution benevolently and only later develop 
hostility and a propensity to betray or destroy. However, the program will reduce the 
ability of terrorist organizations to infiltrate their agents with falsified credentials which, 
absent increased scrutiny, receive only token examination from the most junior clerk 
assigned to processing employment applications. This is why Figure 2 shows a smaller X 
next to the arrow depicting the infiltrator’s first task. The new screening program 
complicates the challenge for the infiltrator, but does not eliminate it altogether.  
More importantly, however, the biggest change from the Figure 1 traditional 
approach to the Figure 2 alternative is the active engagement of the general employee 
population. Employees now support the screening process by at least verifying 
credentials through their own professional and trade networks. The immediate 
supervisor monitors the employee closely throughout the probationary period. During 
this interval, the new default expectation is not that all newcomers pass probation 
absent egregious incidents, but that all are released from employment unless they 
demonstrate talent worth keeping. This demonstration must satisfy not only the 
supervisor but teammates as well, which forces close interaction on a daily basis. 
Moreover, during probation, new hires are treated like student pilots who are not ready 
for solo flight – never left alone in the cockpit. Only, in the case of critical infrastructure, 
the student is a new employee and the cockpit is any critical asset or control system.  
At the same time, this alternative approach requires a culture of constant team 
interaction and self-monitoring that reduces opportunities for probing and undermining 
the institution clandestinely. This approach eliminates the dark corners represented by 
the black boxes in Figure 1 because, in Figure 2, employee oversight means there are 
fewer places to hide. This is the No Dark Corners approach that configures the job to 
reduce chances for a sole individual occupying a sensitive area undetected. It breathes 
life into this security prescription of management expert Tom Peters when exhorting 
security professionals not to see their contribution exclusively in the character of 
corporate sentinels: 
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I don’t want you to be security people for the organization, but to make everyone 
else in the organization a security person. You don’t “do” security.  You help all 
the employees do it … You win the game when I and my colleagues are the real 
security people in the place. 23 
At the heart of the cultural shift, this alternative approach also increases the opportunity 
to detect any insider threat because it spreads defensive responsibility pervasively, 
rather than relying exclusively on corporate sentinels. 
BALANCING TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY: THE CO-PILOT MODEL 
How can a cultural shift in the workplace create a team whose members constantly 
monitor each other without undermining the trust necessary for internal cohesion? On 
the surface, it would appear that such a team is merely relieving assigned corporate 
sentinels of their snooping duties.  After all, as organizational consultant Stephen Covey 
has observed, suspicion can generate the behaviors that managers and leaders are 
defending against, thus fostering a collusive environment of distrust.24 Extending the 
pilot and cockpit metaphor from the preceding discussion on employment probation 
periods, however, offers an answer to this apparent contradiction. 
In line with the cultural shift to internal team monitoring, every team member 
becomes not an inquisitor but a co-pilot. The key elements of the co-pilot definition that 
apply are of a “qualified pilot who assists or relieves the pilot but is not in command.”25 
The co-pilot has a vested interest in maintaining safe altitude and air speed and in 
arriving on schedule at the right destination. Applied to the work team, this model 
makes every team member a co-pilot. Neither a co-pilot nor a team member need 
become a snoop or tattletale. Yet both should be in a position to fully monitor what is 
happening in the cockpit or control room, with aircraft gauges or with SCADA displays. 
In this context, a co-pilot level of engagement becomes cohesion producing because it 
demonstrates a shared sense of ownership in the team’s work.26  
While many parts of a given countermeasure carry forward into the new framework, 
the means of applying the countermeasure changes fundamentally. No Dark Corners 
transforms invasive techniques into performance gauges for work teams. A video 
camera monitoring a critical process involving hazardous materials should now be 
welcome as a way for a fellow team member to be able to summon assistance if another 
team member in the area gets hurt – not as a spy camera for helping bosses catch 
subordinates in the act of violating established procedures. The same cultural shift 
should make team members appreciate having a back-up control room operator or 
lineman within earshot or line of sight, rather than bristle at the thought of not being 
trusted to work alone. Embracing the co-pilot model should transform additional 
physical or electronic monitoring into a welcome means of summoning assistance. It 
should also limit opportunities for a hostile insider to act against the institution. 
Ultimately, greater transparency and work redesign should limit opportunities for 
clandestine and damaging activities by eliminating the dark corners that insider threats 
need to do their worst. 
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CONTRAST WITH TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
Applying the No Dark Corners strategy communicates to the would-be insider threat 
that someone may be watching. In a traditional approach, the watcher is a corporate 
sentinel, and there are seldom enough of these watchers to monitor every process or 
venue. By contrast, in a No Dark Corners arena, the one who may be watching is a co-
worker who has a proprietary interest in the institution and will therefore act to defend 
it. 
Figure 3 highlights key features of this strategy, showing innovations, as well as what 
management authority Peter Drucker emphasized as a primary duty of all organizations:  
organized abandonment of processes and strategies that are no longer working.27 A 
method of fostering the creation of innovative strategies according to some observers, 
this grid challenges the institution to act on four key features in order to arrive at 
meaningful innovation.28  
 
 
Figure 3.   Key Features of No Dark Corners Strategy29 








As Figure 3 shows, measures that impede an infiltrator’s ability to surveil or strike take 
precedence over measures that are easily bypassed and offer negligible value in 
defeating an insider threat. Organizing these measures to contrast them with the 
traditional defenses that accepted wisdom favors underscores even more the 
distinctions of the No Dark Corners approach. Figure 4 presents this contrast in the 
form of a strategy canvas where the status quo appears in red and a breakaway challenge 




Figure 4.   Strategy Canvas:  Traditional vs. No Dark Corners 
The strategy canvas is at once a gauge and a framework for revealing where traditional 
insider defenses have faltered and where the innovations of No Dark Corners offer 
alternatives to reduce chronic vulnerabilities. The canvas visually communicates the 
current state of affairs in insider threat defense (in red) while also showing the potential 
for breaking new ground (in blue) to reduce susceptibility to infiltrators and, by 
extension, to any hostile insider. 
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In addition to adjusting defensive measures already discussed at length throughout 
these pages, Figure 4 draws attention to three particular innovations that reflected 
insights both of Delphi experts and of published analysts of trust betrayers. These three 
are close probation, transparency on the job, and team self-monitoring. All three 
measures offer productivity value, as well as defensive benefits.   
Close Probation 
As one study shows in extolling the virtues of close probation for example, 
“organizations that systematically integrate new employees enjoy lower turnover, and 
the recruits report greater commitment and job satisfaction.”30 This and the other tools 
intend to defeat hostile insiders through the kind of scrutiny that corporate sentinels 
cannot match, namely, the scrutiny of a co-worker, or what one analyst calls a “citizen-
sentry.” 31 
In critical infrastructure institutions, probationary periods are the ideal means of 
rejecting a new hire for any reason, without having to meet the rigors of bargaining unit 
constraints that are the equivalent of academic protections for tenured professors. Yet, 
Delphi-respondent experience shows that two parts of the probation process are under-
exploited. Hiring managers hesitate to release probationary employees, particularly if 
the internal hiring process is lengthy, complicated, and demanding of management 
time. To make matters worse, in many cases, the longer a vacancy goes unfilled, the 
greater the chance of losing that position, as upper management can see that work goes 
on despite the vacancy. Finally, in areas where supervision is traditionally lax, 
mentoring and monitoring of probationary employees is absent, thereby  predisposing 
hiring managers to keep the probationary employee by default.  
In reversal of this process, No Dark Corners puts a premium on using the probation 
period as a line of institutional and infrastructure defense. The default shifts away from 
keeping the new hire absent overwhelming evidence of a problem. Instead, the default 
becomes termination at the first sign of any problem and automatic release at the end of 
probation absent ostensible proof that the new employee adds value. The only way for 
this proof to surface is through close supervision, which means active engagement of 
front-line supervisors and fellow members of a work team. The supervisor acts as the 
pilot, with the rest of the team members as co-pilots – all having a vested interest in 
assuring that anyone joining their ranks can be trusted in their institution’s equivalent 
of the cockpit. 
Transparency on the Job  
In keeping with the new strategy for maximizing the value of probationary periods, 
transparency on the job means that every task, operation, or action performed at a 
critical infrastructure site should be within the actual or virtual line-of-sight of a 
knowledgeable peer or supervisor. Evoking the two-person-integrity rules of working in 
some classified environments,32 every job and work space should be designed to 
maximize visibility to peers and minimize opportunities for clandestine, hostile action. 
While critical infrastructure employers seldom have the staffing to implement a forced 
buddy system like this under all circumstances, the selective use of surveillance cameras 
to monitor critical operations can at least reduce infiltrator assurance that clandestine 
attivities will remain undetected. The deterrent value of this kind of system is analogous 
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to that of having surveillance cameras and their associated video monitors openly placed 
near the cash register at retail convenience stores. This practice in retail security is 
thought to deter robbery because of the uncertainty it creates about who may be 
watching in the eyes of the potential robber.33 Process-monitoring cameras, which assist 
with environmental watching of systems to be sure they are operating within design 
tolerances and of hazardous areas in order to dispatch rescue crews, are already 
commonplace at infrastructure sites, as are security surveillance cameras and access 
control systems in public areas, particularly in Britain.34 Designing new work sites, as 
they come online, to increase such visibility reduces the perception of concealment 
opportunities and increases the opportunity for fully-engaged team members and other 
employees to spot untoward activity while in the course of routinely looking out for each 
other. 
Team Self-Monitoring  
Finally, No Dark Corners recognizes and seeks to exploit the difference between over-
the-shoulder audits and self-policing out of work team cohesion and pride. As a Delphi 
expert observed, the most effective use of audits occurs when internalized at the work 
team level. Instead of shrinking from oversight as a form of witch hunt, team members 
focus on “how we can make things better” discussions. By including such discussions in 
regular team meetings and also encouraging informal one-on-one comments between 
employee and supervisor after each formal meeting, members should become their own 
most ardent diagnosticians. This self-monitoring presents an imposing threat of 
discovery for the infiltrator who may be adroit in hiding from corporate sentinels but 
cannot hide from the team. 
As another Delphi expert noted, metrics by themselves may supply only an illusion 
that management can track all work and make necessary course corrections in time. As a 
senior executive in a large infrastructure organization, he found that he did not have 
time to read, let alone check for discrepancies in employee performance based on all the 
timekeeping, output measures, budget variance, and failure analysis records available 
only to senior executives. So, this expert pushed out these data to front-line managers 
who could at least track themselves and their own team. As a result, the managers and 
soon the team members started gauging themselves and monitoring their own 
performance, improving effectiveness in the process. Some teams competed with each 
other in friendly rivalry. More teams and their managers, though, began competing with 
themselves, striving to beat last month’s or last year’s best record. An expert reasoned 
that this kind of self-monitoring, properly encouraged and applied to defense against 
insider threats, would present an almost insurmountable obstacle to infiltrators intent 
on an attack against critical infrastructure. 
NO DARK CORNERS LINKAGE TO OTHER SECURITY STRATEGIES 
The No Dark Corners strategy of configuring work space for maximizing opportunities 
for teammates to exercise a proprietary interest in their work and for promoting 
transparency relies on employees – legitimate insiders – defending an institution and its 
infrastructure by taking ownership. No Dark Corners is to critical infrastructure what 
Defensible Space is to community housing and Fixing Broken Windows is to community 
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policing: a defensive strategy relying on legitimate users of a given space or activity to 
exercise a proprietary interest sufficient to defeat adversary encroachment. In his 
seminal work, architect Oscar Newman examined data from housing projects in New 
York to make a case for reconfiguring residential areas to enhance the natural human 
tendency of territoriality. In his words, “defensible space is a model for residential 
environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric 
that defends itself.”35 
While Newman made efforts to extend his work to nonresidential environments with 
government sponsorship, the latter appeared to make little progress in the course of 
twenty years, despite considerable investment.36  
In a variation of Defensible Space applied to order maintenance in public spaces, 
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling offered Broken Windows theory ten years later.37 
Then Kelling’s follow-up research demonstrated multiple successes in crime reduction 
in major urban cities – all based on the premise that neighborhoods decay into crime 
and disorder if the little things, like broken windows, remain untended.38 Soon, vandals 
break all the remaining windows. Conversely, attention to the little things, like fixing 
broken windows, sends a communal message of a sense of ownership. This 
demonstration of proprietary interest, in turn, deters offenders, driving them away from 
defended areas.39   
No Dark Corners extends the foregoing theme of a sense of ownership to critical 
infrastructure, in a way that recalls the housing application of Defensible Space and the 
community order maintenance of Fixing Broken Windows. The difference is that while 
the other two models apply exclusively to public spaces, No Dark Corners adds private 
space into the mix,  as all critical infrastructures have control rooms and physical assets 
that are not open to the public, hence, out of the public view. Invariably, however, 
critical infrastructures also include important assets that are exposed to public view, 
such as transmission lines and aqueducts, which may be visible or accessible to 
members of the public. 
Why has this not happened before?  Because infrastructure defense is assumed to fall 
primarily into the hands of the private sector.40 By extension, the critical assets must, 
therefore, be under private control and not in the kinds of public spaces where there 
apply existing models of defense through a sense of ownership, like Defensible Space 
and Broken Windows theories. The reality, however, is that critical infrastructure may 
be impossible to secure in some cases, as in transmission lines, aqueducts, and fiber-
optic cables stretching across broad expanses of undefended territory. 
No Dark Corners reduces relatively unproductive but resource-intensive investment 
in countermeasures that an infiltrator can readily bypass. The strategy shifts exclusive 
reliance of institutions on overly specialized monitors, the corporate sentinels, to the 
larger employee population, especially the work team closest to the infiltrator or other 
hostile insider. It also redirects some investment away from moderately useful pre-
employment background investigations and unproductive update investigations, which 
may deter obvious criminals but will not defeat a hostile infiltrator.41 Instead, the 
strategy shifts this investigative scrutiny to verifying identity and right-to-work 
documentation, which takes the form of supplemental identification, and which the 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement arm of DHS is advancing through its 
ICE/IMAGE program of enhancing the capacity of all employers, including 
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infrastructure stewards, to close the door to a major penetration vulnerability in the 
hiring process. 
At the same time, this new strategy brings to bear the tools of close probation, work 
redesign for transparency, and self-monitoring for greater engagement of the employee 
population and, in particular, the work team.   
Envisioning a No Dark Corners Workplace 
In a No Dark Corners workplace, standard screening will have new emphasis on identity 
and right-to-work verification, and false credentials will be subject to discovery, making 
it particularly difficult for a foreign adversary to penetrate an American institution. 
Close probation means an infiltrator will face unabated scrutiny, supervision, and 
evaluation. Similarly, a fully-engaged employee population and work flow design that 
eliminates hiding places while promoting transparency will reduce opportunities for the 
infiltrator gathering sensitive information unrelated to the individual job and breaching 
protocols under the banners of ignorance or deficient supervision. Corporate sentinels 
previously mistrusted will be accessible to team members to follow up on their concerns 
and suspicions. In the process, the sentinels themselves will become part of the 
extended family seen as supporting the work team. Opportunities for unfettered, 
clandestine access will be severely constrained, subject to monitoring by people or 
devices, and too limited to exploit reliably. 
Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
Just as Kelling’s 1996 work on Broken Windows took experimental efforts in several 
municipalities to support the theory he and James Q. Wilson first espoused in 1982, No 
Dark Corners awaits the refinement and validation that would follow introduction of 
this model into an institution. Ideally, such an institution could be compared to a sister 
organization or agency of comparable size and function. Results of this comparison 
would draw on a broad array of metrics, including measures of general productivity, 
positive or negative impacts attributed to insiders, and relative expenditure of resources 
for defense against adversaries. Alternatively, a single institution adopting the No Dark 
Corners strategy could compare itself across a similar scale to determine the impact of 
the new strategy in relation to previous experiences with insider problems under 
alternative defensive strategies. 
CONCLUSION 
As this study suggests, a hostile insider needs three essentials to carry out an attack:  a 
worthy target, an open door, and a dark corner. Any adversary seeking to strike a 
devastating blow against any institution needs the same. 
Level 1, or primary, critical infrastructures, such as power, water, and 
telecommunications make worthy targets. Not only are some of them irreplaceable, their 
damage or destruction leads to cascading failure of other, interdependent infrastructure 
components, from banking and finance to emergency responders, from transportation 
and logistics to food and agriculture. All depend on the Level 1 infrastructures – on 
worthy targets. 
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The open door comes from a traditional culture of unrestricted public access. This 
openness flourishes because public and investor-owned utilities must answer to a 
demanding public, ratepayers, and various regulatory agencies. Even when these 
infrastructure stewards have critical assets to protect, when it comes to their public 
customers, they cannot be perceived as having something to hide. In this environment, 
defenses against infiltrators or any type of insider threat require a cultural shift. The 
challenge is to close the door to infiltrators while leaving it open to legitimate workers. 
Even if an infiltrator sets sights on a worthy infrastructure target and exploits weak 
defenses, he or she still needs a dark corner free of oversight or restraint in order to 
gather pre-strike intelligence and then initiate an attack without risk of timely 
intervention and defeat. The best way to defeat such an attack is to remove the dark 
corners. 
Second, as previously mentioned, Americans have a penchant for relying on 
technology to solve problems. This tendency places a premium on depth at the 
occasional expense of breadth. As a result, in addressing the insider threat to critical 
infrastructure, the tendency leaves us attempting to penetrate with the intensity and 
focus of a laser what we should be illuminating with a flashlight. No matter how deep 
the laser drills, it points to only a fragment of the entire picture. Caught in the laser’s 
beam, a clever insider can mask or explain away hostile activities with relative impunity. 
The No Dark Corners approach substitutes the flashlight of open team and employee 
engagement for the laser of limited and specialized monitoring of corporate sentinels 
working in secret. It represents a method of implementing layered defenses, particularly 
on the front lines of detection and intervention: where critical operations take place. 
Despite generations of study, the insider threat remains alive. Infiltrators continue to 
pose a risk to critical infrastructure.  There are no easy answers. No Dark Corners shows 
promise, however, as an approach that fills the gaps in traditional defenses. In so doing, 
this approach stands poised to deliver an important benefit for defenders: the victory of 
ownership over surprise. 
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adverse consequences.  Now he concentrates on preventing them.  He may be reached via 
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1 T. Noonan and E. Archuleta, The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures (The National Infrastructure 
Advisory Council, April 6, 2008), 32. 
2 E. D. Shaw and L. F. Fischer, Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by 
Information Technology Insider (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2005), 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
18 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dod/nps33-122107-
01.pdf&code=cabcfb03c46e06e36ad177e692594c28. 
3 C.  Eoyang, “Models of Espionage,” in Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal, ed. T. Sarbin, 
R. Carney, and C. Eoyang (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 80. 
4 N. Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners:  Defending Against Insider Threats to Critical Infrastructure” 
(master’s thesis, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, September 2009), https://www.chds.us/?research/thesis&view=public. 
5 G. J. Skulmoski, F. T. Harman, and J. Krahn, “The Delphi Method for Graduate Research,”  Journal of 
Information Technology Education 6 (2007),  http://jite.org/documents/Vol6/JITEv6p001-
021Skulmoski212.pdf 
6 R. C. Brackney and R. H. Anderson, Understanding the Insider Threat (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND 
Corporation, 2004), 14,  http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF196/index.html. 
7 Catrantzos, “Dark Corners,” 6-10. 
8 Ibid., 5-38. 
9 Ibid., 11-41. 
10 Ibid., 26. 
11 Ibid., 43-50. 
12 T. B. Allen and N. Polmar, Merchants of Treason: America’s Secrets for Sale (New York: Delacorte 
Press, 1988), 3 and 47. 
13 K. L. Herbig, “Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007,” Technical Report 08–05 (Monterey, 
California: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, March 2008), V. 
14 In the United States, employment-related investigations can only legitimately use conviction records, 
not arrest records.  Only law enforcement has access to the latter and is prohibited from sharing them 
with employers so that the latter do not unfairly affect an applicant’s livelihood by making adverse hiring 
decisions before the legal system has decided actual guilt.  See pp. 20–24, Pre-employment Background 
Screening Guideline (Alexandria, Virginia:  American Society for Industrial Security, International, 
2006), http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinespre-employ.pdf. 
15 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Employment Tests and Selection Procedures (2009), 1-6,  
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html. 
16 Pre-employment Background Screening Guideline, 24. 
17 Ibid., 20 and 22. 
18 J. J. Fishman, The Faithless Fiduciary and the Elusive Quest for Nonprofit Accountability (Durham, 
NC:  Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 274. 
19 R. M. Carney, “The Enemy Within,” in Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal, ed. T. Sarbin, 
R. Carney, and C. Eoyang (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 21. 
20 M. Anderson, “Introduction,” in Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal, ed. T. Sarbin, R. 
Carney, and C. Eoyang (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 1-17.  
21 The seven-year number is based on the standard state limit for reporting of criminal convictions and 
that the Fair Credit Reporting Act uses for employment-related background screening (Pre-employment 
Background Screening Guideline, 20, 22). 
22 ICE Mutual Agreement for Government and Employers (U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement, March 2, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/partners/opaimage/image_faq.htm. 
23 T. Peters, speech on emerging security trends.  Keynote address presented at the 2007 seminar and 
exhibits, American Society for Industrial Security, Las Vegas, NV, September 25, 2007. 
24 S. M. R. Covey and R. R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust:  The One Thing that Changes Everything (New 
York: Free Press, 2008), 292. 
25 Merriam Webster Dictionary Online (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co-pilot.  




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
19 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 See Appendix D, items 1, 2, and 5, in Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners,” for Delphi respondent illustrations 
of this point. 
27 P. Drucker, Managing in the Next Society (New York:  Truman Talley Books, 2002), 295. 
28 W. C. Kim and R. Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 
2005), 27-35. 
29 See Catrantzos, “Dark Corners,” 55-56 
30 C. Fernandez-Araoz, B. Groysberg, and N. Nohria, “The Definitive Guide to Recruitment in Good Times 
and Bad,” Harvard Business Review (May, 2009), 74–84.   
31 Fishman, The Faithless Fiduciary, 311. 
32 See Appendix D, item 2, in Catrantzos, “No Dark Corners,” for more detail on the two-person integrity 
rule. 
33 For representative observations supporting the merits of such video surveillance, refer to M. Nieto, K. 
Johnston-Dodds, and C. W. Simmons, Public and Private Applications of Video Surveillance and 
Biometric Technologies (California Research Bureau. Sacramento: California State Library Foundation, 
2002), 34, and P. Murphy, “Surveillance,”  Security Business Practices Reference, Volume 2 (Alexandria, 
VA:  American Society for Industrial Security, 1999), 19. Patrick Murphy, Loss Prevention Director for 
Marriott International, confirmed experiencing an 84 percent decline in losses from armed robberies as a 
result of such an openly visible installation of surveillance cameras, which led him to publish his 
experience as a best industry practice in 1999 and which still holds true ten years later (personal 
communication, July 23, 2009). 
34 Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, and Simmons, Public and Private Applications, 16, and R. Day, “Remotely 
Monitored CCTV Reduces Theft by 80%,” in Secure Times (Essex, UK:  Sheen Publishing, Ltd., May, 
2009), 19.  Richard Day, a manager whose British firm had been experiencing high losses of construction 
equipment to burglars, credited remotely monitored surveillance cameras for reducing such losses by 80 
percent as of June 2009. 
35 O. Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1972), 6. 
36 O. Newman, personal communication, November 21, 2002.  Newman’s remarks came in an e-mail 
response to my inquiry regarding whether he was teaching his principles or aware of any such program of 
instruction he would currently recommend for security practitioners. 
37 J. Q. Wilson and G. L. Kelling, “Fixing Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982. 
38 G.L. Kelling and C.M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our 
Communities (New York: Touchstone, 1996), vx. 
39 Kelling’s theory is not without its critics.  However, much of the criticism is directed not at whether 
Fixing Broken Windows works to take back public spaces from offenders who otherwise scare legitimate 
users of the public away, but at larger societal issues, such as the inevitable displacement of offender 
activity that occurs in neighboring communities that are not using the same strategy. The criticism is 
along the lines that applying Broken Windows just pushes a problem from one neighborhood to another.  
Similarly, other critics object that changing demographics may also account for crime, thus bringing into 
question Broken Windows as a panacea. One criticism even went so far as to opine that greater access of 
unwed mothers to abortion should account for crime reduction because children who would have grown 
to be criminals were aborted, and Kelling did not credit this phenomenon in his theory [S. D. Levitt and S. 
J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 2005)]. Since Kelling did not offer his theory as a panacea or as the sole explanation for 
decreases in crime, himself taking account of other factors, including Newman’s work, it is more accurate 
to say his theory may have been challenged but not discredited in terms of actual aims and results. More 
recent criticisms focus on community policing aspects of the theory, which vary greatly depending on the 
police force. However, researchers Braga and Bond highlighted this point but vindicated the theory in a 
recent study, which found that cleaning up the physical environment in Lowell, MA, was very effective, 
while a corresponding increase in misdemeanor arrests was not (C. Y. Johnson, Breakthrough on “Broken 
Windows” Boston Globe, February 8, 2009, 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
20 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/02/08/breakthrough_on_broken_wi
ndows/?page=2). 
40 R.T. Marsh, Chairman, President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, in cover letter to 
the president dated October 13, 1997, Critical Foundations – Protecting America’s Infrastructures: The 
Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October 1997), http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pccip.pdf. As Marsh noted, 
“Because the infrastructures are mainly privately owned and operated, we concluded that critical 
infrastructure assurance is a shared responsibility of the public and private sectors.”  
41 Basic pre-employment background investigations continue to offer value as a tool of due diligence that 
may detect or deter criminals and individuals with a history of misconduct. They do not pose a serious 
obstacle to a moderately prepared infiltrator whose selection will in some measure depend on having a 
history free of criminal convictions and otherwise free of easily identifiable discrepancies that background 
checks are designed to spot. 
 Firefighters and Information Sharing:  
Smart Practice or Bad Idea?1 
Bryan Heirston 
While our information sharing capabilities have improved significantly, substantial 
obstacles remain. We must continue to break down information barriers among 
federal, state, local, and tribal partners and the private sector. 
-2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security2 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has over one million firefighters serving in over thirty thousand fire 
departments that respond to over twenty-four million emergencies annually.3 In their 
efforts to prevent and respond to life and property loss, firefighters enter homes, 
businesses, vehicles, and other assets, without a search warrant, thousands of times 
each day. This access has allowed firefighters to identify potential terrorist activities, 
oftentimes unexpectedly for both the firefighters and the potential terrorists. U.S. 
firefighters may be in a unique position to positively or negatively impact our current 
homeland security information-sharing efforts.   
This article identifies smart practices, comparing and contrasting the information-
sharing activities of the New York City Fire Department’s Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy (FDNY Strategy), the U.S. Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise 
draft concept plan (FSIE CONPLAN), the UK’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA) 
and current ad hoc U.S. fire service information-sharing activities. Matrixes contrast 
legal compliance, political acceptability, Target Capabilities List linkage, operational 
impact, and cost for the FDNY Strategy, FSIE CONPLAN, CCA, and current fire service 
information-sharing environment.4    
Current U.S. Fire Service Information-Sharing Environment 
Nationally, fire departments have impressive staffing and capabilities. According to the 
National Fire Protection Association, total employment in firefighting occupations was 
1,141,900 in 2006, of which more than 823,950 were part-time or volunteers.5 Of the 
30,635 fire departments in the United States, 4,052 are career departments, with the 
majority of departments (26,583) staffed by volunteers.6 Firefighters are often the first 
response personnel at the scene of emergency incidents, where they perform a myriad of 
critical life-saving and property-conservation functions. Fire departments and 
firefighters are located throughout the country, from densely populated urban 
environments, residential neighborhoods and airports, to chemical plants, oil refineries, 
wild lands, and large unincorporated areas.7  
As few as fifteen of the thirty thousand U.S. fire departments formally use terrorism 
indicators and communicate the information gathered to the homeland security 
community.8 Despite the obvious potential benefit of thousands of firefighters as 
consumers and collectors of information, the current information-sharing environment 
is ad hoc at best and in many locales, non-existent. It appears few firefighters have 
received formal training in what terrorist indicators to look for or how to communicate 
or request information.   
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In late 2002 President Bush commissioned the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission). The 9/11 
Commission’s Final Report included recommendations designed to guard against future 
attacks. One recommendation involved unity of effort. The following excerpt may have 
application to the fire service sharing information with the intelligence community:  
National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the 
home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all source 
analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots.” 
No one component holds all the relevant information.9 
An example of successful informal information sharing effort resulted from a DHS-
sponsored New Mexico Technology course at the Energetic Materials Research and 
Testing Center (EMRTC). After a local fire department hazardous materials team 
member attended an EMRTC class, the local fire department responded to a “smoke 
condition” inside a building. During their check of the building for smoke, which proved 
to be negative, the firefighters came across fourteen one-gallon plastic containers filled 
with an unknown substance. The on-scene incident commander requested the Haz Mat 
unit, and upon their arrival, they determined the substance in the containers to be urine. 
The incident commander did not think anything of it, nor did the police supervisor at 
the scene. However, the member of the Haz Mat unit who had attended the EMRTC 
class indicated that the urine could be a component of a bomb, and because of this, the 
fire department contacted the FBI. Further searches of the house turned up an 
additional twenty empty containers and maps and train schedules of the New York 
metropolitan area. The FBI took the tenant of the apartment into custody. At the time of 
this writing, the FBI investigation continues.  
 Successful emergency prevention strategies have reduced fire loss in the U.S. 
through a unity of effort from a diversified cadre of citizens, federal, state, local, private, 
and public partners working together and sharing information to prevent life and 
property loss from fire and other emergencies. These fire prevention strategies may be 
useful in terrorism prevention efforts.10   
For years it has been a common practice in many U.S. fire departments to share 
information relating to potential illegal activities with the law enforcement community.  
For example, in Oklahoma City, if firefighters respond to a fire in the kitchen area, and 
while searching for victims or ventilating the structure notice a potential 
methamphetamine lab in the bedroom, the police department will be contacted. If 
children are present, the Department of Human Services will be notified. When 
domestic violence is suspected, the local law enforcement agency is notified. In these 
instances, the information is usually communicated by a radio call to the 911-dispatch 
center. This collaboration also occurs at non-emergency operations, such as fire code 
inspections, where firefighters sometimes report large quantities of explosives, 
chemicals, or firearms at businesses that typically do not handle those products.  
On the other hand, this spirit of collaboration can lead to illegal collection plans. In 
2007 a law enforcement representative approached an Oklahoma City firefighter and 
inquired if he would conduct a fire inspection at a local mosque in order to identify 
potential terrorist-related information. Fortunately, the firefighter’s supervisor realized 
the legal exposure associated with the plan and denied permission for the firefighter to 
participate. One aspect of determining whether information collected by a firefighter is 
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legal or “fruit of a poisonous tree” may lie in whether the firefighter identified potential 
terrorist-related items or information during the normal course of their duty or the 
firefighter was assigned to collect information on suspected terrorists.  
National Strategy for the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Concept of 
Operations PLAN (FSIE CONPLAN) 
The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A)-coordinated FSIE initiative is a 
national strategic approach to information sharing between the U.S. fire service and 
homeland security community. Homeland security affiliates for the FSIE were identified 
within the FSIE framework as federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector “agencies or 
organizations that are stakeholders of FSIE initiatives, either as collaborators or 
customers” for the DHS.11 The FSIE CONPLAN appears to be a strategic extension and 
formal expansion of the current informal fire service information-sharing environment 
between the fire service and homeland security communities. The primary FSIE 
CONPLAN venues for sharing information are federal, state, and local fusion centers. 
Working within the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, fire service fusion 
center liaisons or representatives would act as nodes, and the fusion centers would act 
as hubs for receiving and disseminating relevant information in a timely and actionable 
manner.12  
The FSIE CONPLAN appears to represent a logical progression in maximizing the 
current homeland security information-sharing culture. Given the current and future 
threat environments in this long-term conflict (sometimes called the global war on 
terrorism), it might be careless or even negligent not to build on the FSIE CONPLAN to 
formally incorporate over one million firefighters into the information-sharing 
community.  
New York City Fire Department Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
Strategy (FDNY Strategy) 
According to the 9/11 Commission, the lack of information sharing on 9/11 may have 
resulted in unwarranted fatalities for civilians, firefighters, and other responders in New 
York City: 
Just as in the North Tower, callers from below and above the impact zone were 
advised to remain where they were and wait for help. The operators were not 
given any information about the inability to conduct rooftop rescues and 
therefore could not advise callers that they had essentially been ruled out. This 
lack of information combined with the general advice to remain where they were, 
may have caused civilians above the impact not to attempt to descend, although 
stairwell A may have been passable.13 
Regarding information-sharing with the FDNY on 9/11, FDNY fire chiefs testified to the 
9/11 Commission that the lack of information sharing, particularly between the fire 
command staff and other Emergency Services Sector agencies, adversely impacted 
operations.14    
As a direct result of 9/11, the FDNY released their comprehensive Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness FDNY Strategy (FDNY Strategy) in 2007. Based on my review of 
the FDNY Strategy, the fire department has taken administrative (but not necessarily 
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operational) steps to operate safely and effectively use information sharing in the post-
9/11, multifaceted, all-hazards threat environment. The following statement in the 
FDNY Strategy indicates that the fire department is in a position to address a number of 
the information-sharing challenges within the homeland security community.  
An examination of the events leading to 9/11 highlighted many gaps in 
information-gathering capabilities and information-sharing protocols within the 
homeland security community. The FDNY recognized that the Department could 
help to fill some of these gaps by contributing to local intelligence-gathering 
efforts. When routinely shared with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
the information gathered by FDNY personnel could make a significant 
contribution to existing intelligence and lead to the identification and disruption 
of terrorist activities. Terrorism-related information can be gathered by the 
FDNY in many ways. During the course of routine building inspections, arson 
investigations and response to fires and medical emergencies, FDNY personnel 
have unique access to homes and buildings that generally are concealed from 
outsiders.15 
According to FDNY Commissioner Scoppetta and Fire Chief Cassano, the FDNY 
leadership employed the insight and skills from a cross section of FDNY’s considerable 
work force to develop the FDNY Strategy.  The FDNY Strategy was designed to provide 
direction and unity toward enhanced preparedness.16  
The FDNY Strategy is organized around four articles. Article 1 (Strategy and Purpose) 
addresses the foundation of preparedness based on the current and future threat 
environment for man-made and natural disasters. Article 2 (mission and focus) 
examines the life-safety oriented work and focus of the FDNY, based on pre-determined 
significant issues that must be addressed to achieve the pre-identified levels of 
preparedness. Article 3 (Operational Readiness) describes how the FDNY ensures that 
firefighters have “the tools, training and support they need to do their job.”17 Article 3 
also identifies a number of the National Preparedness Goal components to assist FDNY 
firefighters in achieving the evaluation points identified in Article 4 of the FDNY 
Strategy. The National Preparedness Goal components identified in the FDNY Strategy 
are “planning; organization and leadership; equipment and systems; training; exercises, 
evaluations and corrective actions; and personnel.”18 Article 4 (Coordination and 
Evaluation) is the final article of the FDNY Strategy and utilizes an “FDNY Strategy 
Cycle” to provide a systematic approach in identifying hazards, evaluating risks, 
implementing control measures and evaluating the FDNY Strategy. 
United Kingdom Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA) 
A review of the terrorism information-sharing systems in Canada, Australia, Israel, and 
the United Kingdom, as they relate to fire service and homeland security information 
sharing partnerships, resulted in the identification of one applicable information-
sharing legislative action, the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA).  
This article utilizes the sections of the CCA relevant to England exclusively and does not 
consider the other UK countries due to their relatively small and often administrative 
CCA variances. The CCA is the product of a legislative evolution that began with the 
United Kingdom’s Emergency Powers Act of 1920, continued with the 1948 Civil 
Protection Act, and later the foot-and-mouth outbreak, and World Trade Center attacks.  
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The CCA may be the most comprehensive single national fire service-related 
information-sharing document analyzed for this article. For example, in England, the 
fire service roles and responsibilities regarding information sharing are clearly 
identified in the CCA and in some cases the local fire brigade is mandated to play a lead 
role. In contrast, the National Information Sharing Strategy does not identify the U.S. 
fire service anywhere in its forty pages.19 
The common law process used to adopt the CCA does not appear to be substantially 
different from the adoption of many post-9/11 homeland security-related U.S. 
guidelines, policies, strategies, presidential directives, and public laws relating to 
counterterrorism information sharing.20 The difference is that the U.S. has chosen not to 
explicitly require information sharing between the fire service and the homeland 
security community, while England has. In both countries national crises occurred that 
necessitated change to lessen or eliminate future man-made and natural disasters. Both 
the United States and England analyzed the issues, sought input from the major 
stakeholders, developed wide-ranging policies, strategies, and laws, and instituted 
measures in an effort to lessen or eliminate future catastrophic events.  
The result has been an informal information-sharing environment within the U.S. fire 
service that is often non-mandatory, casual, and limited in structure and scope. In 
England, the CCA requires fire brigades to participate in the Local Resilience Forums 
and to share information both informally and formally. The majority of the fifty-seven 
regulations in Part One of the CCA significantly enhance the probability of informal and 
formal information sharing with England’s fire service. In the United States, DHS 
funding – primarily in the form of grants to fusion centers and other information-
sharing enterprises – has been the catalyst for fire service information sharing related to 
terrorism. Also in the United States, most firefighters may not know what terrorism 
indicators to look for, when to look for them, or how to share the information.  
The CCA was designed to provide a single legislative point for wide-ranging 
protection of civilians and military from significant all-hazard disasters. Part One 
identifies and assigns local arrangements for information sharing and formally 
recognizes fire brigades as an integral part of England’s intelligence cycle. Part One also 
identifies the legal framework regarding the roles and responsibilities for local Level 1 
and 2 responders. Level 1 responders are referred to as “core responders” and include 
emergency services such as police, fire, ambulance, and maritime and coastguard 
agencies, as well as other local authorities such as environmental and health care 
agencies.21 Category 2 responders or “co-operating responders” include utilities and 
transportation agencies.22  
Part Two of the CCA focuses on the emergency powers at the regional and national 
governmental levels and includes special legislative actions and authority at the policy 
level that may be needed to address the effects of significant events such as the London 
7/7 subway bombings, or the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. Part Three addresses 
the general, fiscal, and administrative issues relating to implementing and maintaining 
the CCA.23  
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COMPARISON OF FOUR FIREFIGHTER-RELATED INFORMATION-
SHARING SYSTEMS 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in 
its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. 
— Niccolò Machiavelli24 
 
The fundamental qualitative premise underlying this article is that there are lessons to 
be learned by the U.S. fire service and homeland security community from current 
information-sharing systems (New York City Fire Department Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy, current U.S. Fire Service information sharing, U.S. Fire Service 
Intelligence Enterprise, and England’s application of the U.K. Civil Contingencies Act of 
2004). The following matrixes and related information compare the value of the four 
information-sharing systems relative to each other based on five criteria. 
The five criteria (legal compliance, political acceptability, Target Capabilities List 
linkage, operational impact, and cost) are used with each of the four information-
sharing systems (FDNY Strategy, FSIE CONPLAN, CCA and current ad hoc U.S. fire 
service information-sharing) to identify strengths and weaknesses applicable to 
improving information-sharing between the U.S. fire service and other homeland 
security partners.   
Legal Compliance 
Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or engaged in reporting potential 
terrorist indicators, the fire service has not yet created any significant legal exposure or 
civil-liberties violations. Based on Todd Masse’s findings, the fire service has a legal 
responsibility to report suspicious activity.25 As a counter point to Masse’s findings, in 
December 2007 the ACLU raised questions regarding firefighters’ collecting and sharing 
potential terrorist information. The ACLU position indicated excessive potential loss of 
personal privacy rights would be the result of firefighters’ collecting and sharing 
information.26  
With that said, the four information-sharing systems were evaluated for compliance 
with legal rulings as they relate to entry onto or into property by firefighters during 
emergency and non-emergency operations. The U.S. cases regarded as applicable for fire 
personnel collecting potential terrorist information were: Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499 (1978); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); and Camara v. Municipal Court 
of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), as well as the Homeland 
Security Act 2002, Subtitle I “Information Sharing.”27   
In the case of Camara the court indicated “The basic purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its 
prohibition of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 
Firefighters in the performance of their emergency duties to save lives and property 
were not considered to be “arbitrary” or “unreasonable.”28   
Relative to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it appears the U.S. fire service and 
homeland security community have a duty to share information (at least unclassified), 
as exemplified by the following:  
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(1) Under procedures prescribed by the President, all appropriate agencies, 
including the intelligence community, shall, through information sharing 
systems, share homeland security information with Federal agencies and 
appropriate State and local personnel to the extent such information may be 
shared, as determined in accordance with subsection (a), together with 
assessments of the credibility of such information. (2) Each information sharing 
system through which information is shared under paragraph (1) shall— (A) have 
the capability to transmit unclassified or classified information, though the 
procedures and recipients for each capability may differ; (B) have the capability 
to restrict delivery of information to specified subgroups by geographic location, 
type of organization, position of a recipient within an organization, or a 
recipient’s need to know such information; (C) be configured to allow the efficient 
and effective sharing of information; and (D) be accessible to appropriate State 
and local personnel. 29 
The court rulings advocate firefighters entering homes, businesses, vehicles, and other 
assets without warrants to prevent and respond to potential life and property loss. The 
court rulings do not allow for “arbitrary invasions” or “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” by fire personnel. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 indicates local agencies 
have a legal responsibility to share potential terrorist-related information.  
The following matrices and information-sharing criteria discussions are organized 
from highest to lowest for each measure. For example, the matrix for legal compliance is 




Information-Sharing Option Legal Compliance 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE  High 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low/Average 
CCA Unknown 
Figure 1.   Legal Compliance 
The FDNY Strategy received the highest value due to the use of accepted local, state, and 
federal strategies, laws, and guidelines. (At the time of this writing, the FDNY Strategy 
was the only completed U.S. fire service information-sharing document that had 
received and passed a legal review).  
According to Keeley Townsend of the DHS I&A, “The FSIE is being designed in 
compliance with all federal laws and will be reviewed by DHS Privacy, Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties, Security, and DHS OGC, as well as the DOJ Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative. We are also adhering to all criminal intelligence laws, when 
applicable.”30 Based on the review of current FSIE documents and Townsend’s previous 
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work with the FDNY Strategy, it is anticipated that the finished FSIE products will meet 
or exceed the established legal requirements.31  
The legality of the current information-sharing environment is questionable, since 
most firefighters do not know what terrorism indicators to look for, when to look for 
them, or how to report them. Given that most firefighters are not actively aware of or 
engaged in reporting potential terrorist indicators, the fire service has not created any 
significant legal exposure or civil liberties violations. Based on Masse’s findings, the fire 
service has a legal responsibility to report suspicious activity.32 
England’s CCA information collection and sharing structure was based on the United 
Kingdom’s system of government and did not address the legality of information 
collection. The CCA exceeded the three other information-sharing systems relating to 
legal information sharing of open-source, sensitive, and classified information between 
the core and cooperating responders.  
Political Acceptability 
For this article, “political acceptability” refers to policy-level support. The decision 
makers generally considered were formal policy groups accountable for the strategy, 
concept of operations, or legislation. Examples could be local, state, or national 
governing bodies. In some circumstances consideration was given to labor 
representatives, such as the International Association of Firefighters or the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which might have significant influence and interest in the political 
acceptability of the strategy, act, or information-sharing arrangement. 
 
 
Information-Sharing Option Political Acceptability 
FDNY Strategy  High  
CCA Good 
Current U.S. Fire Service Average 
FSIE Unknown 
Figure 2.   Political Acceptability 
The FDNY Strategy incorporates FDNY policy-level fire officers who use the 
requirements and guidelines of numerous accepted local, state, and federal documents. 
The CCA was the most politically comprehensive, single-source fire service 
information-sharing document analyzed for this article. As stated earlier, the U.S. 
National Information Sharing Strategy does not identify the fire service anywhere in 
the document.33 In England’s CCA, the fire service roles and responsibilities regarding 
information sharing are clearly defined at the national, regional, and local levels, and in 
the case of the London fire brigade, the fire service is mandated to take a lead role. 
HEIRSTON, FIREFIGHTERS AND INFORMATION SHARING 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 2 (MAY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
9 
Applicability of the current fire service information-sharing environment to the U.S. 
public, policy groups, labor unions, governmental agencies, and other related 
organizations is in the early stages of development. At the national level, Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated for the inclusion of firefighters 
in state and local fusion centers.34 
Based on the December 2008 draft of the FSIE CONPLAN, the CONPLAN appears to 
be a more practical and robust direction for the U.S. fire service.  
Target Capabilities List Linkage 
In 2004, DHS released fifteen National Planning Scenarios.35 The National Planning 
Scenarios listed and explained the hazards and risks associated with high-impact events 
that would significantly affect local emergency-response capabilities. The capabilities 
identified in the planning scenarios resulted in thirty-six target capabilities within four 
mission areas (Prevention, Protection, Response, and Recovery). The criteria for this 
article relied on four of the nine “prevention target capabilities” listed in the DHS 
National Preparedness Guidelines.36 Four target capabilities were selected due to their 
correlation to information sharing.37   
• Intelligence/information sharing and dissemination;  
• CBRNE detection; 
• Information gathering and recognition of indicators;  
• Warnings, intelligence analysis, and production. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Target Capabilities List Linkage 
FDNY Strategy  High  
FSIE Good 
CCA Average 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
Figure 3.   Target Capabilities List Linkage 
The FDNY used the fifteen planning scenarios to enhance their protection and response 
missions and to compete for DHS grant funding. The FDNY Strategy exceeded the four 
information-sharing target capabilities criteria used for this article by identifying the 
role of the FDNY in all thirty-six target capabilities identified in the National 
Preparedness Guidelines. 
The current FSIE CONPLAN does not specifically address target capabilities. The 
FSIE is given a “good” rating based on information received from the DHS I&A State 
and Local Program Office that indicated “national planning scenarios, attack timelines, 
and universal adversary profiles are being used to guide the information/intelligence 
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requirements identification, and the Target Capabilities List is being used to guide the 
mechanisms of identification, technical assistance, and training.”38 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the CCA 
addresses three of the four target capabilities fully, and the CBRNE capability partially. 
Of the four information-sharing target capabilities selected for this project, the 
current fire service role in the homeland security information-sharing environment 
formally utilized only the CBRNE detection target capabilities component through the 
DHS FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP).  
Operational Impact 
How the current ad hoc fire service information-sharing arrangements, strategy, or CCA 
would influence the operation of the homeland security information-sharing community 
was measured initially by collecting key indicators of success, such as those identified in 
the documents themselves and, in some cases post-product analysis. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Operational Impact 
CCA  Good  
FDNY Strategy Average  
FSIE Low 
Current U.S. Fire Service Unacceptable 
Figure 4.   Operational Impact 
In England, the 2006 National Capability Survey suggested that local responders have 
made good progress in enhancing the operational information-sharing impact of the 
Civil Contingencies Act.39 “The vast majority of Local Resilience Forums and supporting 
task groups are up and running and functioning effectively. Almost all local responders 
are happy that Local Resilience Forums are providing the right level of engagement to 
enable members to perform the tasks mandated by the Act.”40   
The FDNY Strategy may have relevance for increasing the U.S. fire service 
operational impact in the all-hazards information-sharing environment. For example, 
the FDNY Bureau of Investigation maintains numerous important connections with the 
homeland security community; they are implementing a network-centric, information-
sharing-based command system that has the potential to significantly increase real-time 
information sharing among a myriad of local, state, and federal partners; and they 
communicate national and local information to tens of thousands of fire personal and 
homeland security partners through their weekly Watchline e-mail. What appears to 
make the Watchline unique is a fire service operational orientation and specific tactical 
comments on eight to ten all-hazard fire service related issues.  
The FSIE CONPLAN contains specific accountability components for the 
management of the information-sharing tasks. If the current information-sharing gap is 
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the catalyst for increased information sharing with the homeland security community, 
then the current FSIE CONPLAN is moving towards enhancing the operational impact 
of information sharing. 
The operational impact of the current information-sharing environment was difficult 
to quantify. The anecdotal successes associated with information sharing among 
homeland security and the fire service, combined with the recent emergence of 
strategies and technical assistance programs, suggests that there is a heightened 
awareness of the potential for firefighters as sensors of opportunity who identify 
potential terrorist activities and as consumers of information for specific terrorist 
targets. Considering that the U.S. is at war on two fronts and that domestic and 
international terrorists have sworn to cripple the United States through terrorism, the 
current organized information sharing between the fire service and homeland security 
community is unacceptable. 
Costs 
The United States spends approximately $100 billion per year on homeland security.41 
Homeland security expenses include federal, state, and local law enforcement, and 
emergency medical, public works, and fire services, but exclude most funding for the 
armed forces.42 Generally speaking, the national effort to enhance homeland security 
through information sharing with the fire service appears to involve a relatively small 
fiscal impact. Costs include the human resources the fire service and homeland security 
communities have committed specifically to information sharing. Most costs appeared 
to be “soft costs” absorbed by current fire and intelligence organizations responsible for 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. 
 
Information-Sharing Option Costs 
Current U.S. Fire Service Low 
FDNY Strategy Average 
FSIE Average 
CCA Average 
Figure 5.   Costs 
The cost of developing and implementing the FDNY Strategy appears to have been 
incorporated into the operating budget and supplemented with DHS grant funding for 
equipment. For example, the cost of producing and distributing the Watchline as well as 
the proposed Network-Centric Command System appear to have been developed within 
the FDNY’s FY 2006-07 operating budget. 
Data identifying costs were not available in the FSIE CONPLAN. Based on 
information within the CONPLAN framework, requirements, mechanisms, technical 
assistance, and training, the costs may be reasonable considering the DHS budget. 
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At the time of this writing a review of available literature indicated that the CCA has 
not been audited for cost in England. Scotland is auditing their version of the CCA, but 
the results were not available. The costs of implementation of the CCA may have been 
primarily soft costs incorporated into the current budgets for the public and private 















Current U.S. Fire 
Service 
Low/Average Average Low Unacceptable Low 
FDNY Strategy High High High Average  Average 
FSIE High Unknown Good Unknown Average 
CCA Unknown Good Average Good High 
Figure 6.   Information-Sharing Matrix 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations consider existing programs, political concerns, and 
financial constraints associated with the four information-sharing systems. 
Current Fire Service Information-Sharing Recommendations 
Despite all our collective homeland security efforts since 9/11, it appears that the only 
emergency services sector homeland security partners with established access to 
information are those with law enforcement connections. If the fire service is to increase 
its use of all-hazards information in its decision cycles, then homeland security 
information-sharing partners may wish to open up the information-sharing system both 
culturally and politically. The best intelligence should be provided to the widest group of 
decision-makers, including (perhaps especially) those with no historical information-
sharing relationships.  
The four indicators listed below were common among the more than one hundred 
and fifty current homeland security terrorist-related indicators studied. The four 
common terrorist indicators could be printed on business cards with contact 
information of the local information-sharing partner (fire marshal, law enforcement, 
JTTF, fusion center) on the other side of the card. The cards could then be distributed 
through the representative organizations such as the International Association of 
Firefighters, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National Volunteer Fire 
Council. 
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1. Suspicious Behavior: Especially unusual nervousness for the situation 
and inappropriate or lack of eye contact.  
2. Unusual supplies for occupancy type (structure or vehicle):  
Especially storing large amounts of chemicals, cash, electronics... 
3. Unusual documents for the occupancy type: Especially maps, books, 
blueprints, literature… of critical infrastructures.  
4. Intelligence gathering: Especially surveillance, taking pictures, video, 
notes, asking questions, attempting to gain access. 
A second recommendation is to use local fire marshals as planning-and-logistics 
officers, specifically for fire personnel (and their families) during extended all-hazards 
responses lasting longer than two operational periods (typically twenty-four hours). 
This will enhance information sharing between families and response personnel. This 
recommendation may reduce anxiety for fire personnel and their families during high-
profile heavily media-covered events. 
FSIE Recommendations 
Regarding the DHS I&A-sponsored FSIE, the FSIE CONPLAN recommendation of a 
national network of fire service and homeland security organizations that share all-
hazard information and intelligence in a collaborative effort to enhance the national 
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery missions should be implemented. The 
FSIE should also continue to work within the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, the U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Protection Association and others 
to ensure that fire service fusion center liaisons (or representatives) act as nodes and 
that the fusion centers (UASI and state) act as hubs for receiving and disseminating 
relevant information in a timely and actionable manner.   
A final significant FSIE information-sharing recommendation is to increase the 
current level of information sharing across the fire service through social networking. At 
the time of this writing, the DHS I&A is designing a new version of the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) that includes fire service-wide dissemination of 
all locally- and federally-generated information and intelligence products that relate to 
the fire and emergency services.43 If the portal is user-friendly and the information is 
concise, informative, and pertinent to current fire service all-hazards missions, many 
fire personnel may use the information to augment their prevention, preparation, and 
response procedures.44 During a DHS I&A and U.S. Fire Administration-sponsored 
Emergency Services Sector Information Sharing Workshop held in April of 2009, it was 
determined U.S. firefighters, as consumers of intelligence products, did not need to 
know sources, suspect names, or other case-sensitive information, but fire fighters must 
have the following three pieces of information from national, state, or local intelligence 
sources to enhance their response missions and increase survivability for the public and 
emergency responders:  
 
1. Threat Level 
2. Target Hazard(s) 
3. Attack Methodologies 
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FDNY Strategy Recommendations 
Many of the strategies and tactics that FDNY developed for responding to, mitigating, 
and preventing all-hazard disasters can be leveraged by others in the emergency services 
sector, especially fire departments. The FDNY’s considerable human resources and 
other resources have allowed the FDNY to develop strategic approaches and operational 
practices in preparation, prevention, and response to all hazards.45  The FDNY Strategy 
identified numerous ways in which firefighters can produce and consume practical 
preparedness and response information. A number of the following FDNY strategic 
objectives may have application to fire departments throughout the United States. 
One strategic objective involves the use of fire marshals as homeland security liaison 
officers with homeland security partners such as the JTTF, TWIG, FBI, or fusion 
centers. The fire marshals/security liaison officers would share information in 
preparation for generalized or non-specific terrorism threats and participate in the 
investigation of fire or explosion-related terrorism incidents. Fire marshals may be 
useful at potential terrorist emergency scenes to ensure the safety of workers relating to 
secondary devices and scene control.  
If successful in NYC, consideration should be given to incorporating the FDNY 
Network-Centric Command System into the national incident management system for 
use throughout the U.S. fire service to enhance real-time information sharing among 
multi-disciplinary operations within a large-scale command. Another recommendation 
– prompted by the idea of FDNY’s Network-Centric Command System – is to enhance 
information collection and sharing through the use of a diverse suite of small-unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and possibly intervention operations. The 
Naval War College’s Global Hawk or a similar less expensive system might be leveraged 
by the fire service and homeland security partners for real-time information sharing 
during pre-planning, response, and recovery missions on large scale, natural or man-
made disasters. 
Finally, with permission of the FDNY and working in conjunction with the 
DHS/FEMA Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing Analysis 
Center, the FDNY Watchline could be modified and distributed to the U.S. fire service. A 
national Watchline-type program, with state and regional sections, could be coordinated 
and managed through U.S. Fire Administration. Using the fusion centers as venues for a 
Watchline-type product might enhance relationship building between the fire service 
and the intelligence community working in the state and regional fusion centers.  
CCA Recommendations 
The primary recommendation derived from the CCA for this article was the modification 
of the current National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) “Sharing Information 
with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section to include language extrapolated 
from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-57, “Role of London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority.” Modification of the NSIS may enhance information sharing 
through the establishment of formalized local and regional networks similar to those 
found in England. Unlike England, U.S. information sharing is currently not required 
among America’s core responders, which may increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the 
United States.46  
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Other recommendations derived from the CCA involve the development of national 
U.S. guidance templates for formally requesting information after first leveraging the 
CCA three-step informal information-sharing method. When instances of formalized 
information sharing might be necessary between the U.S. fire service and its homeland 
security partners, templates similar to those required by the CCA may be useful.47 
The international, national, and local comparisons and smart practices presented in 
this article may provide the catalyst for increased systematic, operational, and legal 
information sharing between the fire service and homeland security partners.  
CONCLUSION  
There is nothing permanent except change. 
—Heraclitus of Greece48 
Over eight years have passed since the release of the first National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, yet little progress has been made toward solving the Gordian knot 
of information sharing between the U.S. fire service’s million plus fire personnel and the 
homeland security community.49 Unfortunately, we cannot simply cleave the knot in 
two. We must rely on a variety of acumen ranging from strategic and policy expertise to 
the most fundamental tactical skills, in order to develop horizontally- and vertically-
oriented policies, strategies, and tactics to identify and share potential terrorist-related 
information and intelligence.50 
This article presents an analysis of four information-sharing systems relating to 
terrorism and all-hazard strategies, policies, and programs, in an attempt to identify if 
U.S. fire personnel should participate in terrorism-related information sharing and – if 
they should participate – to consider the legal, political, and operational boundaries.  
The research for this article produced three universal or macro-level findings. The 
first indicates that U.S. firefighters have legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to 
gather and share potential terrorist-related information that could assist the homeland 
security community in preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks. Second, these 
responsibilities must be conducted within the context of a 250-year U.S. fire service 
enterprise founded on saving lives and property while maintaining exemplary 
trustworthiness, reliability, and credibility with the public. The third inclusive finding 
was that legal and operational issues may be addressed by firefighters using 
standardized terrorist indicators while operating as sensors of opportunity during 
emergency and non-emergency operations, but fire personnel must not be specifically 
asked or assigned to gather information on suspected terrorists or terrorist activities. 
A strategic recommendation is to modify the NSIS to include the local fire service as 
an information-sharing leader in some situations (see Appendix 2 for suggested NSIS 
language). For example, based on England’s CCA, a modified NSIS might enhance 
collaborative information-sharing through the creation and maintenance of formalized, 
fire department coordinated, local and regional information sharing plans.  Also, for the 
purpose of ensuring that the information sharing plans are actionable and effective, the 
fire department would lead in the training and exercising of the plans. The training and 
exercises would include all public and private agencies identified in each area’s 
information sharing plan. 
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Suggested smart practices identified in this research range from four common 
terrorist indicators that every firefighter should know to the creation of national U.S. 
guidance templates (based on the CCA model) for formally and informally requesting 
classified information. 
Possibly more important than all the findings, recommendations, plans, and smart 
practices identified in this article is the acknowledgment of who firefighters are and 
what they can do to prevent or disrupt terrorism through information sharing. Since 
before the time of Fire Chief Benjamin Franklin the fire service has been built on the 
legal, moral, and ethical commitment to protect U.S. citizens through prevention and 
response. For me, as a potential collector and consumer of potential terrorism (and all 
hazards) related information, the continued sporadic, unstructured, ad hoc information 
sharing system is unacceptable.  
We are at war, and war calls for risks if we are to prevail. One of the risks of using fire 
personnel to collect information in plain sight is the tarnishing of our reputation or 
possible legal action. That risk is considerably less than dealing with the consequences 
of the attacks on the Murrah Building, the World Trade Center, or more horrendous acts 
of terrorism. We must continue to build on the U.S. fire service’s long and successful 
history of information sharing to prevent fires and other disasters; when these 
prevention efforts fail, our citizens and emergency responders deserve a solid 
information sharing response.  
More than eight years ago the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became the catalyst for the U.S. 
expansion of information gathering and sharing with non-traditional partners such as 
the fire service. Now is the time for action. The significant value of fire personnel’s 
prevention of life and property loss from terrorism through the use of standardized 
terrorist indicators and formalized collaboration with the homeland security community 
should not be underestimated. The more than one million U.S. fire personnel serving in 
over 30,000 fire departments may be a phenomenal resource for our homeland security 
partners, and our homeland security partners could be a valuable resource for 
firefighters and other first responders. If the strategic and operational recommendations 
identified in this article are implemented by the nation’s fire personnel, the volume of 
suspicious-activity reporting should increase and with it the potential for preventing or 
disrupting future terrorism in the United States. Citizens will be safer and, in my 
opinion, will appreciate their firefighters stepping up, as they have historically done to 
prevent life and property loss in our country.  
 
Bryan Heirston recently retired as a deputy fire chief for the Oklahoma City Fire Department 
with more than twenty-five years of fire service. During the course of his career, he served as 
incident commander, section chief, hazardous materials specialist, water rescue diver, peer 
counselor, firefighter, and in other positions at scores of events including the 1995 Murrah 
Building bombing, 2001 World Trade Center bombing, and hurricane Katrina in 2005. Mr. 
Heirston is a graduate of the National Fire Academy’s four-year Executive Fire Officer 
Program and holds a master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School.  He may be 
contacted as bch1@cfl.rr.com.  
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Suggested Language for the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
“Sharing Information” Section  
The current National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS) “Sharing Information 
with State, Local and Tribal Governments” section could be modified to include the 
language shown below (extrapolated from the CCA Part One Regulations 55-57, “Role of 
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority”). A new open-source information-
sharing plan involving local fire departments may improve formal and informal 
information sharing between the U.S. fire service and other homeland security partners 
and may potentially prevent or disrupt terrorism.  
 
Current NSIS Language: To implement recommendations developed pursuant to 
Guideline 2 of the President’s Guidelines, and as key participants in the information-
sharing mission, State, local, and tribal entities are encouraged to undertake the 
following activities, in appropriate consultation and coordination with Federal 
departments and agencies. 
 
Recommended NSIS Language 
A.  Role of local or regional fire service authority 
In communities with established fire service, it shall be the responsibility of fire chief of 
the fire service to: 
(1) Ensure that a collaborative open-source information-sharing plan is created and 
maintained. The fire chief shall be responsible for ensuring that all agencies, public and 
private, associated with the area homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sectors identified in the National Response Framework participate. The 
information-sharing plan will include informal and formal information-sharing systems 
or processes associated with potential man-made or natural disasters, including 
terrorist attacks for the pre-defined area, urban area, state homeland security region, or 
other mutually accepted area(s). 
(2) On behalf of all relevant homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sector participants who have functions that are exercisable in the 
identified area, the fire department will be the authority having jurisdiction and will 
take the lead responsibility for exercising the information-sharing plan in relation to 
area-wide emergencies in accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program; and 
(3) At the request of relevant homeland security, emergency services, or critical 
infrastructure sector partners who have functions that are exercisable in the area, assist 
sector and private partners in: 
(i) carrying out exercises for the purpose of ensuring that the information-sharing 
plan maintained by that relevant sector or partner is appropriate for the risk(s); 
(ii) the inter-sector training of responders or other persons for the purposes of 
ensuring that the plan is actionable and effective. 
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B.  Role of other homeland security, emergency services, and critical 
infrastructure sector partners 
 
Homeland security, emergency services, and critical infrastructure sector partners who 
have functions that are exercisable in the pre-determined area, shall cooperate with the 
fire service authority having jurisdiction in connection with the performance by that 
authority of its functions under paragraph A(1). 
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CCA Information Request Process 
Below is the CCA guidance document template for formally requesting information. 
 
 
Once a formal request has been made, a formal response is required. Below is the CCA 
guidance document template for response to a formal request for information. 
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1 Editor’s Note: This article draws on research conducted in 2008. 
2 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy For Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, October 2007), 7. 
3 National Fire Protection Association, “The United States Fire Service,” 1, 
http://www.mdchief.org/fire06/pdf  and U.S. Fire Administration, “Fire Department” (U.S. Fire 
Administration, n.d.), http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/departments/index.shtm.  
4 For the purpose of this article, the terms “homeland security community” or “homeland security 
partners” are based on definitions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
Information Sharing Environment Information Sharing Plan (November 2006),  10, 
http://www.ise.gov/docs/reports/ise-impplan-20611.pdf.   “Information sharing,” is based on the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.   “Fire personnel”, “firefighter” or “fire service” are based on the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office 
(DHS I&A), “Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise – Executive Briefing” (November 2008, contact author 
for copy); and the U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-8 (Washington, DC: The White 
House, December 2003), 1,  is used to define “All-hazards.” The following bulleted points provide more 
detail regarding the terms and their use in the context of this article. 
• U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Information Sharing: “For the purposes of the 
ISE IP, the term “homeland security community” includes the Department of Homeland Security 
and those agencies with public health and welfare, emergency response, transportation, fire, and 
emergency management.” It should be noted that the only reference to “fire” or “homeland 
security community” in the 123-page document is a footnote on page 10. 
• U.S. Homeland Security Act 2002 , (f) – Definitions.  “Any information possessed by a federal, 
state, or local agency that (a) related to the threat of terrorist activity, (b) relates to the ability to 
prevent, interdict or disrupt terrorist activity, (c) would improve the identification or 
investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (d) would improve the response 
to a terrorist act.” 
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local 
Program Office, “Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise Definitions.” The terms “fire personnel, 
firefighter or fire service” include the functions of “firefighting, emergency medical services, 
technical rescue, hazardous materials operations, aviation operations, marine operations, fire 
prevention activities, fire inspections, fire investigations and fire communications.” 
• U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-8. All-hazards is defined as domestic 
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. 
5 National Fire Protection Association, “U.S. Fire Department Profile Through 2006,” 
http://www.mdchief.org/fire06.pdf.  
6 Ibid. 
7 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Fire Fighting Occupations,” 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos329.htm.   
8 Department of Homeland Security, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (DHS-FSIE), “National Strategy 
for the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise” (March 2008, contact author for copy), 4.  Fire departments 
from the following cities participated in the initial DHS-sponsored FSIE conference: Baltimore, Boston, 
Chicago, Denver, Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, Miami-Dade County, New York, 
Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, DC. 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm, 426. 
10 John Whitely and Gerald Yonas, “The War on Terrorism and What We Can Learn from the War on Fire” 
(Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, July 2002), 3-9.  In their paper, John Whitely and 
Gerold Yonas state, “Prevention is the holy grail of our terrorism protection plan just as prevention is the 
key to our fire protection plan…we have created a multi-pronged approach to fire protection that involves 
both government and individuals in the prevention, mitigation, and response to fires.” Historically major 
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Twelve Questions Answered 
 
The purpose of this letter is to offer some answers to the questions posed by Christopher 
Bellavita in the January 2010 issue of Homeland Security Affairs. The essay posed a 
series of significant issues that require far more than can be offered in a concise 
response. However, my intent is not to offer “the answer” to any of the questions but to 
offer “an answer” to each so as to provoke a continuing dialogue on these most 
important topics. 
As has been argued in seminars, around conference tables, and in the field, we as a 
community are still struggling with exactly what homeland security really means. In 
discussing this topic with practitioners and academics around the country, I find that 
perspectives shape responses. At the risk of over generalizing, those with homeland 
security responsibilities at the national level tend to focus on terrorism with natural or 
non-terror man-made disasters a distant secondary focus, while those at the state and 
local level have exactly the opposite view. There are clearly exceptions to these stances, 
but those exceptions are few and far between. Thus, the discussion of what exactly 
homeland security is or should be provides fertile ground for philosophical discourse.  
Given the above, individual perspective might shape how one might respond to these 
questions. Certainly my perspective, one of considerable sensitivity to state and local 
conditions, shapes my response. In articles written by me and published in this journal, 
I have argued very strongly that this disconnect in perspective lies at the very crux of 
some of the more troubling difficulties the nation faces in gaining as high a level of 
preparedness as possible. With that crystallized perspective in mind, I will attempt to 
address each of Dr. Bellavita’s questions. 
1. Why is it so difficult to make risk-based decisions in homeland security? 
Risk-based decisions are made every day in homeland security, either directly or 
indirectly. There is ample evidence that explicit, direct-risk calculations go into 
determining how much security should be placed around power plants, water treatment 
plants, etc.  Implicitly, risk is calculated in every public budget put forward by an elected 
body. Such is the essence of “public choice” economic theory: preferences made known 
to elected officials by the electorate are reflected in budgetary priorities for the 
community, county, city, or state.  
This same implied risk calculation goes into the budgetary process at the national 
level as well. Somewhere in this process, bureaucrats and elected officials must 
determine how large the defense budget must be, how much must be spent in health and 
human services, or how much must be put aside for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Those officials, working through the budgetary process, 
must determine how much is going to be spent on intelligence, technology, and other 
law enforcement-oriented programs to battle terrorism around the world. 
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Perhaps implied in the question is why risk-based decision making is not used in 
distributing homeland security grant funding. Supposedly, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is using risk modeling to make these determinations, though 
the risk modeling used by DHS remains an ephemeral illusion hidden behind smoke-
colored glass. Why those charged with homeland security responsibilities at the state 
and local level have not demanded transparency on this issue is quite beyond 
understanding. In fact, one will find entire divisions of Washington-based think tanks 
supporting DHS and devoted to risk modeling, yet the community is still in the dark (or 
worse, no further along than those with far less sophistication, resources, and 
administrative capacity using implicit methods). Perhaps the risk-based decisions being 
made are quite adequate already.  
2. Why are we unable to measure the relationship between homeland 
security expenditures and preparedness? 
Perhaps the question posed is not of a high enough level of abstraction. Perhaps the first 
issue to address is whether or not there is a relationship between expenditure and 
preparedness. Some would submit that based on the concept of marginal return – 
gaining measurable benefit for each dollar expended – the level of resources advanced 
has been inadequate to really gain advantage from economies of scale. Though the 
original amount of funding put forth by the national government (mostly in the form of 
unencumbered grants) provided a tangible shift in modernization and “preparedness,” 
the precipitous decline in funding each year, along with the increased bureaucratic 
hoops jurisdictions must negotiate to get funding, has had a chilling effect on 
preparedness fever. After state and local governments absorbed “homeland security” 
mission space into their already considerable mission requirements in emergency 
management and public safety, governments at the state and local level had to 
recalibrate priorities for a host of constituent expectations. There are other factors, 
however, that further bring the question as posed under more intense scrutiny. 
Implied in the question is that there is an idealized state of preparedness for the 
nation. There are many who take exception to such a position. The pragmatic view is 
that national, state, and local governments are spending all they are going to spend on 
homeland security and the nation is as prepared as it is going to be. Further, 
“preparedness” is fluid, changing with each day as communities deal with severe 
resource constraints, shifting “threat” priorities, and changing demography. The 
preparedness needs of a community are greatly affected by its aging population, the 
flight of young people, the influx of immigrant populations, the decline in revenue bases, 
and a host of other factors that affect a community’s ability to prepare for or respond to 
significant events.   
As the nation faces increasing budgetary deficits, mounting national debt and fewer 
options to regain economic resilience, one must ask how much longer the country can 
continue to prosecute two wars and increase public spending on entitlement programs 
and the expansion of government before the people resist at the cash register and rebel 
at the ballot box. As hard as one might try to marginalize local grassroots activism, a 
dramatic shift in preferences expressed by the people cannot long be ignored by those 
elected to represent those people. 
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3. Why is illegal immigration a homeland security issue? 
This question is a superb one. Again, one must examine the question from a national 
government perspective and then from a state and local government perspective. At the 
national level, the focus has been on terrorism and, to date, there is little evidence that 
terrorists have crossed our porous borders with the intent of perpetrating attacks on the 
people of this country.  However, such evidence may be emerging.  As Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller told Congress on March 19th of this year, al-
Qaeda is seeking to infiltrate operatives into the United States through both legal and 
illegal means. One could easily make the leap that such infiltration will take (or has 
taken) place across the southern border. Certainly, as the FBI grows more confident that 
such actions are taking place, illegal immigration takes on a decidedly significant 
homeland security priority. 
At the state and local level, illegal immigration and its impact on homeland security 
manifests itself in quite a different manner. Any action or set of actions that diminish 
the resilience of a community has homeland security implications. The presence of 
illegal immigrants in a community diverts resources away from the expressed 
preferences of the legal residents of the community. Illegal immigration imposes 
unfunded costs on communities most significantly in the form of support for public 
education, public safety, and public health. Depending on the source, one can attribute 
as much as $70-90 billion a year across the nation to support those who are in the 
country illegally. As is often the case, certainly in my part of the country, as young 
people with education and good work skills leave communities for better paying jobs, 
illegal immigrants come in behind so that populations do not appear to be affected but 
public revenues and consumer spending continue to decline. This displacement, not 
obvious to many, eventually erodes revenue streams to the point that overall services in 
the community decline precipitously. This decline further exacerbates the flight of those 
with skills so that, eventually, the community will have its resilience stretched to the 
breaking point. Regardless of the reasons so many choose to enter the country illegally, 
their accumulated presence in this country has significant homeland security impact.   
4. Why is FEMA still a part of the Department of Homeland Security? 
Again, a great question.  If one refers back to the opening paragraphs of this letter, DHS 
would be best focused on terrorism as this mission space seems most appropriate for a 
top-down, hierarchical approach to dealing with those challenges. The national 
government should lead this effort, and the effort should be predominantly dealt with 
through a partnership between DHS, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  All other functions found in DHS should be moved out 
into a separate agency that deals with all other significant events. If FEMA is the right 
agency to be the centerpiece is arguable, but an agency that forms partnerships with 
state and local governments instead of coercive top-down regulation-heavy regimes is 
an appropriate response on the part of the national government to deal with the 
particular needs of all the other governments in this country. Further, this agency 
should work at giving state and local governments as much flexibility as possible in 
dealing with own-source challenges. By facilitating cooperative networks of 
communities/jurisdictions a far more realistic and pragmatic approach to all hazards 
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preparedness is a logical outcome. The national government should provide the 
organization around which such networking might take place. Again, if that organization 
is FEMA, so much the better. 
5. What can the nation realistically expect from its intelligence apparatus? 
It would be unrealistic to think that the intelligence apparatus of the nation will provide 
a 100 percent shield against terrorist attacks at home or abroad. That said, the gap 
between citizen expectations and a realistic level of defense provided by our intelligence 
networks could be quite large. The nation values individual liberty and freedom, so the 
balance between aggressive intelligence gathering and intrusions, visible or otherwise, 
into that free space must be carefully weighed. In this, I am deeply conflicted. I am a 
strong civil libertarian and am also acutely aware of the needs for comprehensive 
intelligence gathering. For counsel on this matter, I have to refer to a project upon 
which I worked several years ago. 
A small research team was asked to assess the psychological impact of acts of terror 
perpetrated against our national monuments. As one might imagine, the conclusions 
were that some national monuments held universal meaning for Americans while 
others, those typically viewed in a more regional perspective, were of less significance. 
However, what I found most interesting in the project was that there were models from 
which we might be informed about the impact of persistent terrorism on a society. Over 
time, societies gain a level of resilience to such events, particularly if one can focus on 
the perpetrators and acknowledge that terror events are going to be part of the everyday 
lives of the society. Sooner or later, communities gain a sense of normalcy that allows 
for the day to day activities of people to continue. It is this normalcy that seems to be at 
the crux of the matter. 
In America today, our sense of normalcy does not include persistent attack and 
significant loss of life and property. We must deal with anxiety caused by uncertainty, 
but not the kind of uncertainty that bring life and limb into the equation. To the extent 
that acts of terror remain discreet events, such as 9/11 or the Fort Hood shootings, the 
return to “normal” will likely be much like it was after those horrendous events.  Within 
weeks, most lives in America were pretty much back to what normal was before 9/11.  
Arguably, our politics and policies have returned to a pre-9/11 posture. If, however, 
sleeper cells of jihadists, or any other groups of extremists for that matter, were to be 
discovered, or worse, were to perpetrate a deliberate and methodical terror campaign 
against randomly chosen communities, our sense of normalcy would be significantly 
affected. At that point, the nation would have to enter a transition from one state of 
normal to quite another. Along the way, the balance between civil liberty and aggressive 
intelligence gathering might tip decidedly one way. The constancy of terror through 
observed action rather than through perceived threat is problematic.  
6. How does technology contribute to homeland security, and how does it 
make us more vulnerable? 
We are perhaps the most technologically advanced nation in the world. When I ask my 
students how many of them are active in social networking, all but one or two respond 
that they routinely visit Facebook and Twitter. Getting them to cease texting in class is a 
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challenge as is getting them to close their computers so we can conduct class in a more 
traditional manner. Technology, whether I like it or not, has affected how we teach and 
more significantly, how we learn. For the most part, these advances have been positive. 
Technology permeates everything we do. We cannot start our cars, wash our clothes, 
negotiate traffic, or take a flight without near total reliance on advanced mechanization 
of some form. For these advances, I think most of us are essentially grateful, all things 
being equal. However, with all the advances in technology come many factors that make 
us more vulnerable to exploitation. 
The question posed, however, is whether or not technology contributes to homeland 
security and whether or not our technology makes us more vulnerable. I assert that the 
answer is “yes” to both. 
When viewing technology through the prism of homeland security, the ability to 
gather and process information is greatly enhanced by our technological base. However, 
I am often reminded of the old joke about the drunk who lost the keys to his car. He was 
staggering around the base of a streetlight when he was approached by a Good 
Samaritan intent on helping the wayward soul. When asked what the problem might be, 
the drunk related that he had lost his keys. When asked if he had lost the keys near the 
streetlight, the drunk responded that “no” he had not lost the keys near the streetlight, 
but the light was better there. That is how I feel about technology and gathering 
intelligence about terror and terrorists. Are we relying too heavily on technology to help 
us with this task just because “the light is better?” As has been the intelligence challenge 
for the past several decades, human intelligence is hard to develop and cultivate. 
I worry about the technology question in respect to homeland security far more from 
a societal perspective than from one of intelligence and intelligence gathering. We have 
come to depend on technology to such an extent that if the various manifestations of 
technology in our society were to be threatened or taken down, our society would grind 
to a halt. Of most significance would be the impact of losing the technological continuity 
of our already fragile economy. Imagine what would likely take place in this country if 
we were to lose the ability to use credit and debit cards, to use our cell phones, to 
dispatch trains, planes, and trucks, to meter water or electricity to cities, and to dispatch 
emergency medical support to scenes of tragic events in our communities. Technology, 
then, might be considered our society’s Achilles Heel. 
Then again, we must consider what it might take to protect all the technology upon 
which we depend and whether or not those protective tactics might not cross the line 
into significant trespass on our civil liberties. One should always be mindful of Benjamin 
Franklin’s caution that those who trade security for liberty shall eventually have neither.  
7. Are the direct and indirect costs of security – for example aviation 
security – worth the benefits? 
When I teach my principles of economics class to my undergrads, the indoctrination 
into economic theory usually begins with learning that the answer to most questions in 
the dismal science should begin with the words “it depends.” Because the question 
posed is really a question of economics, the same preamble applies. At issue is 
determining what all the costs might be and then measuring those costs against real and 
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perceived benefits. If one focuses on aviation security as the test case, then the outcomes 
might inform one’s views of other areas of interest. 
As is often the case in the study of public policy, one is often confronted by the fact 
that bureaucracies are far more comfortable in dealing with and measuring outputs 
rather than outcomes. In aviation security, those outputs might very well be focused on 
the number of passengers processed, the time it takes to process a passenger, the 
amount of contraband seized in the screening process, the number of incidents that 
occur on flights, etc. But are we actually measuring outcomes along the way? I think not. 
The key outcome of strong and successful aviation security should be a complete 
absence of security incidents either in the process of loading and unloading flights or 
while any flight is airborne, regardless of point of origin. Clearly, we have not achieved 
this outcome. Because a significant in-flight incident could potentially lead to significant 
loss of life, a zero-tolerance position is necessary, regardless of cost. A successful terror 
attack on a flight with a lot of Americans on board would ripple through the psyche and 
economy of the nation at the speed of light. As mentioned above, our sense of normalcy 
would be under withering assault. 
Though there is no definitive answer given to the question posed, perhaps what we 
should all be thinking about is the idea that in order to truly measure costs and benefits, 
we need to focus on outcomes, not outputs. Then, perhaps, we can remove some of the 
ambiguity we face in assessing policy effectiveness and can mitigate the “it depends” 
start to our answers.   
8. How important is cyber security? 
Cyber security may be the most important element of a comprehensive strategy for 
securing the nation. As discussed above, our dependence on technology is so great that 
any interruption to the continuity of cyber space would have enduring and deleterious 
effects on our well-being. Unfortunately, the average citizen and nearly all government 
officials have little understanding of the components of cyber space and the security 
thereof. We are users and, other than dealing with the occasional computer virus, 
spyware or adware, we seldom think about the infrastructure, hardware, and software 
upon which we so depend. Further, we are generally consumers as individuals or as 
members of private enterprises. We are not sensitive to reporting interruptions to 
service or other difficulties we might encounter in our daily use of computers. We are 
more than likely to unplug our machines, take them so to some “geek squad” for repair 
and then go back to business as usual. 
The networks of which our cyber domains are comprised are infinitely complex. 
Unlike thinking organisms that deal with complexity by adapting to the perceived chaos 
of an uncertain situation, our machines are simply instruments that require human 
insight, intuition, adaptability, and action to survive deliberate, methodical assaults. The 
battle to protect our cyber space is, in many ways, similar to our battle against physical 
terrorism. The threat is ever changing and ever present. However, because the 
consequences of a catastrophic cyber attack could be as devastating as the detonation of 
a nuclear weapon on a major city, the strategies for fighting cyber warfare are likewise 
similar to those we employed during the Cold War. A defense in-depth is essential, but a 
cold, focused offensive capability is just as important to deter state sponsored attacks. At 
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the national level, I have a great deal of confidence we are doing a remarkable job of 
protecting our cyber space every day. However, at the state, local, enterprise, and 
individual level, increased awareness will increase protection.  
9. Can the values of security and privacy be complementary, or must they 
be competitive? 
This question is perhaps the most intriguing of those offered. Are security and privacy 
equal values, or is one more important than the other? Are the measures of security and 
privacy found on a continuum where absolute metrics can be assigned or are the 
measures of security and privacy relational and relative? 
Recently, I stumbled across a news item that expressed the notion that people in 
America really do not expect privacy, thus privacy may be a “devalued” value. 
Technology and our interaction in social networking lower our privacy protections. I 
suppose I can understand this line of thinking, but privacy, though not protected 
explicitly by the Constitution, is certainly an expectation upon which much legal opinion 
is based. One need go no further than Roe v. Wade to find the most significant Supreme 
Court case where privacy was the principle upon which this most profound of judgments 
was made. Thus, if privacy is to be protected to the extent outlined in legal precedent, 
then surely privacy becomes a more significant value than security. 
The measure of security could then be argued to be more relative in value than is 
privacy. If security is a relative state of being, then some level of risk can be entertained 
without subverting our sense of well-being or, dare I return there, our sense of 
normalcy. The state of our security changes as conditions change. If we live in a 
neighborhood that is evolving in a negative way toward more crime, then our security 
may be significantly compromised. If we live in a country that is under constant attack 
from illegal, dangerous elements, then our relative security is eroded. The security 
quotient of our nation was changed forever after 9/11, but our state of privacy was not 
affected as much. 
Security and privacy need not be placed at competitive opposites. Privacy, an 
enduring and protected state for most Americans, should be protected without much 
sensitivity to cost. Diminished security, measured as a relative state of being, is more 
likely to be accepted if society’s situational awareness is increased. Raising awareness 
does not have to come at the expense of privacy.       
10. Under what conditions will the United States torture people? 
This question is the most troubling to me. Allow me to rephrase the question to read: 
Under what circumstances will officials of the United States government, on behalf of 
the American people, resort to intelligence gathering tactics than could be defined by a 
reasonable person as torture? This phrasing of the question seems to offer a much 
clearer picture of the conundrum that our intelligence operatives should address before 
taking any actions. Had this question been in the forefront of our intelligence-gathering 
activities in the aftermath of 9/11, perhaps we would not have to address this situation at 
all. 
Hardly anyone involved in the intelligence activities related to 9/11 and the two wars 
we are fighting will read this letter or this journal. At issue is an American value of 
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decency and respect for human life. Though the fabric of the nation is currently littered 
with contradictions to this precept, most Americans still adhere to the notion that we, as 
a people, should be above resorting to questionable forms of interrogation to gather 
information, regardless of what might be at stake. The first question could be shunted 
off as a hypothetical that does not require an answer. The first question could be 
dismissed because some would say that if American lives are at stake, any technique is 
justified. There is one caveat that might bring us to a different conclusion: What would 
we have done under the same circumstances? 
History is replete with stories of dutiful individuals following orders, doing what they 
thought was best under the circumstances. I can relate to my own experiences in 
stressful situations, resorting to actions that, in the calm of a later day, I wanted to 
reconsider. My statement here in no way relieves those that violated that perceived 
value of decency; I offer the statement so that others will be more considerate in their 
judgments of those who are faced with difficult choices that might very well affect the 
security of the nation. 
11. Is it necessary to understand Islam to develop an effective 
counterterrorism policy? 
There is a short, concise answer to this question: yes. Yet understanding Islam as a 
religion will not likely give us the necessary insights into the mindset of those who wish 
to do us harm in the name of Allah. We need to understand the gang mentality, the 
sense of desperation, the sense of zealotry, and the concept that there are people on this 
earth who truly hate America and all for which it stands. We should, however, be totally 
unapologetic about this nation and our system of values. 
We need to embrace the notion that America is an exceptional country with 
exceptional people living here. We need to embrace the notion that we provide 25 
percent of the economy of the world. Our productivity and work ethic are the envy of the 
world. Even the poorest among us lives a relatively safe and secure life. We are a nation 
that believes in individual freedom, accountability, and merit. We resist collectivism and 
any form of suppression, whether that suppression is of our speech or practice of 
religion. We resist the suppression of groups of people because of their color, gender, 
age, or station in life. Because we embrace liberty, individual freedom, and merit, our 
value system is a direct threat to those who seek tyranny, whether they be sectarian or 
secular in their persuasions. As long as this great nation exists, there will be those who 
will want to destroy everything we treasure. That’s OK, because we are a nation of laws, 
not men, so we will, as a nation, endure. 
12. What can the homeland security enterprise learn from the apparent 
success managing the H1N1 pandemic? 
The answer to this question is relatively short: it’s too early to tell if we can learn 
anything valuable from the “pandemic” identified with the H1N1 strain of influenza. To 
date, there have been approximately 12,000 deaths attributed to this particular disease, 
a far cry from what was predicted early on. Perhaps the outbreak was not as bad as was 
first anticipated or perhaps we were so efficient in our response that we were able to 
mitigate an otherwise dangerous situation. We need to let the dust settle on this before 
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arriving at conclusions about success or failure. Whether there are positive lessons for 
those of us with homeland security responsibilities is yet to be determined. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. I look forward to a lively dialogue on 
these and other questions that will arise during the next year. As we are all focused on 
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